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SOME COMMENTS ON TILLICH'S DOCTRINE OF CREATION

by The Rev. J. HEYWOOD THOMAS

The doctrine of Creation has occupied theologians very much in recent years and in this Paul Tillich has not been an exception.

His doctrine of Creation is one of the most fundamental parts of his system inasmuch as it is an important element in his definition of God as 'the ground of Being' and an equally important element in his doctrine of man as a finite creature. God is not a being, He is being-itself or the ground of being. He is the power of being—the power inherent in everything of resisting nonbeing.

> Being-itself infinitely transcends every finite being. There is no proportion or gradation between the finite and the infinite. There is an absolute break, an infinite 'jump'. On the other hand, everything finite participates in being-itself and in its infinity. Otherwise it would not have the power of being. It would be swallowed by nonbeing, or it would never have emerged out of nonbeing.[1]

The implications of Tillich's doctrine of creation with regard to his doctrine of man are almost completely implications of the way he understands *creatio ex nihilo*.[2] Thus for him the Christian doctrine of *creatio ex nihilo* affirms that there is an element of nonbeing in all finite existence. In this brief discussion I want to consider the crucial question of whether this interpretation of the doctrine is justified and acceptable. There are, of course, innumerable difficulties in this traditional formulation of the Christian doctrine of creation; and with most of these we shall not concern ourselves. We shall not discuss, for example, whether *creatio ex nihilo* can in fact be used as a formulation of the Christian doctrine. Dr Arnold Ehrhardt has pointed out the fact that several instances of the use of this phrase are not identical with, but largely contradictory of, the biblical idea of creation.[3] But it is sufficient for our purposes

[1] Tillich, *Systematic Theology* (Chicago Univ. Press), vol. I, p. 237.
[2] cf. ibid., p. 183f.
[3] A. Ehrhardt, 'Creatio ex nihilo', *Studia Theologica*, vol. IV, pp. 14ff.

that the phrase has been used to mean just this idea, and we shall therefore assume that whenever a Christian theologian does use it this is what he wishes it to mean.

Tillich quite rightly says that the formula must be understood as the critical negation of dualism; but I wish to maintain that his picture is not monistic and that ultimately the way Tillich interprets '*creatio ex nihilo*' lands us back with the dualism it was meant to rebut. But first I shall examine the claim that '*creatio ex nihilo*' 'is the mark of distinction between paganism, even in its most refined form, and Christianity, even in its most primitive form'.[1] If Tillich means this to refer to what we have called the biblical idea then we can agree. But it is not clear that this is what he does mean, and it seems more likely that he means to refer to the very expression *creatio ex nihilo*. At least he has never retracted the historical claim in the face of criticism. Now the only instance of the occurrence in biblical literature of the phrase *creatio ex nihilo*, as far as I am aware, is 2 Maccabees 7.28. The Maccabean mother says to her youngest son:

> I beseech thee, my son, look upon the heaven and the earth and all that is therein, and consider that God made them out of things that were not; and so was mankind made likewise. . . .

For 'out of things that were not' the Greek text has οὐκ ἐξ ὄντων which the Vulgate translates as 'ex nihilo'. Tillich might counter any argument from this evidence alone by saying that this source can hardly be called pagan. But, leaving aside the question of a possible philosophical influence on the language of this section of 2 Maccabees, the text is certainly pre-Christian and this must mean that Tillich's claim as it stands is not valid. We can also quote Philo on this; for though Philo's general tendency, as E. Bréhier has shown,[2] is the Hellenistic conception of God as the Creator as an artificer, *De Opificio Mundi*, xvi, 4, and *De Somniis*, i, 76, are notable exceptions, and as Bréhier points out the Armenian translator of *De Deo*, vi, represents matter as created by God.[3]

More especially pagan sources in which there are references

[1] *Systematic Theology*, vol. 1, p. 253.
[2] E. Bréhier, *Les Idées philosophiques et religieuses de Philon de l'Alexandrie*, pp. 78-82.
[3] ibid., p. 81, n. 2.

to the doctrine are Pseudo-Aristotle and Plutarch. The first says:

> That things which are non-existent come into being and that many things have come into being out of non-existence, has been said not just by nobodies, but by men who have a reputation of being wise. Already Hesiod holds that 'the Chaos was made first and after this the wide earth (Gaia), the everlasting, safe foundation of the universe, and after that Eros who stands out amongst all the immortals, and they say everything arose out of that triad, and that out of nothing.[1]

Plutarch is more explicit on the point of the source as he says:

> . . . for the creation did not take place out of the non-existent, but out of that which was not beautiful and insufficient.[2]

From these references it seems clear that in post-Aristotelian philosophy the doctrine of *creatio ex nihilo* gained considerable ground. Dr Ehrhardt points out that the starting-point of the doctrine can be seen in the early Greek philosophical concern with the definition of μὴ ὄν which meant not so much something which was not there as 'untruth, something which has no right to be there'. He also notes that this physical contrast is then turned into a moral contrast in Xeniades of Corinth.[3]

So much for Tillich's historical claim. The other point I want to raise is a systematic criticism. Tillich's assertion[4] that the word *ex* in the formula *creatio ex nihilo* refers to the 'origin of the creature' seems to me highly misleading. For it would suggest that the classical statement of the Christian doctrine of Creation is an affirmative statement rather than a negative one. It has been well said that the meaning of the creeds is always to be sought in what they denied rather than what they affirmed. 'God created the world out of nothing' though grammatically the same as 'Sybil Connolly has created some wonderful things out of Irish tweed' or 'Picasso has created a very mystifying art out of realism and cubism' is not logically parallel with either. It is much nearer the kind of thing we mean when we say 'Lord Nuffield made his fortune out of an idea.' Here the paradox is meant to remind us that Lord Nuffield did not start with a family fortune which he has now successfully multiplied. Thus it is not descriptive in a straightforward way, and the 'out of'

[1] Pseudo-Aristotle, *De XZG*, 1, 975a, 8. [2] Plutarch, *De Anim. Procr.*, v, 1014b.
[3] Ehrhardt, op. cit., p. 25. [4] *Systematic Theology*, vol. 1, p. 253.

is descriptive only in a very odd sense. If we want to know the origin of the Nuffield fortune we should want a very different kind of description. Similarly, the *ex* in *creatio ex nihilo* is not descriptive, and does not 'refer to' anything. This leads us on to Tillich's further statement—' "Nothing" is what (or where) [the creature] comes from.' If what we have said is right then *a fortiori* the word *nihil* is not to be interpreted thus. It is quite useless then for Tillich to go on to try to define this *nihil*:

> Now 'nothing' can mean two things. It can mean the absolute negation of being (*ouk on*), or it can mean the relative negation of being (*me on*). If *ex nihilo* meant the latter, it would be a restatement of the Greek doctrine of matter and form against which it is directed. If *ex nihilo* meant the absolute negation of being, it could not be the origin of the creature. Nevertheless the term *ex nihilo* says something fundamentally important about the creature, namely, that it must take over what might be called 'the heritage of nonbeing'. Creatureliness implies nonbeing but creatureliness is more than nonbeing. It carries in itself the power of being, and this power of being is its participation in being—itself, in the creative ground of being.[1]

I do not see how we can attach any meaning to this concept of nonbeing—at least, any such meaning as Tillich seems to think it does possess. It is, of course, clear to all who are familiar with Heidegger's work that this is the source of Tillich's use of the term 'Nonbeing'. Following Heidegger he takes nonbeing personally as '*das Nichts*'. Man, he says,

> must be separated from his being in a way which enables him to look at it as something strange and questionable. And such a separation is actual because man participates not only in being but also in nonbeing. . . . It is not by chance that historically the recent rediscovery of the ontological question has been guided by pre-Socratic philosophy and that systematically there has been an overwhelming emphasis on the problem of nonbeing.[2]

But this emphasis has been characteristic only of Heidegger and the other existentialist philosophers, and this is one of the instances where the majority of philosophers would apply Occam's razor. His idea of nonbeing is in fact merely the hypostatisation of a negation such as Lewis Carroll used in his humorous dialogue of the King and the Messenger.

> 'Who did you pass on the road?' the King went on, holding out his hand to the Messenger for some more hay. 'Nobody,' said the Messenger.
>
> 'That's right,' said the King: 'This young lady saw him too. So of course Nobody walks slower than you.'

[1] *Systematic Theology*, vol. 1, p. 253.
[2] ibid., vol. 1, p. 187.

'I do my best' said the Messenger in a sullen tone. 'I'm sure nobody walks much faster than I do.'

'He can't do that,' said the King, 'or he'd have been here first.'

This dialogue reveals the peculiarity of the word 'nobody' as being a class rather than an individual like its opposite 'somebody'. It also reveals how natural a tendency it is to identify words as referring to objects, which is what lies behind Tillich's concept of nonbeing. The fallacy that the existence of a word means the existence of a thing results in a great deal of confusion in Tillich's thought. But it is quite fallacious to hold with Mill[1] that a significant proposition implies 'the real existence of the subject because in the case of a non-existent subject there is nothing for the proposition to assert', for we can significantly use descriptions which describe nothing, because these descriptions do not refer to any particular which is a constituent of the proposition. To see the error of Tillich's use of 'nonbeing' rather more clearly we may examine the hoary statement 'Unicorns exist'. Now we might think that there must be a sense of 'exist' or 'there are' in which it is true that there are unicorns and equally another sense in which it is true that there are no unicorns. The second assertion would then be equivalent to 'Unicorns are unreal'. This sense of 'are' must be such that we can describe 'being real' or 'being unreal' as a property like 'being yellow'. But this is not the case, and 'are unreal' is an expression which denies existence rather than asserts any special kind of existence. Similarly, the only meaning we can give to 'nonbeing' is the denial of the 'being' of something. Therefore to say that 'creatureliness implies nonbeing' either is a useless tautology or is meaningless. That is, we can give it meaning by defining the term 'being' as meaning only the existence or the reality which is God's as Creator. From this it will necessarily follow that any Creature's existence is nonbeing, that being a creature will imply nonbeing. But this is not anything more than giving creatureliness another name and does not tell us anything about what it means to be a creature. And if we do not mean this then we are committed to a meaningless Manicheism, such as is sometimes wrongly attributed to Augustine. For Augustine creation *de nihilo* is

[1] J. S. Mill, *Logic*, bk. 1, vi, 2.

simply creation, and creatureliness means a being which is not God's and therefore not unchangeable.[1] Thus he says:

> When we say . . . that because it is made from nothing and not from God we do not give the Nothing any nature; but we do distinguish the nature of the Maker from the nature of the things that are made.[2]

What Tillich has done is to make the 'nothing' out of which we come a something with fatal power. Hence, as I suggested, we are once more faced with Dualism.

[1] Mutability is inseparable from creatureliness, according to Augustine—see *Contra Julianum opus imperfectum*, v, 42.
[2] *Contra Julianum op. imp.*, v, 44.

THE CHRISTOLOGICAL DETERMINANT IN BARTH'S DOCTRINE OF CREATION

by The Rev. Professor DAN L. DEEGAN

Karl Barth's Christological formulation has taken with increasing seriousness the participation of Christ in the creaturely mode of existence. His effort to interpret the Chalcedonian dogma concerning reality of Jesus Christ as two natures, God and man, united without confusion, change, division, or separation, has contributed to his conception of the creature as existing with its own proper mode of being and activity. We are not concerned to trace in detail in this essay the developments in Barth's thought which have led to modification in his understanding of creation. Fundamentally, Barth recognises that the theology of Crisis characteristic of the second edition of his *Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans* so emphasised the timeless and transcendental character of revelation that it had no place for a conception of creaturely being and time as constitutive of the incarnation.[1]

Von Balthasar has observed that a concept of nature was lacking, for there was no place for the substantiality of the creature. The tension between grace and nature was so sharply drawn that the transcendence of nature in revelation became the denial of the contingent independence of created being.[2] The concept of God as existing in infinite qualitative difference from the world rendered impossible a proper concept of the life of Jesus as integral to the incarnation. The death of Jesus was seen as the real moment disclosing the meaning of Jesus as the Christ, for this is the moment in which the over-againstness of the finite to God is overcome. The present theology of Paul Tillich still strongly suggests this way of viewing Jesus as the Christ. Jesus of Nazareth becomes the Christ precisely when He achieves uninterrupted unity with the ground of being in His

[1] Karl Barth, *Church Dogmatics* I.2, trans. G. T. Thomson and Harold Knight T. & T. Clark (Edinburgh, 1956), p. 50; *C.D.* II.1, p. 635. Refer also to Barth, *Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans*, trans. Edwyn Hoskyns (Oxford University Press, London, 1933), p. 103.

[2] Hans Urs von Balthasar, *Karl Barth: Darstellung und Deutung seiner Theologie* (Im Summa-Verlag zu Olten: Hegner Bücherei, 1951), p. 78f.

death. The real medium of revelation overcomes its own finite condition by sacrificing it.[1] We may recall Barth's own earlier assertions that Jesus Christ is the dissolution of history because His death discloses the unity of the creature in God, a unity in which the duality between creature and creator is overcome. Now, however, Barth warns against 'monism' as the outcome of theological reflection.[2] The creaturely reality of Jesus Christ is no mere vehicle for revelation, pointing to that which is supra-historical and wholly transcendent, so that the humanity finally disappears. Where Jesus Christ is really known, there is no place for monistic thinking. There can only be thinking in which deity and humanity each has its own distinctive character.

The modification in Barth's thought which is of primary concern for the purpose of this essay is nowhere better illustrated than in his refusal to speak of God in terms of 'the infinite qualitative difference' and to construe the incarnation as paradox.[3] Such concepts make it impossible for us to affirm the reality of the union in Jesus Christ which occurs in the freedom of God to be genuinely present to the creature. When Barth says that in his *Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans*, John 1.14 'does not have justice done to it', he is referring to the fact that in Jesus Christ God's Word binds itself in union with actual creaturely existence.[4]

The purpose of this essay is first, to indicate Barth's conception of the relation between Creator and creature as the presupposition for the activity of reconciling grace; second, to examine his doctrine of Jesus Christ as the basis and meaning of the divine creative will; and third, to ask in conclusion whether or not the manner in which Barth relates his Christology to the doctrine of creation enables him to take with full serious-

[1] Paul Tillich, *Systematic Theology*, vol. I (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1951), p. 133. We take exception to the interpretation of Tillich's Christology offered by A. T. Mollegen in his essay 'Christology and Biblical Criticism in Tillich' in *The Theology of Paul Tillich* (Macmillan, New York, 1952), pp. 230-45. Mollegen says that the general tenor of Tillich's Christology stands with the classical dogma concerning the two natures. Actually, the way in which Tillich interprets the death of Christ means that the doctrine of Jesus Christ as continuing to be both God and man cannot have justice done to it.

[2] *C.D.* IV.1, p. 10.

[3] *C.D.* IV.1, p. 186.

[4] *C.D.* I.2, p. 147. T. H. L. Parker in *Studies in the Fourth Gospel*, ed. F. L. Cross (Mowbray, London, 1957), shows the extent to which Johannine writings have shaped Barth's mature theology. This is especially true of John 1.14.

ness Christ's participation in the mode of existence proper to man as creature. Throughout, it is our purpose to show that Barth is genuinely concerned with the ontological implications of revelation. The doctrine of the Creator-creature relation is one of the points at which this concern for ontology emerges in Barth. His own criticism of his earlier theological views may in part be interpreted as his awareness of the dependence of faith in the Gospel upon the ontological affirmation of creation.

The conception of creation involves first the transcendence and aseity of the Creator. God is to be regarded in His own existence as independent of the world He has created. This means that His essential nature is distinct from and not identical with the nature of that which He creates. God has an independent life of His own, and if this is so, then clearly there is neither an identity between His being and the being of the world nor any necessity for creation. The absoluteness of God does not derive primarily from the fact of His relationship to creation. God has His own mode of being in Himself and this is specified primarily quite apart from His relation to another. Creation is not an activity in which God fulfils His own being. Creation is not constitutive of the plenitude of God's being because He has this plenitude in Himself.[1] This point is expressed clearly in Irenaeus:

> . . . The things established are distinct from Him who has established them, and what has been made from Him who has made them. For he is Himself uncreated, both without beginning and end, and lacking in nothing. He is Himself sufficient for Himself; and still further, He grants to all others this very thing, existence; but the things which have been made by Him have received a beginning. But whatever things had a beginning and are liable to a dissolution, and are subject to stand in need of Him who made them, must necessarily in all respects have a different term [applied to them] . . . so that He indeed who made all things can alone, together with His Word, properly be termed God and Lord: but the things that have been made cannot have this term applied to them. . . .[2]

The idea of creation means also the positing by God of finite existents as distinct beings with their own created essence

[1] *C.D.* II.1, p. 309. Barth is more consistent than Thomas Aquinas on the problem of the freedom of creation. Aquinas tries to explain creation as good in the sense of the diffusion of goodness on the part of an all-perfect being. Arthur Lovejoy in *The Great Chain of Being* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1953), pp. 65-98, rightly indicates that this view is antithetical to the concept of the freedom of creation.

[2] Irenaeus, *Against the Heresies*, book II, ch. 8, sec. 3.

and their own created existence. While the freedom of God is to be understood primarily as His own positive freedom, it is secondarily to be understood as freedom to enter into relationship with that which is other than Himself. In His activity as Creator, God allows the creature to exist in distinction from Himself. God's relation to the world, binding Himself to it in freedom, yet distinguishing Himself from it, is the relation of the Lord, who has really created the world, in its existence, and who continues to have and affirm His own existence over against it.

It is in this connexion that Barth is critical of the classical interpretation of God's aseity, for God's independence is defined in such negative terms that He cannot relate Himself positively to creaturely time and history. One of the primary criticisms directed by Ritschl against the concept of divine aseity is that it construes God as absolute being, standing outside of all relations with creatures.[1] Barth's interpretation of God's aseity enables us to take account of Ritschl's criticism without abandoning, as Ritschl did, the concept of aseity itself. If the freedom of God means primarily that God is self-sufficient, dependent neither on the world nor any other power for His being, it means also the constancy and reliability of God's decision in relation to the world created and sustained by Him. God is free to have authentic relations with creatures even while maintaining the consistency and constancy of His divine intention. His freedom over creation involves His freedom to act in the sphere of creation, and to be the subject of a real history with the creatures.

In His freedom, God relates Himself to the creature which has its own degree of 'operational efficacy'. We may use the latter phrase to indicate that the creature is not simply a function of the expression of God's own being and action, but possesses a mode of being in its own right, such that it is a genuine other to God. One of the important facets, therefore, of Barth's doctrine of creation is the notion that created beings have been given a definite nature, an essence of their own,

[1] Albrecht Ritschl, *Theologie und Metaphysik* (Adolph Marcus, Bonn, 1881), p. 17. See also H. R. Mackintosh, *The Person of Christ* (T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh, 1913), p. 473. Mackintosh speaks of God's self-consistency which reveals itself in the mobility of grace. Sheer unchangeableness is not the proper way of describing God's essential nature of holy love.

which determines their mode of being and action. While creation is the donation of being by *God*, and thus each being is forever dependent upon Him, creation is also the donation of *being*, the activity of existing, which has a particular mode. This mode is the essence of the being, the nature which it has in existing. As possessing this power of being and this nature, the creature can operate causally within the finite order. The nature which the creature has determines the form which its activity takes and thus the relations which it has to other finite entities. As a creature it is the centre of structural and dynamic aspects, making it causally effective on the one hand and structurally intelligible on the other. 'The benefit of creation consists in the fact that the creature may be and therefore is, through its Creator; that it is in its own creaturely mode, conditioned and determined by its dependence on the being of the Creator, and therefore distinct from and not to be compared with Him; but that it really is. . . .'[1]

H. R. Mackintosh some years ago wrote that Barth's predominant thought of creation is '*creatio continua*, the ever-renewed calling into existence by God of the whole world of finite things'.[2] T. F. Torrance utilises the phrase '*creatio continua*' in his introductory essay in the volume *The School of Faith*, p. ciii. This phrase is only to be employed with caution, for it may tend to suggest a doctrine of 'occasionalism' in which there is no real causality granted to finite being. Barth himself clearly recognises the danger here, because he now says that the creature, while dependent on the *operatio* of God, has an *operatio* of its own. The Creator's activity does not absorb the activity of the creature or blot it out.[3] The freedom of God is the freedom to grant real coexistence with Himself to another. While in its existence created being is dependent upon God, from whom it derives its being, nevertheless, in so far as it possesses a real nature of its own, it confronts God as another being.

Creation establishes the order within which the history can

[1] *C.D.* III.1, p. 244.

[2] H. R. Mackintosh, *Types of Modern Theology* (Nisbet, London, 1937), p. 314.

[3] *Kirchliche Dogmatik* III.2, p. 105. See also p. 98 where Barth, in reference to 1 Cor. 15.28 says: 'That God will then be all in all does not mean that all created being will no longer exist . . . but that He in the final completion of his revelation . . . will have come to His goal with His creature without ceasing to be differentiated from the creature.'

transpire between God and man when God wills to reveal Himself to man and address man. This history *presupposes* the structural relationship between the Creator and creature which we have thus far delineated. The man addressed by God who is summoned to participation in the reality of revelation is already the man who exists in differentiation from God. The creatureliness and identity of man as subject are not eliminated by grace but rather fulfilled by it, for grace presupposes the distinctness of man in relation to God. The divine activity in reconciliation does not exclude but includes the continuation and fulfilment of the life of the creature as a genuine 'other' over against God. The incarnation is the confirmation of the distinctive reality of creation, for in the fact that God becomes one with creation, there is revealed that God and creation as such are two distinct realities.

A serious doctrine of the incarnation requires the affirmation that Jesus Christ existed as a creature among creatures.[1] The term *physis* in the Chalcedonian formula refers to the being of man in its unity and its totality. The prejudice against the term 'nature' in much modern criticism of the formula rests frequently on a refusal to acknowledge the realism of the biblical message.[2] It is true that one of the reasons why Barth is critical of the way in which the term 'nature' was used even in the Fathers, is that it did not express sufficiently the historical character of the relation between God and man in Jesus Christ, and tended to be used somewhat impersonally. Yet the history which occurs in the incarnation presupposes the distinctive structure and operation of the finite mode of existence as having its reality within the union in the incarnation. 'The concept of the true humanity of Jesus Christ is . . . basic in exactly the same and not a lesser sense than that of His true deity. The humanity of Jesus Christ is not a secondary moment in the Christ-event, it is not something which happens later, and later again will pass and disappear. . . . Like His deity, it is integral to the whole event.'[3]

On the one hand, the incarnation is not an identification of the human nature with the divine. Over against the tendency

[1] *C.D.* IV.2, p. 38.
[2] *C.D.* I.2, p. 130. See also the discussion of *physis* in George Hendry, *The Gospel of the Incarnation* (The Westminster Press, Philadelphia, 1958), 49-61.
[3] *C.D.* IV.2, p. 35.

of Lutheran Christology to conceive the humanity of Christ as deified by God's being in the sense of omnipotence, omniscience, and impassibility, Barth insists that Christ's humanity was genuinely characterised by limitations appropriate to the finite creature. On the other hand, the two natures of Christ are not to be viewed as existing simply parallel to one another; they are not like 'two planks of wood glued together'.[1] There is a real communion and confrontation between the two natures. The statement of Chalcedon is again essential: If the divine and human natures are *inconfuse*, they are also *inseparabiliter*. There is a real reciprocity and mutuality expressed in the history of God with man and the history of man with God in Jesus Christ. The twofold character of this incarnational history emphasises not only God's efficacious participation in our human situation, but likewise also the reality of Christ's human knowing and willing as integral to the responsiveness and obedience of His humanity in union with God. D. M. Baillie's judgment that Barth's theology is a 'Logotheism because it is strictly a theology of the Word of God rather than of the Incarnation of the Son of God, the Word made flesh', is a judgment needing substantial revision in the light of the later volumes of the *Dogmatic*.[2] The place which Barth wishes to give to the earthly life of Jesus means that he wishes to take seriously Christ's participation in the creaturely mode of existence.

We may further clarify this point by referring to Barth's interpretation of the *communicatio operationum*. This indicates the effective confrontation not only of the divine nature with the human, but also of the human with the divine. In this activity, the human word and obedience of Jesus Christ correspond to the divine Word.[3] While traditional dogmatics has interpreted the states of humiliation and exaltation in Jesus Christ primarily as successive, Barth argues that they belong together simultaneously. In the twofold movement to which the *communicatio operationum* refers, we may speak of the humiliation in Jesus Christ as the act of God's love, His freedom

[1] *C.D.* IV.2, p. 70. See also the 'Formula of Concord', Article 8.

[2] See D. M. Baillie, *God Was in Christ* (Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1948), p. 53. Barth declares in *C.D.* IV.2, p. 35: 'The truth is that this human history, "the earthly life of Jesus", belongs with the act of God to that which is revealed.'

[3] *C.D.* IV.2, p. 106.

to condescend graciously to us and be present in our situation. But we are to think likewise of the movement of exaltation, the way in which Christ's human obedience is wrought out in correspondence to the Divine Will. The incarnation shows us that revelation is not only an Act of God but real act of man in obedience to the Word of God. This human obedience does not play merely an instrumental, but an integral and essential part in the incarnation. When the incarnation is interpreted in terms of the humiliation and the exaltation which occur in the history of Jesus Christ, we see most clearly how Barth wishes to uphold the two natures in their distinctness and in their real union. This union requires us to take seriously the distinction between Creator and creature which is not abrogated in the incarnation.

Having thus far in our essay examined this distinction between Creator and creature and its significance for Barth's doctrine of the two natures in Jesus Christ, we turn now to examine the conception of Jesus Christ as the basis and meaning of the divine creative will. Both the differentiation of the creature from God and its substantiality are linked directly by Barth to the reality of Jesus Christ. It is our contention that precisely here, Barth's primary thought-form passes from that of realism to idealism. By 'realism' in this context we mean the affirmation of the independent reality of God and the substantiality of the creature in its relation to God, i.e. the determination of the finite existent as having its own operation grounded in the order of creation. The element of idealism in Barth's thought manifests itself in the way in which Barth links all cosmological and anthropological reality directly to Jesus Christ as the prius, both ontologically and noetically, for all other being. Barth has long been aware of the contribution of both realism and idealism in his theological expression.[1] If the function of realism is to emphasise the reality and nature of God as the independent ground of all relation of God with creation, the function of idealism is to emphasise the fact that God veils Himself even in giving Himself to be known. The concept of veiling refers not only to the way in which God confronts man in Jesus Christ; it is likewise employed as a

[1] Karl Barth, 'Schicksal und Idee in der Theologie', *Theologische Fragen und Antworten* (Evangelischer Verlag A.G. Zollikon, Zürich, 1957) pp. 54ff.

concept by means of which all creation is related directly to the concreteness of the divine will as expressed in Jesus Christ. In other words, this concept of veiling has not only its noetic aspect, but also its ontological aspect. The point from which the grasp of revelation begins is thus also the point where one must start to explain the order of being. Revelation does not simply disclose an antecedent situation which exists in its own right, rather it discloses the relation between nature and grace which can never be derived from or understood from the situation of nature alone. This relation is, in other words, not a given state (*Zustand*) of nature, but is mediated only through the primary act of God's grace in Jesus Christ, the point of intensity and concreteness in the expression of the divine decision. This point is essentially above nature yet the basis of it. 'Idealism signifies the breaking (*Brechung*) and precisely in this manner the strengthening of the cognition of the given: the break consists in the questioning of its realistic self-evidence; the strengthening, in the foundation of its genuine relation.'[1] The given situation of natural existence must be transcended and understood in the light of grace and not an immanent state of nature.

Nature, in its innermost core, is finally constituted by its relation to Jesus Christ. It is our contention that the idealistic component in Barth's thought presses hard against the maintenance of realism in the understanding of Jesus Christ as two natures, God and man, in their union and distinction. When Barth speaks of creation, God's first work, as the veil of the second, the work of reconciliation, he tends to suggest that the absolute actuality of Jesus Christ is already contained in the divine decision in such a way that it overarches the reality of creation even before the incarnation comes to pass as event with its earthly-historical component. Looking back on the past of the man Jesus, one does not stop at the limit which marks His entry into the history and time of all other men. '. . . Jesus Christ, the incarnate word, the baby born in Bethlehem, the man put to death at Golgotha and raised again in the garden of Joseph of Arimathea, . . . is there at the beginning of all things.'[2] The time of Jesus Christ is the real time, and as such this time exists in the immediacy of God's

[1] Barth, op. cit., p. 76. [2] *C.D.* IV.1, p. 53.

eternity. Thus, this time embraces and dominates the time before as well as the time after the earthly manifestation of Jesus Christ. This is to be seen in Barth's declaration that while Jesus's resurrection and final *parousia* are for us two events, they are for God a single event.[1] The differentiation in time here applies to the finite mode of apprehension but in God's eternity what will be manifest at the *parousia* is already present.

Jesus' history is the prototype of all time. This prototypal character of the actuality of Jesus Christ suggests that the history disclosed in the incarnation is determined so exclusively in God's eternity that Barth fails to preserve sufficiently the emphasis so clearly delineated in his interpretation of the *communicatio operationum*, i.e. that God in Jesus Christ actually relates Himself to real human time and history so that an event comes to pass which makes a difference to God Himself. While Barth wishes to avoid thinking of Jesus Christ as only an 'afterthought' in the mind of God, nevertheless he fails to preserve a real distinction between the intention of God to become incarnate and the event of the incarnation itself. We shall clarify this point more fully by turning to certain aspects of the relation between Jesus Christ and creation, in which the proleptic and symbolic character of creation appears, in its relation to grace, uppermost in Barth's thought.

The knowledge of creation is based upon an *intelligere* which proceeds from the *credere*. Faith in God the Creator is really derivative from the confession of Jesus Christ who contains the secret of creation, that it takes place for the sake of the history of salvation. Jesus Christ is the origin, the basis and the constitutive centre of the whole course of God's relation with the world. God's relation to the world as Creator is 'bound up with the special nature of His presence in His revealing and reconciling work *ontologically*, in its reality, and *not merely noetically*, as far as our knowledge of it goes'.[2] The general course of events in nature has finally no independent significance, for such events are rightly understood only as they point toward and refer to the concrete centre of God's activity in Jesus Christ. If our interpretation at this point is correct, we may take exception to the judgment expressed by John Marsh that Barth speaks of *Christus praesens* as a reality only in the fulfilled

[1] *C.D.* III.2, p. 588. [2] *C.D.* II.1, p. 478.

time of the revelatory event. Marsh himself argues that Jesus Christ is the reality beyond and beneath the phenomena of the events of nature and history, and that as this reality he gives identity and meaning to events both before and after the incarnation.[1] Actually, Barth himself tends to express the matter in a similar way.

Barth's theological interpretation of nature becomes an essay in the symbolism of grace. This symbolism is no mere poetical licence; there is a cognitive relationship between nature and the work of grace which corresponds to an ontological and factual connexion. If the works of creation are used as images of the events of salvation history, it is because they are originally and properly by reason of their creation the image of these things and from the outset ordained to serve this purpose. We may put the matter thus: The alteration of *credo* in the first article of the Creed into *intelligo* is noetically what the alteration of natural existence into significative reality is in the ontological sphere. An interesting affinity between Barth and the Christian Platonists of Alexandria can be drawn at this point, for it is Origen who speaks of the 'eternal gospel', in the light of which Christ is seen as the mystery through whom alone the events of nature and history are understood.

We may cite three examples which illustrate how, for Barth, the works of creation serve as signs for grace. The Old Testament knowledge of heaven and earth is a promise and prototype (*Vorbild*) of the true messianic union of God and man in Jesus Christ. The ordered cosmos of heaven and earth provides, in other words, a distinction and yet interconnexion which is symbolic of the relation of God and man in Jesus Christ. Likewise, the establishment of light is a sign of the illumination of God's word in Jesus Christ, a promise of the history of salvation. The revelation of grace has already its prototype and sign in the creation of light.[2] The relation between man and woman which is established in creation is a reflection of the relation between Christ and the Church. The manner in which Jesus Christ exists for other men finally constitutes the truth and reality of human existence as such. These examples show us

[1] John Marsh, 'Christ in the Old Testament', *Essays in Christology for Karl Barth* (Lutterworth Press, London, 1956), pp. 41ff.

[2] *C.D.* III.1, p. 119.

how creaturely reality is sign and promise of that which in His grace God discloses to man. Jesus Christ is not simply the illumination of creation (*ordo cognoscendi*). He is related to the being and existence of the creature as such (*ordo essendi*). Outside of the reality of Jesus Christ as the primary point of congruity between nature and grace, we can deal with creation only phenomenally, because awareness of the essential character of creaturely existence rests wholly and exclusively upon God's act in Jesus Christ. Idealism finds expression in Barth's thought precisely as the distinction between the real and the phenomenal becomes important when Barth relates nature to Jesus Christ. This is clearly to be seen in Barth's conception of human nature.

That man is not a mere phenomenon but really human depends ontologically on the fact that he is not without Jesus Christ. The realisation of this relationship with Christ transcends the immanent possibilities of human nature as such and is never a given factor or constant but is ever renewed by God's act. While it is not an inherent condition (*Zustand*), the being of man *as creature* is determined by his relationship with the primary history (*Urgeschichte*) occurring in Jesus Christ. This history precedes and underlies the whole course of man's history with God. Yet in this way, Barth tends to make the criterion of the eternal divine decision in Jesus Christ the exclusive criterion for the reality of the history which actually occurs in the incarnation. When Barth tries to clarify the proper status and activity of created being, his thinking does not come to rest until it reaches the christological basis from which all such being is derived. The order of creaturely activity, distinguished by its own structure of operation and serving as the presupposition for the work of grace, tends finally to become merged with the actuality of grace itself. This way in which Barth relates christology to his doctrine of creation affects directly his effort to grant a proper place to human history and activity within the incarnation itself.

We may ask whether or not further modification of Barth's thought in the direction of realism would not serve more adequately the true intention of his christology. In other words, the distinctive mode of creaturely activity we would affirm to be genuinely presupposed (*ordo essendi*) by the incarnation.

Contemporary christology needs to look not only at the Chalcedonian formula of A.D. 451, but also at the affirmation in A.D. 681 that in Jesus Christ there are really two wills. The further clarification provided by the definition of A.D. 681 followed the monophysite and monothelite controversies, in which the reality of Jesus' humanity was genuinely obscured. The dogma of A.D. 681 states explicitly that there are in Christ 'two natural wills and two natural energies without confusion, change, division or separation . . .'. Barth, himself, explicitly affirms that the thinking of those was right who, in the so-called monothelite controversy in the seventh century, upheld and eventually led to victory the doctrine that along with the true human nature of the God-man there must likewise be affirmed his true human will, different from the will of God although never independent of it.[1] It is Barth's own emphasis on the reality of the union between the two natures which leads him to stress the essential mutuality and reciprocity of the divine and the human in Jesus Christ. The fidelity and constancy of God's love in His act of condescension so effectively enters our creaturely sphere that Jesus' human will is fulfilled precisely in His existence as creature in dependence and trust on the Father alone. At every point in the course of the incarnate life we must think of the dynamic interpenetration and involvement of the divine and human wills. While we are not to think of the humanity of Jesus Christ independently of or apart from the manner in which it exists within the actual union with God, nevertheless within this union we may speak of Jesus' continuous conformity to the divine will, the authentic human obedience which He renders to the claim of this will upon Him.

George Hendry, in his *The Gospel of the Incarnation*, argues for an approach to the christological problem which is made not only from the ontological constitution of Christ's Person in the traditional sense, but from a perspective which embraces the entire fact of Christ, His incarnate life and work, His death and resurrection.[2] A consideration of the bearing of Christ's

[1] *C.D.* I.2, p. 158.

[2] op. cit., p. 115. See also H. R. Mackintosh, *The Person of Christ*, p. 342f '. . . It is indeed an error alike in method and interpretation when the Atonement and the Incarnation are viewed as rival or competing interests. . . . The person and the work of Christ have concrete and intelligible reality only as they constitute and define each other. . . .'

historical work on the christological problem has led some contemporary scholars to argue that the faith of the early Church centred not in what Jesus was, but rather in what He did for mankind. John Knox for example, argues that christology is to be construed soteriologically but not ontologically.[1] Knox sets christological formulation in terms of natures over against expressions concerning the meaning of the historical event centering in Jesus Christ. The consequences of this division, in Knox's interpretation, however, involve the reduction of revelation primarily to the *beneficia Christi* as appropriated within the community of faith. The action of God in Christ tends to be reduced to the meaning Christ has for the community appropriating revelation. Actually, we ought not to divorce considerations of the being of Christ from His history in word and deed. The being of Christ is concretely exhibited and embodied in what He did. A proper conception of the importance of Jesus' creaturely will helps us to reach a new understanding of the traditional formula of Chalcedon which does justice to the dynamic presentation of Christ in the Gospels and yet gives primacy to His Person as the real locus for God's revealing and reconciling activity.

John McIntyre in *The Christian Doctrine of History* declares that if we accept the force of the word 'reconcile', then 'we have to face all the implications of literality, and particularly this one, that the Death of Christ sets up a relation between God and the world that did not exist before'.[2] The life, death and resurrection of Christ disclose the real involvement of God with our actual human history, and this involvement is His union with man in Jesus Christ. The context and locus of this revelation cannot be specified by appeal only to the divine eternity, for this revelation actually alters the character of events in a way which *makes a difference for God's own relation to them.* Again we are thrown back upon the assertion that in the incarnation something genuinely new actually happens in time.

Speaking of the fulfilment which occurs in Jesus Christ, McIntyre says: 'There is in the fulfilment a novely which is the expression of divine grace, far beyond man's expectations.'[3]

[1] John Knox, *On the Meaning of Christ* (Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1947), pp. 55ff.

[2] John McIntyre, *The Christian Doctrine of History* (Erdmans, Grand Rapids, Mich., 1957), p. 78. [3] ibid., p. 72.

In this actual fulfilment, we have to think not only of the way in which Christ Himself spoke and acted according to the pattern indicated by certain Old Testament situations, but likewise we must recognise the gap which exists between the anticipation in prophetic expectation and the actual fulfilment in Jesus Christ. Christ judges and transforms the thought and life of Israel itself and he does so in the history of the incarnation. Hoskyns puts the point quite precisely when he speaks of 'the uniqueness of the obedience of Jesus in the midst of opposition and of complete misunderstanding, dictated by a creative and penetrating insight into the meaning of the Old Testament Scriptures'.[1] In the beginning it was the very novelty of Jesus' interpretation of His relation to Israelite expectations that prevented the religious leaders of Israel from apprehending who Jesus really was. The Messianic destiny of Jesus was wrought out in the midst of real humiliation and conflict so that the way Jesus Himself in His historical and human life interpreted the traditions of Israel belongs to the actual situation of the incarnation itself. In other words, we cannot say that this actual fulfilment in its novelty exists only as a pattern in the divine decision prior to the incarnation, just as we cannot say that this fulfilment is to be ascribed to the mind of the primitive Church rather than to Jesus Himself. It is the element of real novelty in the incarnation which is appropriately preserved when we think of the dynamic union between God and man occurring in the actual course of Jesus' history itself, rather than thinking of the divine decision in eternity in such a way that it contains the whole earthly course of this history prior to the actual event itself. We are contending that the redemptive meaning of Christ's life, death and resurrection, which it is the function of the Gospel history to portray, is directly related to His concrete humanity and the historical contingency of the incarnate Christ.

The consubstantiality of Christ with us refers to His taking our nature, His participation in the creaturely mode of existence. But this nature is constituted in part by solidarity with fellow men. Thus, when we speak of the human nature of Christ, we are not referring to His being in isolation, but to His

[1] Sir Edwyn Hoskyns, *The Riddle of the New Testament* (Faber and Faber, London, 1931), p. 174.

being man among men and for men, the One who acts as man in our behalf. Further, because God as Creator is the really free and transcendent God, who gives man existence in space and time over against Himself, He is able to enter into this creaturely existence without abrogating His deity or abolishing the existence of the creature. The aseity of God, delineated in the doctrine of God as Creator, means that in His freedom God can relate Himself to creation in different ways and at specific times while maintaining the steadfastness of His own will as God. The incarnation is the effectuating of God's full communicative immanence, the disclosure of God's being-in-act, not in spite of the historical and creaturely humanity of Jesus, but precisely in it. We cannot understand the presence of God in Christ in abstraction from the incarnate life up to its full identification with the deepest realities of our situation. The Gospels themselves show us that the disciples understood who Jesus is only when the actual succession of events in His history reached its culmination in the resurrection itself. But while the resurrection is the disclosure of the true presence of the Son of God in and through the humanity of Jesus, it does not abrogate the course of Jesus' history prior to Easter; rather, it enables us to know this history aright. The disclosure of the 'Messianic secret' refers to nothing less than the completion of Christ's work of reconciliation. The function of the ontological aspect of Christology is to make clear the real identity of the One who accomplished this reconciliation for us, and who did so in our humanity.

Ignatius makes quite clear that when Paul says Jesus Christ 'was born of the seed of David, according to the flesh, and declared Son of God in power according to the Spirit of holiness by resurrection from the dead', he does not mean that Jesus was first man and then later God, but rather that he was *both*.[1] There is One Christ at once human and divine. Similarly, Irenaeus inveighs against the heretics who make Jesus one and Christ another, who tear asunder the humanity and deity in such a way that deity has not really entered our world of flesh and blood. Like Ignatius, Irenaeus argues that Romans 1.3, 4 means that Jesus Christ is both God and man in a union carried through every stage of a real human life in which the intention

[1] Ignatius, *Epistle to the Smyrnaeans*, ch. 1, ch. 3.

of the Creator-Word is fulfilled for man in reconciliation.[1] Jesus does not become the Christ only in the resurrection, for the resurrection reveals that it is the Christ who has lived in the form of the Servant, who suffered and died for us. The ontological language employing the conception of 'two natures' when properly understood reinforces and contributes to our interpretation of the incarnation history itself.

[1] Irenaeus, *Against the Heresies*, book III, ch. 16.

THE CATHOLIC CRITICS OF KARL BARTH

IN OUTLINE AND ANALYSIS

by GROVER FOLEY

In 1932 R. Grosche, editor of the newly founded magazine *Catholica*, attributed to Karl Barth the chief honour of 'having made the Catholic-Protestant controversy again possible in the form of theological discussion'.[1] For the Catholic critics of Barth the full possibilities of this discussion were first realised in 1951 in a brilliant work by Urs von Balthasar,[2] whose central thesis was rated by Barth himself as 'incomparably more powerful than that of most of the books which have clustered around me' (*C.D.* IV.1, 768).[3] Now, in his latest part-volume, Barth expresses his gratitude to three other Catholic authors of excellent books on his theology, one each in German, French, and Italian, all showing a 'thorough familiarity with the text', and even more important, 'an earnest wish to comprehend and a real comprehension' (*K.D.* IV.3.1, viii). Hans Küng's *Rechtfertigung*[4] reconciling the Catholic doctrine of justification with Barth's own, and raising a storm of interconfessional debate, has since become virtually a part of the continental theological vocabulary. Henri Bouillard's three-volume 900-page analysis,[5] surpassing even von Balthasar's research in objectivity and breadth, and stimulating sheer envy for its French-reading public, appears to be *the* introduction to Barth's theology for the foreseeable future. And Emmanuele Riverso worthily represents even Italy's traditionally conservative Catholicism with a lengthy critique ranking with most Protestant attempts to date.[6] Among the multitude of questions which this whole remarkable phenomenon raises for the Protestant spectator, several are

[1] *Catholica*, I, 1932, p. 96.

[2] H. U. von Balthasar, *Karl Barth*, Köln, 1951.

[3] *C.D.* stands in the following for the *Church Dogmatics*, Edinburgh, 1936ff; *K.D.* for *Die Kirchliche Dogmatik*, being those volumes not yet published in English.

[4] *Rechtfertigung*, Einsiedeln, 1957, 304 pp.

[5] *Karl Barth*, Paris, 1957, in two parts: I, 'Genèse et évolution de la théologie dialectique'; II, 'Parole de Dieu et existence humaine' (in two sections, here referred to as II.1 and II.2), 284, 288, and 308 pp.

[6] *La Teologia esistenzialistica di Karl Barth*, Napoli, 1955, 425 pp.

basic: how does Catholicism see Barth's dogmatics, what does it say to what it sees, and why should it to a greater extent than Protestantism be so obviously interested in seeing anything at all there?

In the early days of Barth's theology such critics as K. Adam and E. Pryzwara had indeed applied themselves to the task of criticism, and some of the decisions then made were so fundamental and far-reaching as, for instance, Barth's speaking of the Catholic *analogia entis* as an 'invention of the Antichrist'. But until the storm of the 'dialectical theology' subsided into its disparate elements and the promontory of the *Church Dogmatics* emerged, the real defenders of traditional Catholic dogma could not sight the danger. Even long after the determinative Anselm study *Fides quaerens intellectum* of 1931 and in face of the steadily growing *Dogmatics*, most Catholic (as well as Protestant) opinion held that the early commentary on *Romans* included, concluded, and (for the critics) excluded the essence of the Barthian aberration. Typical are the only two full-length books prior to von Balthasar's, in one of which J. C. Groot, though enthusiastically joining the attack on nineteenth-century Liberalism, finds in Barth only a 'dialectic' based on the 'actualistic principle of distance', to which the Catholic 'analogy' must oppose its true 'static source of revelation'.[1] Jérôme Hamer as late as 1949 is even less favourable to Barth's 'occasionalism' 'founded on an agnosticism which he tries in vain to evade through fideism'.[2] Some excellent works in *Catholica*, such as G. Söhngen's defence of the *analogia entis* which almost reconciled Barth at least to this interpretation of the concept,[3] were not applied directly to Barth's theology. If a system is attributed to Barth at all during these 'dark ages' of the Catholic criticism, it is exclusively Kierkegaard's 'infinite qualitative distinction' between God and man in the *Romans*.

However, a splendid enlightenment was being prepared by von Balthasar, resulting finally in the freedom of most critics from those Platonic and Kantian 'eggshells' which Barth had long before discarded. No longer is Barth presented as the

[1] J. C. Groot, *Karl Barth en het theologische kenprobleem*, Heiloo, 1946, p. 329.
[2] Jérôme Hamer, *Karl Barth, l'Occasionalisme théologique de K. Barth*, Paris, 1949, p. 171.
[3] Gottlieb Söhngen, 'Analogia fidei', *Catholica*, III, 1934, pp. 113-36, 176-208; cf. *C.D.* II.1, pp. 81ff.

disciple of Kierkegaard, but rather as his chief modern foe. No longer is he an 'occasionalist', but the first systematician since Aquinas. Even the dialectic of Yes and No rules no more, but the christocentric analogy allows man a reality precisely in his dependence on God's grace. *Credo ut intelligam* does not mean that I know nothing, any more than *analogia fidei* means that there is no likeness between creature and Creator. What they do exclude is the reverse movement from a human knowledge or potentiality to the knowledge of God, as in the Cartesian *cogito ergo sum* which bases faith's certainty of God ultimately on human self-certainty, and the *analogia entis* which substitutes for God's revelation a 'being in general' 'existing and capable of proof even without revelation and otherwise than in faith' (*C.D.* II.1, 231). Yet there is a real analogy, for faith is not nothing, but everything, not only noetic but also ontic (though von Balthasar unfortunately tends to oppose faith to 'being', reducing it almost to *notitia*, an interpretation of Barth which the Lutheran G. Wingren carries to an extreme[1]). Man may think he at least 'is'. 'But the point is that in faith he must regard . . . his very self in its activity, in its living of its own life, as determined by the Word of God . . .' (*C.D.* I.1, 280). For the believer as for Paul, the same 'life that I now live in the flesh, I live by the faith of the Son of God' (Gal. 2.20), in the proper order of both senses of the *fides Jesu Christi*. To imagine a 'creation' or 'history' to which faith would be superfluous would threaten the only real existence which Christians have in and with Christ. 'This "with Christ" determines their past and present and future; their whole history' (*C.D.* IV.2, 277).

Yet von Balthasar goes further. In the third volume on the doctrine of creation, Barth supposedly not only admits the reality of human nature in its dependence on God's grace, but allows it enough relative independence to satisfy even the requirements of the *Vaticanum*. Without denying that the *analogia entis* signifies a similarity or likeness between creature and Creator, von Balthasar applies Söhngen's argument for this analogy as subordinate but indispensable to the *analogia fidei* directly to Barth's own development, though with a more

[1] Gustaf Wingren, *Die Methodenfrage der Theologie*, Göttingen, 1957; Engl. trans. *Theology in Conflict*, Edinburgh, 1958.

Catholic emphasis than Söhngen displayed. The noetic analogy of faith, that 'God is known only through God', requires and receives an ontic basis in the analogy of being, which also involves a creaturely self-knowledge grounded in a 'primary act of the reason'. Since Barth admits that nature forms a relative but indispensable 'presupposition' for grace, von Balthasar concludes that 'at this point the polemic against natural theology and the *analogia entis* is also outdated'.[1] Consequently Barth's continuing rejection of other doctrines such as the *preambula fidei*, the proofs of God, *philosophia perennis*, freedom of the will, the *potentia oboedientialis*, and so forth, reveals itself simply as a misunderstanding.[2]

Von Balthasar has had such a determinative influence on later critics, as Küng and Bouillard acknowledge, that a criticism of his thesis best follows analysis of the subsequent authors. So representative are these three other authors with respect to the present-day possibilities that a constant comparison in a dogmatic area characteristic for each recommends itself, following each general introduction. (In the following comparisons, however, it must be remembered that the authors themselves almost never mention one another.)

Emmanuele Riverso entitled his book in 1955 *The Existential Theology of Karl Barth*, making clear at the outset his return to the pre-Balthasar interpretation (in contrast to Bouillard, who consistently employs existentialism precisely against Barth). The method is quite simple: 'The *analogia fidei* is only an illusion which hides the polarity . . .' (36) which Hamer has rightly classified as a man-God dualism (being therefore rejected by Bouillard, I, 235). Barth's whole theology, epitomised in the *Romans*, is irrevocably opposed to the Vatican Council's defence of man's autonomous reason. 'A faith which has no other relation to reason than its exclusion lacks contact with the higher part of man' (146f). Somewhat disconcerting is Riverso's combination of polemics and irenics which allows him not only to find occasionally in the *Dogmatics* an 'exalted and profound religious passion' (97) but also to designate for example the grace Barth proclaims as 'a nonentity in fact in man and a lie in God' (149).

[1] op. cit., p. 313. [2] For a fuller report cf. in *S.J.T.*, 7, 1954, the essay by G. Miegge, pp. 59-72, and the review by E. Wildbolz, pp. 108-11.

For Riverso the stumbling-block is 'the fundamental dialectic of Barthianism: God unveils Himself in veiling Himself' (99), the inseparability of mystery from revelation, the constant so-called transcendence which only conceals a fideistic agnosticism (122) indifferent, among other things, to the significance of modern philosophy and science for apologetics (41). Christocentrism offers no help. All Barth's 'positive' language for the goodness of creation and even the admittedly orthodox doctrine of the Trinity (found orthodox also by Bouillard, I, 123), since these lack any demonstrable 'effects' in man, are vitiated.

With respect to the problem of *dialectic and analogy*, Riverso constantly opposes to von Balthasar his conviction that 'properly speaking there is no evolution in the thought of Barth' (236) (in contrast to Küng and Bouillard, who accept von Balthasar's thesis, though Bouillard finds a final rehabilitation of Barth too optimistic). To explain the positive language on creation and reconciliation, Riverso maintains a widespread use by Barth of the analogy of being, for instance in the *analogia relationis* (220) (similarly equated with the *analogia entis* by von Balthasar and Bouillard, II.1, 203). Supposedly Barth relies on pure phenomenology (221) (which Bouillard also finds in the *imago Dei* in the *Dogmatics*, II.1, 258, combined with a silent use of natural law, II.2, 258). The political ethic is not analogical or theological but 'bourgeois' (367) (in contrast to Bouillard's quite positive estimate of this 'confessing' prophetic ethic). And though it is hard to believe that Riverso totally rejects the analogy of faith, he nevertheless is so uncritical toward the analogy of being that even Boisset's formula of an 'ontological parentage of God and man' represents for him 'the purest Catholic orthodoxy' (397).

After all due recognition of Riverso's careful and often inspired summaries of the *Dogmatics* and the salutary counterbalance he offers to the widespread criticism of Barth's 'objectivism', he seems to have failed to grasp Barth's radical Christocentrism. Virtually ignoring the *Fides quaerens intellectum*, he naturally also misses the significance of the christological 'indicative' for the ethical 'imperative' and the constitutive importance of christology for anthropology (199, 387). No wonder then that Barth's *credere* seems void of any *intelligere*, and the *sola iustitia Christi* meaningless for our justification. An

excellent illustration is offered by an earlier essay in which he defends Bartmann's doctrine of grace with its endless distinctions between *gratia increata et creata*, *gratia externa et interna*, and so forth,[1] which had been passionately attacked by Barth (*C.D.* IV.1, 84ff). Precisely the final distinction between *gratia Christi et gratia Dei*, which Barth finds 'the most remarkable of all', receives the least attempt at explanation by Riverso (making the unreserved recommendations of Küng and Bouillard for this essay rather mysterious).

If Italian Catholicism as represented by Riverso were to be classified, it would perhaps resemble most the post-Ritschlian conservative 'Positivism' for which Barth has always harboured less sympathy than for a straightforward Schleiermacherian Liberalism. For instance, there is an uncanny centrality of 'positive religion' in this apologetic: 'Religion has therefore always been positive, and only in positive religion has natural religion had effective historical continuity and a valuable effect on humanity' (394). To Riverso's apologetic use of the most up-to-date physics, sociology and depth psychology (368f) must be added his Catholic Biblicism (Moses the author of the Pentateuch, 174; the original monotheism of all peoples, 394; the biological community of all men descended from one primordial ancestor, 299). Nevertheless, Riverso reveals and communicates more enthusiasm for much of the *Dogmatics* than any Positivist would have shared, and many of his passages are so perceptive and exciting that one wonders whether he or his readers can really believe the otherwise radically negative assessment of Barth.

Scarcely anyone could have dreamed a greater contrast to Riverso's work than Hans Küng's *Rechtfertigung*, published in 1957. If von Balthasar's thesis was enlightening, Küng's is incendiary, having ignited to date at least thirty articles and reviews in reply,[2] and prompting even Barth to profess in an

[1] 'Caroli Barth in doctrinam catholicam de gratia recentissimae difficultates refutantur', *Angelicum*, XXXI, 1954, pp. 31-45.

[2] Because of the importance of Catholic and Protestant reactions, sources for the various essays and reviews should be mentioned. Mutually supplementary lists of twenty-seven works are given in the articles of J. L. Witte, 'Ist Barths Rechtfertigungslehre grundsätzlich katholisch?', *Münchener theologische Zeitschrift*, 10.1, 1959, pp. 38-48, and of J. Alfaro, 'Justificación Barthiana y justificación Católica', *Gregorianum*, XXXIX, 1958, pp. 757-69. Interest has been stirred also in Spain, with Alfaro's sympathetic review being balanced by J. M. Alonso's 'Karl Barth, un "criptocatólico"?' answered in the negative, *Revista Española de*

introductory letter, '*If* what you develop in your second part as the doctrine of the Roman Catholic Church actually *is* her doctrine, *then* I must certainly admit that my doctrine of justification agrees with hers' (11f).

Following a first section summarising Barth's doctrine of justification and a second devoted to the Catholic position, both displaying impressive scholarship and splendid clarity, Küng's conclusion finds quite simply a 'basic agreement of the Barthian with the Catholic doctrine' (192, 224). Most Catholic reviewers, despite Barth's strict assurance to the contrary, have suspected that Küng overestimates Barth's Catholicism. Yet there should be little doubt, as the Protestant and some later Catholic reviewers have acknowledged, that a more enthusiastic and faithful follower of Barth would be hard to find even in the Protestant camp.

With regard to *justification and grace*, the key to Küng's faithful analysis is moulded from Barth's Christocentrism, which he makes his own: decisive is the *sola iustitia Christi*, in and by which alone is the *sola fide* sustained. Christology is the indicative which makes possible the imperative of faith (in contrast to Bouillard, who makes every objective revealed truth mutually dependent upon the subjective act of faith). Catholic christology even takes on the contours of Barth's supralapsarianism (163), for it also maintains that election in Christ precedes creation. Similarly, the Gospel is held rightly to precede and establish the Law, though justification remains inseparable from sanctification as in *C.D.* IV.1 and IV.2 (against Bouillard's 'Law and Gospel', II.1, 96, and his criticism of the two parts of *C.D.* IV as artificially separating justification and sanctification, II.1, 91). (But to avoid the impression that Küng is on the way to conversion, mention must be made of the christological speculation attached as an independent essay at the end of the book, so defending Mariology that the result is virtually an eternal quaternity, 287.)

Of special interest is the question of terminology. Typically Reformation themata form the chapter titles: 'Grace as Graciousness' (*increata* rather than *creata*), 'Declaration of the

Teologia, XVII, 1957, pp. 357-82. Additions to the above lists are: H. van Oyen, *Theologische Zeitschrift*, 14.5, pp. 380-3; E. L. Allen, 'Rome Meets Geneva', *Anglican Theological Review*, XL, 1958, pp. 314-17; and a review in *Irénikon*, XXX, 1957, pp. 337-40.

Righteousness of the Sinner', 'Soli Deo Gloria', among others. Küng's uncompromising insistence on the biblical vocabulary as the final authority and guide for all theological language seems even more Reformed than Barth's systematic openness to philosophical terminology. Not only are the Scriptures given full priority over tradition (116ff), but this in turn outranks the teaching office of the Church. When not categorically rejected, such terms as 'natural-supernatural' (147f), grace as a *habitus* (197), and *gratia creata* (200f) are at least reinterpreted to the greatest possible degree in a Barthian sense (of course the very opposite of Riverso). Concerning a *liberum arbitrium*, Küng uses great caution (184) (while Riverso and Bouillard defend it). As to the decisive terminology, the Protestant 'justification' is held more biblical than the Catholic 'redemption' (227ff) for the objective event of salvation, and 'sanctification' better than the Catholic use of 'justification' for the subjective aspect (261ff) though the realities signified by both pairs of terms are found identical.

Specially important is the chapter defending a Catholic use of the *simul iustus et peccator* (rejected by Riverso and Bouillard). Even the Church can and must be defined as *simul iusta et peccatrix* (241) (an ecclesiology which von Balthasar found 'catastrophic' in Barth's *Romans*, 113). And in the translation of Romans 3.28 Küng finds that Thomas Aquinas as well as Luther has added the little word *sola* to the *fide* of the text (244) (in which von Balthasar might agree, pointing to the *sola fides sufficit* in a hymn[1] by Thomas, 29; both Riverso and Bouillard reject the *sola fide*).

Some of the possible deviations from Barth are to be found in the theses of: the formal possibility of a creation independent of Christ (146f),[2] a reinterpreted but still rather neutral 'capability of choice' between good and evil (182), the defence (following Riverso) of Bartmann's divisions and varieties of grace (204f), and the relativisation of Paul's doctrine of justification as 'an essentially anti-Judaic polemic' occasioned by the short-lived peculiarities of the Jewish Christians (214). An apparently clear example occurs in Küng's defence of the

[1] Cited also by Barth in an important essay, 'Der römische Katholizismus als Frage an die protestantische Kirche', *Die Theologie und die Kirche*, Zürich, 1928, p. 342.

[2] For a criticism of this point, cf. van Oyen, op. cit., p. 381.

Catholic *simul iustus et peccator*, by which it is never certain whether he intends more than the traditional *fomes peccati* and the 'tendency' or 'impulse' to sin residing in the saints, or whether he means 'sin' in earnest. Although expressly acknowledging the importance of the *totus iustus*, *totus peccator*, enduring *semper*, in the section devoted to Barth (72ff), when handling the Catholic section he is strangely silent about such an interpretation (Riverso rejects the *totus-totus*[1] and strangely attributes to Luther a *partim-partim* interpretation, 268, while Bouillard refuses both the *totus* and the *partim* interpretations, II.1, 107, preferring the sequence of *olim peccator*, *nunc iustus*, II.1, 105). Of Küng's two supporting authorities here, the primary one is selectively used (235), for Schmaus indeed allows a 'concretely historical' use of the *simul peccator* (by which he intends the *fomes* and 'permissible' sins) but energetically condemns all Lutheran 'actualism' which would encroach upon the 'metaphysical-ontological' sinlessness of the saints.[2]

Yet the final problem is not Küng's Barthianism, but his Catholicism, for the previous theses form theoretically as well as practically only the periphery of his interest. Though Barth and Trent speak different languages, they intend the same realities (contrary to Riverso and Bouillard), and Trent's anthropocentrism was only a necessary correction of the one-sided theocentrism of the Reformation (112, 215, 231). The primarily objective, active and theocentric biblical doctrine of justification speaks indeed 'not first of "Peace to men on earth" but of "Glory to God in the highest" . . .' (227). Nevertheless, Trent's formulas are *in*clusive, not exclusive of God's self-justification. However, can Trent be so interpreted, as though it were consciously only a corrective and by no means a full theological statement? Unusually few corroborative opinions of other Catholics are adduced at this point. As O. Weber has already questioned,[3] can Catholicism accept Barth's christology in which fundamental priority in the Incarnation belongs to the divine and not the human nature? The *anhypostasis-enhypostasis* doctrine with its radical irreversibility of 'the Word assumed flesh' (*C.D.* I.2, 136; IV.1, 179; IV.2, 47) demands the pre-

[1] 'Caroli Barth . . . difficultates refutantur', p. 42.
[2] M. Schmaus, *Katholische Dogmatik*, III.2, München, p. 101f.
[3] O. Weber, 'Gnade und Rechtfertigung bei Karl Barth', *Theologische Literaturzeitung*, 83.6, 1958, p. 404.

cedence of theocentrism over anthropocentrism, of the Reformation over the Catholic interest. As a partial alleviation of the difficulty, Küng interprets the term 'redemption' in Trent's article six, chapter two, as the counterpart of Barth's objective theocentric justification, but exceptionally fails to quote any Catholic who has interpreted the chapter similarly (229). That the great majority of Catholic reviewers have subsequently supported Küng's orthodoxy is, however, as heartening as it is surprising, and if there seems to be still much misunderstanding of Barth's doctrine, there may be just as much Protestant failure to understand the possibilities residing in Catholic doctrine.

Henri Bouillard's defence of his thesis, the first at the Sorbonne ever allowed to be written about a living author, has been called 'the cultural and religious event of the year' 1956 in Paris.[1] Already in 1944, as a young adherent of the 'théologie nouvelle' promoted by Henry de Lubac and Jean Daniélou and admonished in Pius XII's *Humani generis*, Bouillard had criticised and rejected Thomas Aquinas's doctrine of grace as an out-of-date theology. The present work, dedicated to de Lubac, was defended in the presence of Barth himself, who nevertheless according to the strict regulations was not allowed a word of comment!

The importance of Bouillard's analysis may be illustrated in a small way by a selection from some of its significantly new insights into Barth's theological development. In principle the 'dialectic' theology of *Romans* is not exclusive of all 'analogy' (I, 29), nor is it too seriously threatened by a secret 'theology of identity' (both points being made implicitly against von Balthasar, although explicitly basic agreement is claimed, II.2, 216). Fascinating is the proof that, while the villain of *Romans* was chiefly Troeltsch and scarcely at all Herrmann (I, 20off), through the influence of Thurneysen its patron saint was much more Dostoievsky than Kierkegaard, whom Barth himself admitted never to have deeply studied (I, 107). Just as original is the proof that in the 'dialectic' years Barth by no means rejected the possibility of natural theology, but rather that the lines first hardened in the gathering storm after 1930 which dramatically burst in his 'Nein!' to Brunner (I, 183, 204, 216f).

[1] P. Fransen, *Bijdragen*, 19.3, 1958, p. 331.

To concentrate on the problem of *theology and philosophy*, for the first time in the history of Catholic criticism of Barth existentialism has come of age in Bouillard and with full knowledge of its capabilities is turned against the very foundations of the *Dogmatics* (II.2, 298). If Barth's Christocentrism has been presented with exemplary perception and faithfulness, accounts are settled by Bouillard's rejection of this system with an appeal on every decisive point to no other than Barth's major opponent today, Rudolf Bultmann! Naturally other authors such as Brunner are occasionally used against Barth, but in Bultmann's system lies the hope of philosophically defending such Catholic truths as co-operation of the free will (II.1, 110), faith as man's contribution to justification (II.1, 76), and the possibility of natural revelation and theology (I, 201) based on Bultmann's 'pre-understanding' (II.1, 247ff). In short, just as Möhler in the last century poured Catholicism into the mould of Schleiermacher's theology (cf. Barth's criticism, *C.D.* I.2, 561ff), so Bouillard fully exploits Bultmann, objecting only to his dogmatic reductionism and mistrust of the wider-reaching Catholic tendencies, and being fully aware that at the same time he is confirming Barth's well-known thesis of the fundamental identity of Neo-Protestantism and Catholicism.

In the question of Barth's secret philosophy, Bouillard rejects the usual identification with Kant and finds the best parallel in Hegel (II.2, 299) (similar to von Balthasar; in contrast to Riverso, 239). As to his own philosophy, after searching analyses he consistently defends the 'existential' arguments of Augustine, Descartes, Kierkegaard and Heidegger against Barth's criticisms (while Küng relates himself to no philosophy, and Riverso champions Bergson, 231). Often he employs scriptural exegesis, but most arguments come from his vast philosophical and dogmatic arsenal (in contrast to Küng's extended and passionate use of Scripture and Riverso's virtually total neglect of it). Judicious demythologising is the only answer to the 'myths' of the Bible, such as the anthropomorphisms of the Old Testament (II.1, 196f) (in contrast to Riverso's defence of Barth's category of 'saga', 110).[1] In

[1] For a worthy Catholic alternative to Bouillard not only on this point but also concerning the total interpretation, cf. H. Fries's *Bultmann, Barth und die katholische Theologie*, Stuttgart, 1955, which wholeheartedly adopts Barth as the true Catholic answer to Bultmann.

general Barth is too 'positive', as in the doctrines of predestination and creation (while Riverso saw only negativity). If Riverso were comparable to the Protestant 'Positivists', and Küng to the most loyal of Barthians, then Bouillard could most properly be likened to the heirs of Schleiermacher.

For the critic, there are two principle difficulties to the 'pre-understanding' which is the key to Bouillard's Catholicism. First, concerning an often-repeated argument: 'One may say: "It is God who believes in me." But on the condition of also maintaining: "It is I who believe" ' (II.2, 17). To these inseparable concepts in this sequence Barth would by no means object. But it is quite another thing to hold with Bouillard that the subjective 'I' must be *pre*supposed. Here the 'pre-understanding' becomes clearly only another form of the *analogia entis*, from which alone can those doctrines characteristic of Catholicism be developed. Already in *C.D.* I.1, p. 145, Barth agreed with Gogarten that to understand God there must be also a simultaneous self-understanding of man. Yet this fact does not include but radically *ex*cludes a *pre*-understanding, an 'already' instead of an 'also'. Secondly, the author follows Bultmann in assigning to this pre-understanding only a 'formal' and not a material role. No historically determined philosophy is to be made the criterion for theology, but only a purely formal structure of *Dasein*, of being-as-such. Consequently there is to be no concrete material 'demythologisation' but only a 'reinterpretation'. Yet just at this point even the former pupils of Bultmann have today found reason for scepticism. Just as Bultmann, in spite of the theory, in practice discards biblical 'myths' with a free hand, so Bouillard is able to defend Catholic rights to a highly concrete use of Greek philosophy and ethics, and the supposedly merely formal pre-understanding is often clothed in such suspiciously concrete concepts as an 'autonomous moral conscience which . . . must be considered as the voice of God' (II.2, 247) or the ever-recurrent power of a 'critical reflection which fixes upon itself as the autonomous principle of its determination' (II.2, 240). On similar grounds, the idea of an 'immortality of the soul' can be recommended (II.1, 265) (likewise Riverso, 232).

At this point the way seems to have led directly back to von Balthasar's 'apriorism of the spontaneous reason' (173) and the

question of if and how this can be reconciled with the Barthian axiom 'God can be known only through God.' Whether von Balthasar's own system can maintain the desired balance between this *a priori* 'pre-understanding' and the all-pervasiveness of grace remains unclear, but his theory of this same interaction and co-operation in Barth's doctrine between nature and grace, between creature and Creator, has been widely influential. For proof of the general interrelationship he can point for instance to the dialectic between Barth's programme for the 'founding of anthropology on christology' (*K.D.* III.2, 50) and on the other hand his admission, more congenial to Catholic interests, that 'christology is not anthropology' (*K.D.* III.2, 264). Which presupposes which? Here von Balthasar sees 'the central problem of Karl Barth's theology in its ultimate form concentrated in the *concept of presupposition*' (129). As particular proofs he points to the legitimacy finally granted by Barth to philosophy in theology, to general ethics, to non-theological anthropology, and even to natural theology.

Were it not for the acceptance of this theory, Küng's own Catholic fringe—his subdued but significant defence of a possibility of creation apart from Christ (146f), of a *liberum arbitrium* which is not precisely the 'glorious liberty of the children of God' (182), of a *gratia infusa permanens* (204)—would probably not pass his own test of Barthianism. Bouillard also uses the theory of von Balthasar extensively, though in the end he confesses that Barth remains 'unclear' (II.1, 247, 282ff) and therefore uncatholic. Not only have Protestant critics followed suit, but even Barth's closest followers have seen the same difficulties, as the criticism of the doctrine of the *analogia relationis* by N. H. Søe[1] and O. Weber[2] demonstrates.[3]

[1] *Christliche Ethik*, München, 1957², p. 491.

[2] *Grundlagen der Dogmatik I*, Moers, 1955, p. 633f.

[3] Von Balthasar's major thesis has apparently received no extensive reply, though some excellent criticisms on other points have appeared. In an article on 'Analogia fidei oder analogia entis?' W. Kreck replies to von Balthasar's treatment of ontic and noetic *ratio* and defends Barth's continuing faithfulness to the *analogia fidei*, but he also attests the multitude of von Balthasar's questions remaining to be answered (in *Antwort*, Zürich, 1956). W. Pannenberg proposes that Barth drop the concept of analogy altogether and settle for a dialectic of 'encounter' to avoid von Balthasar's consequences (*Theologische Literaturzeitung*, 78.1, 1953, pp. 17-24). Berkouwer devotes his major interest to a defence of Barth's treatment of Quenstedt (*The Triumph of Grace*, Grand Rapids, Mich., 1956, pp. 187ff). For another judgment on Barth and Quenstedt, cf. J. McIntyre's article 'Analogy', *S.J.T.*, 12.1, 1959.

Yet Barth himself, in indirect reply to Brunner as well as to von Balthasar, firmly contends that in the *Dogmatics* as a whole there have been 'no important breaks or contradictions' and cautions against all speculations on a 'new Barth' (*C.D.* IV.2, xi). The controversy between Barth and Catholicism seems therefore not merely, as von Balthasar would have it, a matter of inflection and emphasis, but still an opposition of two qualitatively and definitively different principles calling for a clear decision.

There is indeed a 'presupposition' in creation as the external ground of the covenant or in 'humanity' as the necessary basis for the Incarnation, but never does that allow von Balthasar's separation of an 'order of creation' from the 'order of grace'. Even in *K.D.* III.4 every attempted synthesis of the divine command *and* the 'orders' of creation is rejected; the celebrated reconciliation with Brunner fails to take place. The reality of the dispensations of Old and New Testaments, of Israel and Incarnation, or the stages of creation, reconciliation and redemption are one thing, a speculation on two different covenants quite another, as Barth's passionate criticism of Coccejus's covenants of grace *and* of works reveals (*C.D.* IV.1, 54ff). All knowledge as well as being in a creation independent of the eternal covenant of grace in Jesus Christ is impossible, because 'there is no man but the man of the covenant' (*C.D.* IV.1, 43). 'The fact that God has regard to His Son . . . is the true and genuine basis of creation' (*C.D.* III.1, 50).

Following the general problem of nature and grace, von Balthasar's penetrating specific questions in at least the four areas of philosophy, natural theology, general ethics and non-theological anthropology must be answered. In each of these, there is indeed a 'presupposition' often called 'humanity' or simply the goodness of creation itself, but it stands radically opposed to 'man as such' and his 'natural' theology. Yet it is not itself an explicitly theological entity. Possessing its own relative freedom, justification and necessity, it manifests itself through 'signs', 'witnesses' or 'phenomena' as the obedient substructure which indeed 'makes possible' (itself being created and sustained through grace alone) the Incarnation of the Word and God's Covenant with man realised in Jesus Christ. The constancy and clarity with which Barth has systematically

expressed himself on these points from the first page of the *Church Dogmatics* to the last can best be shown under three aspects.

(1) To 'man as such' the search for a supreme philosophy, a natural theology, a general ethic and a non-theological anthropology is a basic necessity of life. Theology will not oppose but admit this necessity. 'Everyone has some sort of philosophy', and 'it is not only unavoidable as such, but legitimate', indeed, 'necessary' (*C.D.* I.2, 728f). Theology itself is, humanly speaking, only 'a kind of philosophy' (*C.D.* I.2, 734).[1] Even natural theology must be quietly acknowledged as 'a necessary undertaking in the sphere of man as such' (*C.D.* II.1, 168). 'How can a man jump over his own shadow?' (*C.D.* II.1, 136). Man as such cannot attack his own self-certainty and ought not to try to do so, because 'the illusion that we can disillusion ourselves is the greatest of all illusions' (*C.D.* II.1, 169). Likewise a general non-theological ethics has 'a legitimate place in the discussion' (*C.D.* II.2, 523). Even a non-theological anthropology receives the acknowledgment 'that the study of these phenomena is natural, interesting, important and justified' (*K.D.* III.2, 91).

(2) But between the self-certainty of 'man as such' and the actual 'readiness of man for God' (in Jesus Christ) there can be no compromise: *tertium non datur*. 'Every philosophy which is posited absolutely leads necessarily to a falsification of Scripture' (*C.D.* I.2, 732). Contrary to von Balthasar's interpretation, no definite philosophy will ever have a *potentia oboedientialis* (*C.D.* I.2, 734), and Barth's unique permission of this term for the as yet unfallen creation envisages no obedience as a result of 'its own creative power', since 'it was made worthy' to obey (*C.D.* III.1, 153). Similarly for natural theology: 'Only one thing cannot be granted to natural theology, namely, that it has a legitimate function in the sphere of the Church' (*C.D.* II.1, 170). Unlike von Balthasar, Barth radically rejects all *preambula fidei* (*C.D.* II.1, 137). Likewise for general ethics: 'Strange as it may seem, that general conception of ethics coincides exactly with the conception of sin' (*C.D.* II.2, 518).

[1] Berkouwer's objection to Barth's openness to philosophy in theology impinges upon the role of 'nature' in general in the *Dogmatics* and possibly hinders the adequacy of his reply to von Balthasar (op. cit., pp. 19ff).

In thesi, 'in a scientific form there is only one ethics, theological ethics' (*C.D.* II.2, 542). In non-theological anthropology, 'it is clear that here we have to do with the enemy, who cannot be met except with opposition by the Christian confession' (*K.D.* III.2, 24). The only possible procedure is 'the founding of anthropology on Christology' (*K.D.* III.2, 50): *ecce homo!*

(3) Nevertheless, in retrospect theology can and must acknowledge the goodness of creation and its openness to apparently non-theological inquiry (and precisely here is the focal point of von Balthasar's argument for the *analogia entis* in Barth, to which answer must be made). Between 'man as such' and 'man in Christ' there stands 'humanity': *tertium datur*. But this *humanum* is a presupposition for grace only in so far as it exists in and through grace; Barth's sole permission of Thomas Aquinas' *gratia non tollit* (*non destruit*) *sed* (*praesupponit et*) *perficit naturam* is as a proof of God's 'patience'! (*C.D.* II.1, 411). If *in thesi* directly theological knowledge alone is possible, nevertheless *in hypothesi* there is possible in individual unsystematised instances a true knowledge of man and world of which the theological basis has not yet become apparent. Faith is not without a share of 'sight' which, if admittedly faulty and never capable of systematic use, is nevertheless truthful (*K.D.* III.3, 29). 'What F. C. Oetinger called the *sensus communis*, the rule of truth imposed on all men as such' (*C.D.* II.2, 523), is expressed through 'signs', 'symbols' and 'witnesses'. 'Thanks to the wisdom and patience of God, and the inconsequence of men', as Barth puts it (*C.D.* II.2, 542), there are also certain 'phenomena' which occur in general ethics as well as in apparently non-theological anthropology. Barth's special ethics describes not only a vertical but also a horizontal constancy of revelation (*K.D.* III.4, 17f) whose continuity is expressed not in 'laws, precepts or imperatives' but in 'spheres and relationships' (*K.D.* III.4, 31). There is also a genuine science of mankind which, theologically seen, is 'possible, fundamentally justified and fundamentally necessary' (*K.D.* III.2, 241). Barth is not indulging in a bit of natural theology in commenting on three non-theological anthropologies which have truthfully seen 'phenomena' of the actual man (*K.D.* III.2, 236ff), or in pointing out four 'definite constant elements' as 'signs and witnesses' of God's providence, the three histories of (1) the

Holy Scriptures, (2) the Church, (3) the Jews, and (4) the limitation of human life (*K.D.* III.3, 225ff). Indeed, Barth is so aware of the indirectness of all man's knowledge of himself, and of the necessary distinction between the Saviour and the saved, that he can also declare 'Christology is not anthropology' (*K.D.* III.2, 264), for only indirectly can (and must) our knowledge of those destined to be sons of God be derived from *the* Son (the safeguarding of which distinction von Balthasar entrusts to philosophy, as though the knowledge of grace—which always 'mediates'—were insufficient, 255).

What speaks decisively against von Balthasar's interpretation is the complete inability of this indirect knowledge ever to become a 'system' which could have even relative independence within the *analogia fidei*. Unlike the false attempts of 'man as such' outlined previously in paragraph (1), it never precedes but always imperfectly follows the knowledge of faith in Jesus Christ. When in *C.D.* II.2 Barth compared the use by theology of general ethics with the entry of Israel into the land of Canaan, von Balthasar proclaimed the long-awaited conversion of Barth to Catholicism, for here the *analogia entis* supposedly receives its full rights within the *analogia fidei*. Yet Barth emphatically maintains that the Israelites remained the chosen of God and did not become Canaanites, or even recognise themselves as partly Canaanite: 'Annexation remains annexation, however legal it may be, and there must be no armistice with the peoples of Canaan and their culture and their cultus' (*C.D.* II.2, 524). Even theological acknowledgment and use of a philosophy is only possible as an 'essay' or 'hypothesis' (*C.D.* I.2, 730). A non-theological but, loosely speaking, 'Christian' ethics 'does not attempt to draw up expressly and specifically basic principles' (*C.D.* II.2, 542); in an academic form based on principle, it would reveal its theological basis. The 'phenomena' of general anthropology analysed by naturalism, idealism and existentialism likewise do not present for Barth 'stages' culminating in a perfected theological anthropology (so von Balthasar, followed by Bouillard), but considered in themselves, all stand neutral and meaningless within a bracket, while the decisive teaching about humanity comes 'only from outside this bracket' (*K.D.* III.2, 145). Even the 'sight' gained by a Christian interpretation of history through 'signs' and

'structures' is 'not theoretical, but practical, not programmatic, but free, not infallible, but in need of correction' (*K.D.* III.3, 29). These 'phenomena' are not 'stages' in a natural theology, not even parts of a 'Christian' natural theology such as Emil Brunner proposed. There is still no 'system' other than the revealed Word of God. Barth's lengthy polemic against the Catholic systematisation of a moral philosophy or a natural theology, even when supposedly within and as the 'obedient servant' of moral theology (*C.D.* II.2, 528ff) or the revealed Word (*C.D.* II.1, 137ff), could be applied with striking exactness to von Balthasar's systematisation of an *analogia entis* within the *analogia fidei*.

Barth's self-consistent handling of this whole problem perhaps sheds light on other points which often puzzle friends as well as opponents. Naturally the problem of hermeneutics falls into the same pattern, necessary as a fundamental human enterprise, impossible as a closed system not constantly broken through by the *testimonium Spiritus sancti* in the Word itself, and yet possible and necessary to the extent that theological exegesis must at every moment be open to discussion with non-theologians who may have heard the Word more plainly. No doubt Barth's recent permission and even justification of a 'quest of the historical Jesus' (*C.D.* IV.2, 149f) rests upon the 'openness' of humanity. Although this historical knowledge forms a 'presupposition' for the Kerygma, carefully seen it is not a confirmation of von Balthasar's earlier argument for a sequence *intellectus quaerens fidem* (391) in which 'the first act of the reason is not faith' (372). For other possible examples, let the mention of Mozart or Shin-Buddhism suffice. More complex is the *analogia relationis*, and yet it would be unwarranted to find in it a reliance upon the *analogia entis* of pure sexuality. If sexuality in itself were a 'proof' of divinity, so then were Zimmerman's reply—a favourite anecdote of Barth's—when asked by Frederick the Great for a proof of God: 'Your Majesty, the Jews!'[1] The I-Thou relationship expressed in male and female allows no natural theology, because 'man in his humanity is in very fact to himself a sign and witness . . . , to himself he is a mystery' (*K.D.* III.2, 387) and therefore can be understood only in retrospect from the quintessential *imago Dei* in Jesus

[1] Barth, *Dogmatics in Outline*, New York, 1959, p. 75.

Christ and His bride, the Church. And the same 'humanity' standing between *eros* and *agape* no doubt allows Barth to speak not only of human desire as the uncompromising enemy of *agape* but also of a 'sanctified' *eros*.[1]

In view of the categorical difference of this system from von Balthasar's final consequences, it is small wonder that von Balthasar at the last must find (to use his not all too attractive phrase) a 'christological constriction' in Barth's otherwise Catholic system. In the well-known image of the hour-glass, whose sand runs from the upper half to the lower like God's revelation to man through the 'constriction', von Balthasar reveals even a subtle polemic. Why, one asks, would not the more biblical and Barthian image of the mirror, of the *speculum electionis* which is Jesus Christ, suffice?[2] Surely the man who thinks himself as self-evident in relation to God as that lower half of the hour-glass is like the man who, to use a favourite passage of Barth's, having observed his natural face in a mirror, goes away and at once forgets 'what manner of man he was' (Jas. 1.24; *C.D.* II.2, 588f). Von Balthasar seems not to have grasped fully how impossible for Barth's Christocentrism is all separation of divine and human 'nature'. Just as Küng rightly sees that there is only one justification, *sola iustitia Christi*, so likewise is there only one faith, *fides Jesu Christi*, and only one history, the history of salvation, *die Geschichte Jesu Christi*. And as Bouillard correctly sees, the periods of dialectic and analogy are not mutually exclusive, for what Barth once said about Schleiermacher still holds true, that 'one can *not* speak of God simply by speaking of man in a loud voice'.[3] If there is a change in the *Dogmatics*, it is only the increasingly positive emphasis that one *can* talk about man by talking about God in the softest of voices.[4]

Why, finally, should it be the Catholics who seem to have won predominance in the critical analysis of Barth's theology? On the one hand, the answer of course is that many well-read followers of Barth need neither to read nor to write intro-

[1] Perhaps this helps explain the apparent contradiction between *C.D.* III.4 and IV.2 which puzzles O. Weber (in *Karl Barths Kirchliche Dogmatik*, Moers, 1957[3], p. 279f.

[2] cf. Küng's use of this image (16) and Barth's comment (14).

[3] *The Word of God and the Word of Man*, New York, 1957, p. 196.

[4] cf. the recent essay on 'The Humanity of God' (*Die Menschlichkeit Gottes*, Zürich, 1956), significantly not entitled 'The Divinity of Man'.

ductory and interpretative texts. On the other hand, however, it is clear that the recent resurgence of Neo-Protestantism simply lacks the dogmatic interest necessary to such an undertaking. In a very real way Bouillard's massive volumes drawing upon the whole history of dogmatics, though with the same presuppositions and resulting existential truths as could already be found in Bultmann, show the difference. Earlier such a situation might have been interpreted simply as an illustration of the Barthian axiom that Catholicism does in earnest what Neo-Protestantism does only in a dilettante fashion. Yet today such a description would obviously not do justice to the facts. There is too clear a wish to be taken seriously, which involves taking other opinions and beliefs seriously. It may even be that the criticism here offered of von Balthasar's interpretation, instead of weakening his and his followers' material agreement with the theological *and* anthropological (because christological) fulness of the *Church Dogmatics*, may only strengthen their careful avoidance of any theoretical consequences which could only undermine Barth's Christocentrism. At any rate, the ecumenical spirit and openness of Barth's Catholic critics leaves no ground for pessimism. And at times such uncompromising controversy can even lead to the joyful recognition that we are, as Barth writes to Küng, 'separated *in faith*, namely, in *the same* faith' (13).

ULTIMATE TRIUMPH[1]

by The Rev. Principal CHARLES S. DUTHIE

It is a matter of agreement among Christians that there shines throughout the New Testament writings the bright hope, the clear assurance that in the long run, however long the run, God will triumph. He will achieve the fulfilment of the purpose disclosed in Jesus Christ. In that consummation God Himself, in the phrase of Paul, will be 'all in all'. But as soon as we affirm our belief in this final victory, an inevitable question raises itself in our minds. Will that triumph be complete? Will all who have been fashioned in the image of God be united with Him within the redeemed community? Or will some persist obstinately for ever in the repudiation of His grace, self-excluded from Heaven? If God wills that all men shall be saved, if He was truly in Christ reconciling the world to Himself, if it is His purpose to gather up all things in Christ, are we not driven towards the expectation, perhaps even the certainty, that at the last all shall have found their way, or been led, to God 'who is our home'?

This old question, which we cannot silence, is the question which I propose to consider in this essay. I think it is worth while pausing, at the outset, to note that the question springs neither from a perverse spirit of speculation nor from a desire to evade the reality of God's judgment upon sin. According to Professor Farmer, whose opinions on the subject we shall consider in a moment, it arises 'out of the whole Christian message concerning God and man, and out of the necessities of that new life of trust in God and love to men to which the Christian is called by that message' (*God and Men*, p. 144). I believe this to be a true statement, and I think its truth can be illustrated by a brief preliminary appeal to what we may call the witness of the Christian heart, to the testimony of Scripture and to some recent emphases in Christian theology which base themselves upon the examination of that testimony.

When I have been discussing the final destiny of men with

[1] The Drew Lecture on Immortality given at New College, London, on 22nd October 1959.

other Christians and especially with those who feel that they must give the fullest weight to the words of Jesus which point to a continuing separation from God in the world to come—such as 'Depart from Me' (Matt. 25.41)—I have been prompted to ask the question: 'Granted that the offer of the Gospel confronts man with a momentous choice and that the rejection of this offer may entail precisely this ongoing separation from God, both in this world and in the next, when you look honestly into your own heart, remembering God's gracious dealing with you and His purpose of good for the whole race—do you or do you not entertain the hope that somehow, in the end, all men, even the worst, will be reconciled with Him?' Sometimes the answer has been given with reluctance; often it has been qualified; but almost without exception it has been 'Yes, I do cherish that hope.' Please note that the question was asked in order to elicit a true report on what I have called the feeling of the Christian heart. Although the last word cannot be with the Christian heart, what the Christian heart feels in this and in other matters must have *some* importance, since it is itself in some measure shaped by the Spirit of God. I am aware that many Christians might give a different answer to the question, might say, 'I do not cherish that hope', although I should find it hard to believe the evidence of my ears; but I should maintain that the other answer—'I do cherish that hope'—gives expression to something authentically and deeply Christian. Its significance, I suggest, is to be found, first, in the *possibility* that it springs from a spirit so subdued and permeated, despite its sinfulness, by the wonder of the seeking love of God that it finds it intolerable to contemplate the final exclusion of any from the enjoyment of that love: and, second, that it is conjoined with a due awareness of the fact that a man may continue to flout and to resist that love, with dreadful consequences both here and hereafter. In other words it is not so much universalism as a Christian dogma or philosophy that needs to be examined as the tension between the universalistic element and another weighty factor within the Christian consciousness.

This witness of the Christian heart, a finger pointing to what our fathers called 'the larger hope', would count for little unless it found support in Scripture either in specific statements or promises about a salvation from which none will be shut out or

in the vision of what Nels Ferré calls 'the largest logic of God's sovereign love' (*The Christian Understanding of God*, p. 242). We are going to look at the biblical testimony in a moment: let it suffice at this point to say that the passages in the New Testament which suggest a universal restoration must be brought into collision with those which speak plainly of Heaven and Hell so that the divergence is registered and then fully pondered. The tension in the Christian consciousness of which we have spoken will then be seen as a reflection of a tension already present in the determinative Christian documents. But there is a third witness to which we may appeal in this preliminary attempt to establish the fact that preoccupation with the question of universal salvation arises out of the highest Christian concern. This is the modern emphasis of biblical theology on the racial, indeed the cosmic sweep of Christ's ultimate triumph. It was the world which God so loved that He gave His only begotten Son. It was to create and constitute a new humanity that Christ came. Little wonder that Paul's language rises to lyrical splendour when he comes to speak of the consummation of the divine purpose. Every knee is to bow and every tongue confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father (Phil. 2.10, 11). It is possible that we unconsciously restrict the wide outreach of the apostle's thought because in the order of being we are accustomed to place God first, the world second, the Church third. But for Christians there is a good sense in which the Church comes second and the world after it. If you will allow the language, the Church is God's great idea and the world comes into being to give it visible embodiment. Something very like this seems to be the purport of what Paul writes to the Ephesians and Colossians. Inevitably we are led to ask whether a triumph of the Kingdom that is cosmic and complete will embrace all men. If all are finally subject to God, will all be *willingly* subject to Him?

With this introduction I propose to devote the main part of my lecture, first, to considering—and necessarily with selective brevity—what the New Testament has to say on this subject: second, to examining the views of two very dissimilar Christian thinkers of today who tend towards universalism: and, third, to offer in some general comments on our theme, as it affects Christian preaching and the Christian life.

As we consider the New Testament, let the teaching of Jesus and the letters of Paul be the main focus of our attention, with a glance at the Fourth Gospel and other writings. In the Synoptic Gospels our Lord leaves His hearers and us in no doubt about the fateful character of our choices here on earth. Let me cite the words of Baron von Hügel:

> We not only find certain texts in the Synoptic Gospels which directly teach Hell and which put it in simple parallel with Heaven; but (an even more conclusive fact) we can clearly trace, through our Lord's teachings, the keen conviction, and the austere inculcation of the conviction, that the spiritual life is a great all-important alternative and choice—a choice once for all, with consequences final and immense. ('What do we mean by Heaven? What do we mean by Hell?', *Essays and Addresses*, vol 1, p. 209.)

Thus von Hügel can speak of a doctrine of Abiding Consequences which simply cannot be expunged from His teaching. This seems to leave us with Heaven and Hell—although for von Hügel, as for Roman Catholics in general, that cannot be the whole story. Is there no arrow pointing towards universal salvation? In his recent book *The Bible Doctrine of the Hereafter*, Dr Ryder Smith maintains that there are only two textual pointers, neither of them very clear. The first is contained in the opening clauses of the Lord's Prayer. 'So long', he writes, 'as any sinner, whether man or devil, remains, God's name is not being hallowed, His Kingdom has not come, His will is not being done "as in heaven, so on earth" and God has failed to answer His children's perennial prayer.' The other is the parable of the Leaven, with its suggestive phrase 'till the whole be leavened'. This is indeed very little. Some might perhaps be prepared to infer or to conjecture universalism from the character of God as depicted and demonstrated by Jesus Himself as the unwearying seeker of His lost children. Even so, the evidence on the other side has the stronger appearance.

When we turn to Paul we are immediately impressed by his awareness of human responsibility and the fearfulness of the judgment and wrath of God. It is possible for men to perish. Even the security of the new life in Christ demands watchfulness. The treasure is in earthen vessels that the excellency of the power might be of God and not of us. This strain of thought is in direct continuity with the teaching of Jesus. There are, however, several passages which suggest, although they do not

explicitly affirm, the possibility that all will be saved. There is 1 Cor. 15.24-28 where the end will bring all things under Christ's rule and He Himself be subject to His Father, when God will be all in all. There is Eph. 1.20-23 where the authority of Christ subsequent to His Ascension and His filling all in all may prefigure and anticipate His complete Lordship at the end. There is Eph. 4.8-10 in which Christ ascends up far above all heavens that He might fill all things. Not least there is the magnificent description in Phil. 2 of the coming triumph of the Christ who took upon Himself the form of the servant. One must be careful not to extract too much from these passages. In several of them, and particularly in the last-mentioned, Christ's lordship may be acknowledged unwillingly by some. As von Hügel puts it, the final order might be an order 'which includes the subjection but not the salvation of the godless'. Moreover, there is a lack of precision, an indefiniteness about Paul's language in all the passages I have mentioned which precludes us from asserting more than the final victory of Christ. Whether that victory includes the willing return of all men to God is a larger question which would have to be debated on wider ground. The most that can be said is that these passages are moving in the direction of a universal restoration.

A similar pattern is found in the Fourth Gospel. The purpose of Christ's coming is the redemption of the whole world: 'I came not to judge the world but to save the world' (12.47). John describes Him as 'the lamb of God which taketh away the sins of the world' (1.29). In the High Priestly prayer Jesus asks that His disciples may be truly one 'that the world may believe that thou didst send me' (17.21-23). But the purpose of God may be thwarted. Men may prefer darkness to light. Christ can say: 'Whither I go, ye cannot come' (7.34). Everlasting life is for believers and the alternative is perishing. The contrast appears most powerfully in a passage such as John 3.16-21 in which the very positive announcement of God's love for the world and His will to save it only brings out more sharply the implicit possibility that some may refuse to believe and thus fail to 'enter into life'. We may mention finally the important statement: 'Now is the judgment of this world. Now shall the Prince of this world be cast outside. And I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all men unto myself' (12.31f)—from

which it *might* be possible to deduce if not the salvation of all, at least the salvation of all *men*. But the evidence is slight; and here again we must conclude, first, that there is but the beginning of a movement towards universalism; and, second, that this is set within the dominant New Testament pattern of two opposed destinies between which men must choose. When we survey the New Testament as a whole it is the contrast between these two destinies that strikes us first. Von Hügel's idea of 'abiding consequences' is unmistakably present, taking its most arresting form in the Epistle to the Hebrews, the book that dwells so tenderly on the humanity of our Lord and denies, almost savagely, the possibility of renewal and return to those who have denied their faith and crucified the Son of God afresh. In particular, as a recent writer has said, 'it is impossible to deny that there is a doctrine of "everlasting punishment" in the New Testament'. The notion of a universal salvation is tentative and subordinate and to be read almost between the lines. Yet it is present in sufficient strength to generate the tension to which our attention was previously drawn. That tension increases when the argument passes beyond the examination of proof-texts and passages to the consideration of the character of God as holy love, His reconciling action towards man in Christ and the scope of His final triumph.

It is to this wider context that I now wish to turn by bringing into view the opinions of two contemporary theologians who may be said to incline towards universalism without roundly affirming it in so many words. They are H. H. Farmer and Karl Barth. I have chosen these two thinkers because their understanding of the relation between God and man can hardly be said to coincide. If they are nevertheless found moving towards the same conclusion, then we are justified in asking whether there is not some common conviction or insight, above and beyond their differences, which accounts for this movement.

In all his books, Farmer has sought to expound what he calls the massive and consistent personalism of the Christian faith. In his earlier work, *The World and God*, he set forth the thesis that God confronts man in Christ in absolute demand and final succour, so that a personal response must be made out of the freedom and relative independence which man has been granted. The essence of personal, creaturely being is the

capacity to say 'Yes' or 'No' to God: without this tension the structure of true personal relationship is destroyed. It follows from this that men may persist eternally in rejecting the love of God. But at this point, says Farmer, we are bound to ask whether a limit is not set to man's abuse of his own freedom in rejecting God by what he calls the 'unqualified universality' of the love of God. *If* all men are to be saved in the end, this could only happen because God would have found some way of overcoming the resistance of the recalcitrant without destroying the freedom from which their recalcitrance springs. That way is the way of gracious, persuasive, patient and utterly self-giving love.

In a brief but pregnant section of his later book, *God and Men*, Farmer faces the question of universalism openly. He begins by seeking to recapture the sense of wonder aroused by the reality of God's love, the divine Agape. God's love, he tells us, is such that it 'never turns aside from or deserts any human person that He has made'. 'On the contrary,' Farmer writes, 'He seeks with undeviating patience and at any cost to bring every man back to that true personal life which is to be found only in fellowship with Himself and in the doing of His will' (p. 134). Does this mean that the Divine Lover will be successful in His pursuit of *all* His errant children? We are certainly bound to ask very seriously whether it could be accounted anything other than a most grievous defeat for God 'if vast numbers of persons are finally lost in some sort of Hell, or (as some have suggested), by total annihilation' (p. 144). But there are several considerations, Farmer goes on, that make us hesitate to embrace a doctrine of the restoration of all too easily or too quickly.

The first is the consideration that the reality of human freedom seems to carry with it the possibility of a never-ending rejection of God. There *may* be human spirits who hold out against God for ever. Universalism might attempt to meet this in two ways. First, it could maintain that in His infinite wisdom and love, God might so work upon the unreconciled that, as we may put it, resistance would no longer be possible. There would come a willing acknowledgment of and surrender to the God of grace. Moreover, since God has already overcome the resistance of those who have been reconciled to Him without

infringing or destroying *their* status, there can be no objection to extending this principle to others. Universalism would then become the theology of the single decree.

The second consideration that makes us hesitate to tread the path of universalism, according to Farmer, is the misgiving that it may take the note of urgency out of Christian preaching. To which Farmer thinks the universalist might answer that the man who says he understands a salvation that has been secured at infinite cost and continues to indulge himself on the ground that he will be saved in the end, shows precisely that he understands neither the love of God nor the meaning of salvation. Moreover, to argue that without the fear of everlasting damnation there can be no urgency in the preaching of the Gospel *is to neglect the immediate and intrinsic urgency of the claim made by God and neighbour*. Finally, the fact that God will save all does not absolve me from the responsibility of preaching the Gospel. Both here and hereafter men cannot be saved without their own consent, for salvation is not something done upon them as inert persons but a process in which they are intimately involved.

In the third place, Farmer believes, we may be halted in the journey towards universalism by the sobering thought that much in the New Testament points in a quite different direction. We summed this up earlier in von Hügel's phrase—'the doctrine of abiding consequences'. This does not quite shatter the Universalist case, Farmer finds. Even if many New Testament passages indicate that some may be lost, this need not mean that they actually will be lost.

> We may suppose that in creating an order of free persons God took the risk of Hell, but that it is within the compass of His manifold wisdom and sacrificial love to circumvent the risk and save all, as we must believe in fact He has saved some. (pp. 149-50.)

There are, too, other passages which suggest or imply a restoration of all men to God. Farmer concludes by making the point that the bare idea of such a restoration is not an adequate description of the final consummation. 'It will be a restoration' he goes on, 'which contains within it both an infinite cost to God and also the unimpaired significance of human choices and decisions in time' (p. 150). Meanwhile the crucial confrontation of the soul with Christ is still our task. We are not in a

position to say whether anyone ever has or ever will reject Christ finally. We commit everyone in trust to God the Father. We must live in faith with the tension between our conviction that God's love must ultimately prevail and our knowledge of the fatefulness of our human choices and decisions for and against God in this life.

Even from so brief a summary as I have given it must be clear that Farmer's inclination towards universalism never loses sight of the full reality of human freedom. Some theologians would not be prepared to grant to man as much as he does, but the affirmation of such freedom is basic to the whole structure of Farmer's thought. This means that the ultimate coerciveness of God's love is personal, not mechanical. But this insistence on human freedom which may continue to resist God only serves to bring out the more clearly where Farmer rests the weight of his argument. *It is upon the character of God and the ultimate irresistibility of His grace.* I am using the latter phrase deliberately, despite the unhappy associations which cling to the words 'irrresistible grace'. It is one thing to say that grace can be resisted and another thing to say that it can be resisted for ever. For Farmer this ultimately irresistible grace is nothing other than the gracious, personal God who meets us in Jesus Christ, as indeed it was for his great teacher, John Oman. In this his thought is not so far removed from that of Karl Barth who rejects the possibility of any decree that comes from a depth in God that lies beyond Christ and anchors election firmly in Christ Himself. The second comment I wish to make on the course of Farmer's discussion is that he has shown that belief in universal salvation can still reckon seriously with the gravity of sin. This emerges at two points. The first is his insistence on the reality of the 'wrath of God' which he describes as 'the burning heart of utterly pure love'. The second is the awareness that sin is only met by God at utmost cost to Himself and that this costingness continues until the last sinner has been reconciled. Farmer never fails to sound the note of deep moral seriousness.

When we turn from Herbert Farmer to Karl Barth we are made immediately aware of the gigantic nature of the task of assessing his theology, even in what may be considered the limitation of its bearing on a particular problem. Nevertheless

it is not difficult to detect a tendency, a direction, a continuing basic concern within his thought. We may begin by noting that Barth's understanding of the relation between God and man does not permit him to follow Farmer in his mode of speaking about human freedom. For Barth what we describe as our freedom is a concept too often framed outside the orbit of grace. It presupposes a power that man has in himself to respond to God and leads to that synergism which is constantly reappearing within the Church to undermine the Gospel by making man partially his own saviour. Man is God's creature. Through grace, in the activity of faith, hope and love 'he responds, he corresponds to what is simply the Work of God for him and to him, the Word of God spoken to him and concerning him' (*Church Dogmatics*, IV.1, p. 113). This unwearied emphasis of Barth must be given its full value before we dare criticise it. Its theme is the glory of grace. But when we have recognised this, we must take serious account of the fact that for the New Testament writers there is a responsive, active element in faith which seems integral to personal relationship with God and which never leads to the notion that man is, with God, his own co-saviour. If this responsive, active element is not rooted, at some point, in human freedom, it is difficult to understand why the apostolic writers feel it necessary to warn their Christian readers of the peril of falling away or indeed why they should have preached for an answer to the offer of the Gospel. The failure of Barth to acknowledge that the human self is genuinely involved, without thereby acquiring merit, in its own salvation by virtue of its God-given, responsible freedom makes it easier for him, as we shall see, to speak of the great decision as already having been taken by God in that self-revelation in Christ which is both election and reconciliation. A path is opened up towards universalism, but unlike the path taken by Farmer, it does not have to surmount the obstacle of a freedom which may express itself in obstinate and persistent disobedience.

To see how Barth's theology moves towards a universalist position, even if it stops short of it, we need to see the importance of election for all his thought. Election for him is a joyful and comforting doctrine because it is that primal decision of God about man which meets us in Jesus Christ. It means that

God is for man, not against him. A system in which election and reprobation, as the two sides of double predestination, are in balance with each other simply hides the good news and breeds fearfulness and uncertainty. Christ is the mirror and the foundation of election as in Himself the electing God and the elect man. Here indeed we can speak of a double predestination but only with regard to Christ and His suffering. He is the bearer of the Divine No as well as of the Divine Yes, for He who is the elect man is also for our sakes and in our place the rejected man. The fundamental thing is, first, that the election is a universal election and, second, that what Barth calls the divine direction and decision have already taken place in this election. Thus the revelation of God's love 'embraces *realiter* both the world and the community, non-Christians and Christians. But the knowledge and proclamation of it is a matter only for the Christian community' (IV.1, p. 103). It would be an embarrassment to the Christian to be part of this vanguard of humanity if he did not feel impelled to hope as strongly for those who have not yet entered into the knowledge of God as he hopes for other Christians and himself.

Whatever be the vulnerable points of Barth's theology of election, it cannot be doubted that he has striven mightily to lift the dark shadow that has lain so long upon this thoroughly biblical idea. One can only use the word vision to describe his unfolding of this vast new perspective. Why is it, notwithstanding, that we cannot rest in it? It is not because Barth speaks of election as universal. That is only to say in other words what Farmer says when he speaks of the love that goes out to all, is concerned for them as they are and cannot desert them into whatever corruption or sin they may come. It is rather because he seems to regard the primal decision of God as having so settled the issue of human destiny that the significance of a human Yes or No to God's claim has now scarcely a meaning. The difficulty of establishing the No is proved by Barth's refusal to give sin a status. He can even speak of the 'ontological impossibility of sin', of sin existing only on the left hand of God. The difficulty of establishing the Yes appears from the following passage:

> The decision and act of man are, of course, required by the direction given and revealed in Jesus Christ. But the requirement of the divine

direction is based on the fact that in Jesus Christ man has already been put in the place and kingdom of peace with God. His decision and act, therefore, can consist only in obedience to the fact that he begins and does not cease to breathe in this place and Kingdom, that he follows the decision already made and the act already accomplished by God, confirming them in his own human decision and act; that he for his part, chooses what has already been chosen and actualised for him. (IV.1, p. 100.)

That single word 'only' shows how Barth is still struggling against synergism, any endeavour to put what man has to do on the same level with what God has done. But this language is unauthentic. Is it not plain from the whole Bible, first, that God calls for a decision from man and, second, that the one thing God cannot do for man is to make man's decision *for* God on man's behalf? Berkouwer, the Dutch theologian, is surely right when he says that Barth's 'opposition to all synergism has brought him to the verge of the apokatastasis' (*The Triumph of Grace in the Theology of Karl Barth*, p. 295). If election in Christ is universal and if in election God has already taken the great decision, it seems difficult to halt on this verge. Nevertheless Barth does halt. Instead of moving to the full universalist position, he brings in the preaching and witnessing task of the Christian community. Let me quote a relevant passage from the *Church Dogmatics*, IV.1, p. 118.

The last word in the matter, both in theory and in practice, is that it is their concern, their task, their responsibility to shine as light in the darkness, to proclaim Him to others as the eternally living one, even to those who do not seem to know Him as such. It is one thing to be unreservedly in earnest today about the possibility of eternal damnation for some, and to rejoice equally unreservedly tomorrow at that of eternal reconciliation for all. But it is quite another (and this is the task of the Christian community) to know that one is responsible for attesting with the Christian word and the Christian existence (and the existence no less clearly than the word) Jesus Christ not only as the Lord but also as the Saviour of the world and therefore its future. Christians will never find that they are called to anything other than hope—for themselves and the world. If they were, they would find that they were called to look and to move forward to someone or something other than the Saviour. But then eo ipso they could be no longer Christians.

Now the fact that Barth's thought is moving in the direction of universalism does not lessen but heightens the significance of this halt to stress the crucial importance of Christian proclamation. The stop is arresting not only as marking a frontier

for human, Christian thinking or as reminding us of the place of the Church in God's purpose, but as showing that a theology verging upon universalism can recognise as well as a theology of a different kind how urgent the task of preaching the Gospel must be.

We have now considered, very baldly it must be confessed, two contrasting types of theology, each of which is drawn towards the idea of a universal salvation. In the former human freedom is a prerequisite for real personal relationship with God, the basis of that co-operation with God or resistance to Him which mark man off as a distinctive being, and, if resistance be persisted in, the reality which God must both respect and overcome in the fulfilment of His purpose to gather all men to Himself in Christ. In the latter, the accent falls on a divine decision in election which indeed acknowledges man (this is more and more true of Barth's theology) but does not give a comparable status to his freedom. Despite their differences, these two theologies have one massive emphasis in common. *It is the stress upon the outgoing, world-embracing, utterly faithful, endlessly self-spending grace of God towards mankind.* This shared insight is surely derived from a prolonged look at and reflection upon the heart of the biblical message. Both are urged towards the same goal by their understanding of God.

Are we to conclude, then, that a movement towards the idea of a universal salvation is inescapable for any serious grappling with the issue of man's final destiny in the light of the revealed character of God? I believe we must. The process at work in the minds of men like Barth and Farmer is a process which we can see at work in our own minds, in so far as we are Christian. It is a process which, starting from the sovereign and universal love of God, finds it impossible to come to rest save at the point where that love has won its final triumph by gathering all to the heart of God. The argument is built not upon the foundation of a carefully constructed catena of biblical texts but upon the view of God which is uncovered to us by the biblical revelation. The God who in Jesus Christ has shown Himself bound to man by His own loving will cannot allow man's sin to thwart His purpose for ever. That is where we begin. And from this we go on to say that because we ourselves have been and still are the objects of God's grace and concern which He directs

towards all, we do not desire, in the end, a salvation for ourselves in which the whole world of men does not share. We hesitate to take Paul's words upon our lips but we understand what was in his heart when he cried, 'I could wish that myself were accursed from Christ for my brethren' (Rom. 9.3). In so far as we even aspire to utter such a thought, we are aware that in its self-sacrificing and other-centred outreach it could only proceed from beyond our narrow selves, from God, from the Spirit of Christ. In the third place, the movement of the Christian mind towards the possibility of a salvation without limit is a movement away from everlasting Hell. If I may quote Ferré again: 'Heaven to those who truly love all, can be Heaven only when it has emptied Hell' (*The Christian Understanding of God*, p. 229). Which of us finds it possible to be at ease with a God who creates human beings in such a manner that the abuse of their freedom, however terrible, is visited with unending penalty? Many Christians, I suspect, settle the issue at the back of the mind by accepting the idea of abiding consequences and then limiting the duration of these consequences in the after-life. They are, in fact, crypto-universalists. I think, for instance, of P. T. Forsyth who, haunted as he almost was by the weight of the holy judgment of God upon sin, could yet write during the First World War, 'There are more conversions on the other side than on this.'

I have spoken throughout this lecture of *a movement in Christian thought towards universal salvation*. My own conviction is that this movement is an echo, a reflection, a derivative of the outgoing movement of God's love. Our thought cannot help travelling in the direction in which God is going. Two things, however, must be added, each of them a reminder that as Christians we dare not look at these matters as spectators from some lofty eminence but are personally and costingly involved with our whole existence. The first is that we have no right at all to envisage or speak of a world redemption unless we ourselves are working for it with our dedicated powers. The man who talks glibly of a God who will save all without allowing himself to be caught up into the redemptive passion of God shows thereby how ill he has understood what salvation is. The second thing that must be added is that what I have called an inescapable movement within the Christian mind

towards the idea of universal salvation is but a movement and is never quite out of tension with the recognition that it is a fearful thing to persist in the rejection of God. Do what we may, we cannot banish from the Christian consciousness the strong words of our Lord about fire, about darkness, about it being better for a man never to have been born. The appeal to our awful human responsibility remains. Thus the hope which Christians cannot but cherish that God in His great love will find His way ultimately to the throne of every human heart, cannot become the subject of preaching in the form of a dogma or cannot enter into preaching in a way that would diminish by one iota the answerability of the hearer as he listens to the Word of Life. But it can inform preaching as a dynamic, giving to it an insistent and urgent note of wooing that is in accord with the very spirit of the Gospel.

The tension between the Christian hope and the possibility of a continuing repudiation of God cannot be dissolved in this life. We feel that tension in ourselves and it is perhaps significant, when we reflect upon it, that when the mind dwells on the hope, it is a hope chiefly for others whereas when it dwells on the repudiation we feel we must be on our guard lest *we* be found rejecters of God. There are two passages in modern literature which make this point very forcibly. The first occurs in the essay which F. D. Maurice wrote on *Eternal Life and Eternal Death*. That essay reads now like a rather mild protest against an easy acceptance of everlasting or as he called it endless punishment, although it cost him his chair.

> There is one other consideration which I would impress very earnestly upon my brethren—especially upon the clergy—before I conclude. The doctrine of endless punishment is avowedly put forward as necessary for the reprobates of this world, the publicans and harlots, though perhaps religious men might dispense with it. Now I find in our Lord's discourses, that when He used such words as these, 'Ye serpents, ye generation of vipers, how shall ye escape the damnation of Hell?', He was speaking to religious men, to doctors of the Law; but that when He went amongst publicans and sinners, it was to preach the Gospel of the Kingdom of God. (*Theological Essays*, p. 324.)

That is worth pondering. The other passage comes from the chapter 'The Destiny of the Individual' in the late Dr A. E. Taylor's first volume of Gifford Lectures, *The Faith of a Moralist*, and has been often quoted. He concludes the discussion thus.

A living divine was recently reported, correctly or not, to have declared that 'if there really are diabolical men, no doubt their destiny is perdition, but I should hope that such men are very few'. I should like myself to hope that there are none such, but there is just one man, of the many whom I have known, about whom I feel it is salutary not to be over-sanguine, myself.

In other words there can be no false security in the Christian life. To take our own Christian standing and future for granted is to take God for granted. His love is not a cushion on which we can rest but a spur that drives us to obedient action. Because God is a consuming fire, His love freely offered to us in Christ compels us always to give our answer in responsible freedom. That is true whether for this world or for the next, if the law of the spiritual world abides. If the Christian hope is fulfilled in God's long future it will surely be not because God has beaten down all resistance but because with the ingenuity of His tireless grace He has found a means whereby to bring about the glad and free surrender of all. Whatever new forms it may assume that means will still be what we Christians call the way of the Cross.

DARKNESS, CHRIST, AND THE CHURCH IN THE FOURTH GOSPEL

by The Rev. Professor DAN O. VIA, Jr.

The Fourth Gospel, like Mark and Luke, makes no mention of the word *ecclesia*; but does John,[1] nevertheless, have a doctrine of the Church which he develops with other terms; and if so, how does he conceive it? Schlatter held that John had no parallel to the richly developed Pauline teaching on the Church.[2] E. F. Scott, however, has shown that one of the important purposes of the Fourth Gospel was to seek for the true nature of the Church instituted by Jesus. According to Scott John thought of the Church as both a spiritual, mystical community and an outward institution.[3] John's interest in the Church has been confirmed by more recent interpreters such as R. Newton Flew[4] and R. H. Strachan,[5] and C. K. Barrett believes that John more clearly than any other Gospel shows an awareness of the existence of the Church.[6] Bultmann also recognises this concern of the Fourth Gospel but stresses that it has no designation at all for 'Church' in the singular number. The Church is a collection of gathered individuals whose unity is primarily the unity of each individual with Christ.[7] The purpose of this paper will be to show from an interpretation of relevant passages that John conceives of the Church as a unity in a more organic sense than a collection of individuals, and the

[1] 'John' is used simply as the most convenient designation for the author, who is taken to be an unknown figure writing *ca.* A.D. 100. It will be assumed that the Gospel can be interpreted as a meaningful whole in its present form. Though a number of sources and various influences stand behind the Fourth Gospel, the hand which gave it to us has imposed on his materials a unity of thought, purpose, language, and style. See C. K. Barnett, *The Gospel According to St. John*, New York, 1957, p. 20; C. H. Dodd, *The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel*, Cambridge, 1953, p. 290. For a presentation of various theories of partition, redaction, and dislocation see W. F. Howard, *The Fourth Gospel in Recent Criticism and Interpretation* (revised by C. K. Barrett), London, 1955, pp. 95-128, 164-72, 297-303.

[2] Cited by R. Newton Flew, *Jesus and His Church*, London, 1951, p. 172.

[3] E. F. Scott, *The Fourth Gospel*, Edinburgh, 1951, pp. 109, 117-18, 138-9.

[4] Flew, op. cit., p. 172.

[5] *The Fourth Gospel*, London, 1951, pp. 45, 302-5. In his analysis of the Fourth Gospel, Strachan calls John 1.19-4.54 'The Origins of the Christian Church' and John 5-12 'The Conflict between the Church and the World', p. 97.

[6] C. K. Barrett, op. cit., p. 78.

[7] Rudolf Bultmann (translated by Kendrick Grobel), *Theology of the New Testament*, London, 1955, II, 91-92.

attempt will also be made to show that John's analysis of man's existential predicament implies the need for an organic community.

The argument will proceed on the assumption that for John the disciples represent the Church or are the Church in miniature so that what he says about the disciples he understands about the Church.[1] One category which John uses to interpret Jesus' mission is the Messiah of the Old Testament and Judaism[2]; Jesus is the *Μεσσίας* (1.41), the king of Israel (1.49), the Shepherd (10.11, 14) and the Holy One (6.69). He stands over against the flock (10.11ff), the branches of the vine (15.1-6), and the holy people (17.17-19). These images suggest the Old Testament people of God or the messianic community (Ps. 23.1; Isa. 40.11; Jer. 31.9; Ps. 78.70-72; Ezek. 37.24; Mic. 5.3; Song of Sol. 17.45; Isa. 5.1; Jer. 2.21; Ezek. 15.1-6, 19.10-14; Hos. 10.1; Lev. 19.2); and although the twelve may be spoken of sometimes as the leaders of the Church rather than as the Church in miniature (20.21, 15.27, 4.2, 12.21-22, 20.22-23),[3] the concept of the messianic community cuts across this distinction. The distinction is also diminished by the fact that both shepherds (10.2-3, 7) and sheep (10.9)[4] must go through the Door, Jesus, and all are in one flock under one Shepherd (10.16). In 17.20-21 there is clear continuity and unity between Jesus' disciples and later Christians.

Even when the twelve act as leaders, it is still the mission of the *Church* which they carry out. Here the Old Testament

[1] See F. J. A. Hort, *The Christian Ecclesia*, London, 1898, pp. 30, 31, 33; Flew, op. cit., p. 175; Scott, op. cit., pp. 137-8.

[2] For confirmation of this see Dodd, op. cit., pp. 87-93.

[3] See Scott, op. cit., pp. 137-8.

[4] W. F. Howard sees in 10.9 the undershepherds or pastors. They are saved and receive their pastoral authority by passing through the door, Jesus. See *Christianity According to St. John*, London, 1952, pp. 139-46; *The Interpreter's Bible*, New York and Nashville, 1952, VIII, 625. According to Strachan (op. cit., pp. 223-4), both 10.7 and 10.9 refer to the ordinary Christian who finds life by passing through Jesus the door. The reference to 'thieves and robbers' in 10.8, however, implies by indirection that Christian ministers must also pass through the door. That the 'thieves and robbers' refer to the synagogue officials who excommunicated the man born blind and/or to false Christian ministers (Strachan) seems more natural here than that they refer to messianic pretenders and bogus Hellenistic saviours (Barrett, op. cit., pp. 306, 308). Barrett holds 10.7 to mean that Jesus is the door to the sheep through which the true shepherd will enter and also the door through which the sheep enter the fold, while 10.9 has only the latter meaning (op. cit., p. 308). This seems close to the truth. It would seem that the shepherd of the sheep who goes through the door in 10.2 at least includes the minister, for it is not likely that John would think that Jesus had to have the porter's permission to enter (10.3).

concept of 'corporate personality' can help us. The Hebrew thinker starts with the whole or totality and sees each part or individual, not as a section of the whole, but as a manifestation or representation of the totality of the whole.[1] The Servant of Deutero-Isaiah is distinguished from Israel, for he has a mission to Israel (49.5-6, 53.4-5), and yet he is Israel (49.3). Although Israel fails to be the Servant and her task is fulfilled by a remnant or an individual, it is still *Israel's* mission that is fulfilled.[2] In a similar way do the disciples of Jesus in the Fourth Gospel represent the Church.

Let us turn now to a consideration of John's analysis of the human problem. The light, who is Jesus, has come into the world (1.9-10, 3.19, 8.12, 12.46), but the world (men in opposition to God) prefers the darkness (3.19, 9.40-41). It is probably more fruitful to recognise that light is a natural symbol for the divine or the real or what is salutary and that it came to John from many sources—Old Testament, Jewish, Qumran, Synoptic, Zoroastrian, Platonic, Gnostic, Hermetic[3]—than to attempt to pick out one as being solely determinative. John, however, is more nearly Hebraic than Hellenistic in his reluctance to say 'God *is* light'[4] and in his retaining the Hebraic ethical dualism or dualism of decision rather than adopting a metaphysical dualism.[5] The light which Jesus is shines on men and enables them to see where they are going, to understand themselves, to know what they really are (11.9, 9.4, 12.35).[6]

But men do not want to know what they really are. They prefer the darkness to light, blindness to sight (3.19-21, 9.40-41), and this preference for the darkness is what John means by sin.

[1] See J. Pedersen, *Israel*, London, 1954, I-II, 109-10, 178, 171ff; G. A. F. Knight, *A Biblical Approach to the Doctrine of the Trinity*, Edinburgh, 1953, p. 11. For a fuller discussion of the author's views on corporate personality and the Church see 'The Church as the Body of Christ in the Gospel of Matthew', *Scottish Journal of Theology*, XI (1958), 272-4.

[2] See H. H. Rowley, 'The Servant of the Lord in the Light of Three Decades of Criticism', *The Servant of the Lord and Other Essays on the Old Testament*, London, 1952, pp. 50-54.

[3] See Barrett, op. cit., pp. 277-8; Dodd, op. cit., pp. 201-3; Raymond E. Brown, 'The Qumran Scrolls and the Johannine Gospel and Epistles', *The Scrolls and the New Testament*, New York, 1957, pp. 184-6, 192-5.

[4] But see 1 John 1.5.

[5] Howard, *Christianity According to St. John*, p. 83. Barnett, op. cit., p. 277-8. Dodd, op. cit., pp. 202-3. Bultmann (op. cit., pp. 20-21) from a slightly different perspective states that the gnostic cosmological dualism becomes in John a dualism of decision.

[6] See Bultmann, op. cit., pp. 17-18.

Men cannot blame their sin on a cosmic fall or metaphysical dualism because the world came into being through the light (1.9-10). John does not attempt to give a mythical cause for the universality of sin but simply presents it as a *fact* in view of the coming of the light (1.5, 10). Nor does he give a mythical answer to the origin of darkness. Darkness is possible only because there is light; it is shutting oneself up against the light.[1]

Men refuse the light because they do not want to recognise that they are not autonomous, that their actions are not absolutely good. The light came for salvation (3.17), but men judge themselves by their response to it. They do not want to be shown that their works are good only if they are wrought in God (3.20-21).[2] The one work which God requires is that men believe on Him whom He has sent (6.27-29), but this is a work which God Himself performs (6.29, 44, 65; 8.47); that is to say, faith is a gift. Men, however, do not want the gift. All of this means that man refused to understand himself as a creature and to accept his life from God. Those who think that they see —who think that they can provide their own salvation—are blinded by the real light of genuine understanding because they close their eyes to it (9.38-41).

Man in the darkness, however, does not get along as well as he thought he would. He does not know where he is going (12.35), so he seeks glory from others (5.44). The δόξα which comes from man here has the ordinary Greek sense of reputation, honour, or distinction. Men cut off from the real source of life must try to provide some kind of lives for themselves. They find security by seeking distinction from one another. Thus being in the darkness is not just an individual matter but rather has a corporate and structural dimension. Once in this tight collectivity a man is victimised by it and becomes its slave (8.34). He may want to escape, but he is afraid to (12.42-43).

[1] ibid., pp. 18, 25. Dodd (op. cit., pp. 203, 210) seems to believe that for John the darkness was already there and the light made it manifest. Barrett (op. cit., p. 289) holds that the Devil's being ἀπ' ἀρχῆς (8.44) is parallel to the Word's being ἐν ἀρχῇ; He also allows that there may be a reference here to a fall from the truth ἐν ἀρχῇ. Hoskyns (Edwyn Hoskyns and Francis Noel Davey, *The Fourth Gospel*, London, 1947, pp. 343-4) states that the verb tense in Greek does not allow any reference to a fall of the Devil and holds that ἀρχῆς here refers to the fall of Adam. Bultmann says that the meaning of 8.44 is that the Devil lurks behind every sin; or sin shows that a man is in essence a sinner, determined by unreality (op. cit., p. 25).

[2] See Hoskyns, op. cit., pp. 207-9.

John says that even some of the rulers believed, but they were afraid to confess it lest they should be put out of the synagogue, for they loved the glory of men more than the glory of God.[1] This collective self-glorification is seen in the fact that men take pride in and find security in being sons of Abraham (8.33ff). We might say that for John there is a synagogue of darkness, and when a member of it sees the true light and no longer needs the glory of men, he is put out. Thus when the man born blind receives his sight from Jesus and believes, the inevitable result is that he is cast out of the synagogue (9.34-35, 16.2-3). There is no room for differences in this dark synagogue, for there can be no loose links in the chain of glory reception.

Since darkness has this corporate, structural dimension, salvation cannot be just an individual affair. A new community must replace the old one if man is to escape from his slavery. The new community is as much a unity as the old, in fact much more so, but it is informed by a power which creates relationships of a different sort and which makes possible diversity.

The revelation of the glory of God in the ministry of Jesus creates this community. In the LXX δόξα translates *kabod* which denotes heaviness or weight and often the riches or distinction of a man or nation. It can also mean a man's self or spirit, the inward thing wherein his weight or worth is believed to consist. Of God *kabod* denotes his revealed character and also a physical phenomenon in which His presence is made known. His presence might be in the storm (Ps. 29.3-5) or in his acts in history (Num. 14.22; Isa. 40.4-5) or in a bright, fiery appearance (Ezek. 1.28, 10.4; Exod. 24.16-17).[2]

Δόξα in ordinary Greek meant (1) opinion or (2) distinction, fame or reputation. In the New Testament as in the LXX it receives the meaning of *kabod* and retains the connotation of reputation or distinction but not that of opinion.[3] We have

[1] The vision of the human predicament in Sartre's *No Exit* is very similar to John's. Garcin arrives at the conclusion that hell is other people. It is other people in the precise sense that one cannot escape the necessity of winning approval from them. The door to hell flies open, but Garcin refuses to go out of it because he must stay and convince Inez that he is not a coward. He will not face the uncertainty on the other side of the door and risk life alone, so he shuts the door. There is much similarity between John's synagogue of darkness and Sartre's Second-Empire-drawing-room-hell, but, of course, there is a great difference: the synagogue has an exit.

[2] A. M. Ramsey, *The Glory of God and the Transfiguration of Christ*, London, 1949, pp. 9-17. [3] ibid., pp. 23, 27.

already seen in John the meaning of reputation or distinction, but much more important is the peculiarly biblical sense of the manifestation of the character and presence of God in a manner accessible to human experience.[1]

The result of the Word's becoming flesh is that we beheld His glory (1.14).[2] Ramsey has pointed out that the deepest significance of the glory is the paradox that the eternal Word became perishing flesh. In the man Jesus God is present to men. Since God and Jesus are one (10.30) and to see the Son is to see the Father (12.45, 14.9), John can speak of seeing the glory of God or Jesus and of the glorification of God or Jesus and mean the same thing (1.14, 11.40, 12.41, 17.24, 2.11, 13.31-32, 12.27-28, 14.31, 7.1-2). It can be seen from the foregoing passages that the whole life of Jesus is understood as the manifestation of God's glory, but this is especially true of His passion. The first explicit identification between glory and Jesus' death is in 12.23-28 though it has been hinted at in 7.39 and 12.16. God's presence is most fully revealed in the act in which Jesus most fully expresses Himself—His death of love for men.[3] At the moment in which Judas went out to accomplish his deed the passion was virtually accomplished.[4]

The glorification of God in the death of Christ gives life to men (17.1-2) and also creates a community (12.32-33, 11.52, 10.11, 15-16). It is by laying down His life for the sheep that He gathers them into one flock with one Shepherd. And it is by being lifted up on the Cross (and in exaltation) that He draws all men unto Himself. It is then by no means impossible that when John says that the temple which Jesus will raise up is the temple of His body (2.21) he is making a kind of cryptic reference to the Church as the body of Christ.[5] It is obviously a reference to the Resurrection, but John's use of double meanings is well known.[6] If the double meaning is to be seen here, it expresses the same idea found in the other passages just cited: Jesus' death gives birth to the Church. We are very close to Paul's idea that the crucified body of Christ (Col. 1.21-22;

[1] Dodd, op. cit., p. 206. [2] op. cit., p. 59.
[3] Dodd. op. cit., pp. 207-8. [4] Ramsey, op. cit., p. 71.
[5] This interpretation is favoured by Strachan (op. cit., p. 127), Dodd (op. cit., p. 302), and R. H. Lightfoot (*St. John's Gospel*, Oxford, 1956, p. 114). Hoskyns (op. cit., p. 196) thinks that it is implicitly there, and Barrett (op. cit., pp. 167-8) thinks that this idea may be there.
[6] For examples see Barrett, op. cit., pp. 132, 173.

Eph. 2.15) makes possible the body of His Church (Eph. 2.15-16; Rom. 7.4).[1]

Since the glorification of God results in both eternal life and a new community, the implication is that there is not real life apart from community. Jesus gives to the disciples the glory that God has given Him so that they may be one (17.22). The glory of Christ is the glory of God which is given to men though they are not seeking it but are rather seeking their own glory (5.44, 7.18). In 5.44 the glory from men (fame and distinction) and the glory from God (His self-manifestation) are very diverse in origin, and in John they retain their distinctive meanings, and yet the Johannine context gives to the two concepts a certain common signification. Glory in each case is the source of life. When one seeks his own glory, he speaks from himself (7.18), that is to say, he regards himself as autonomous. He believes that he can provide his own life or at least that he can with the help of the human community (5.44). But he cannot, for to live as if he can is to live in falsehood, unreality, and death (8.44, 8.21, 24).[2] The glory of God, on the other hand, confers real life in abundance (10.10, 17.2). The cohesive principle of the synagogue of darkness was that men sought glory from one another. But they have been delivered from that anxious necessity if they will accept deliverance. A very different kind of community is created by a new cohesive power, the glory of God (17.22), and it is different because the glory of God is manifested in that the eternal Word became flesh and the incarnate Word gave his life for the world. Let us look further into how the glory of God in Christ constitutes the Church.

Whether or not John is referring to the Church when he speaks of Christ's body in 2.21, something like Paul's concept of the body of Christ is present if it can be shown that for the Fourth Gospel the risen Christ is present in the Church and identifies Himself with it and that the Church carries out the messianic functions.[3] John speaks in the farewell discourses of the return of Christ to the disciples (14.3, 18-20, 21, 23, 27-28, 16.16, 22, 25) and also of the sending of the Spirit by God (14.16-17, 26) or by Jesus (15.26, 16.7). These passages seem

[1] J. A. T. Robinson, *The Body*, S.C.M., 1952, pp. 48-49.
[2] See Bultmann, op. cit., pp. 18-21.
[3] For a fuller discussion of the author's view on the body in Paul and for a justification of this scheme see op. cit., pp. 271-5.

to raise two main questions of interpretation. Does the coming of Jesus refer to the *parousia* or to the resurrection or to both? Is the Spirit the same as the risen Christ?

The discourses are dominated by the ideas of going and coming,[1] and often the language can refer either to the death and resurrection of Jesus or to His ascension and *parousia* thus indicating by the very ambiguity of the language the eschatological nature of the Cross and Resurrection.[2] The best interpretation would seem to be that 14.3 refers in rather traditional eschatological terms (cf. 1 Thess. 4.13-18; Matt. 16.28) to the *parousia* of the Messiah,[3] although Lightfoot[4] believes that it speaks of a vision of the unveiled glory of the Lord which the disciples will have in the next world. The other references to Jesus' coming probably have in mind the Resurrection, especially in view of the 'little while' in 14.19 and 16.16. Dodd holds that John has reinterpreted popular Christian eschatology so that the 'return' of Christ is no longer a real future coming but the epiphany of the love of God described in 14.21-24. Thus 14.3, according to Dodd, does not have its obvious meaning.[5] Hoskyns and Barrett, on the other hand, hold that genuine eschatology is not abandoned though the advent is not exhausted in the old Synoptic view of the *parousia*. The latter is anticipated in the coming of the Spirit and in the Resurrection. It is the peculiar characteristic of Christian eschatology to affirm the partial but not complete fulfilment of the age to come.[6] In any case the resurrected Christ is present with the disciples for John.

The evangelist, however, speaks about the coming of the Spirit in the same contexts. Does he, then, distinguish between the resurrected Christ and the Spirit? Some have held that he does not,[7] and Strachan[8] holds that in the farewell discourses the Spirit is practically equivalent to the risen Christ—His *alter ego*. The idea is similar to Paul's in 2 Cor. 3.17: 'The Lord is the Spirit.' Hoskyns states emphatically that the advent of Christ in these passages is not an interpretation of the Spirit

[1] See Dodd, op. cit., p. 403. [2] Barrett, op. cit., p. 409.
[3] See Dodd, op. cit., p. 404; Barrett, op. cit., p. 382; Hoskyns, op. cit., p. 454; Strachan, op. cit., p. 280.
[4] op. cit., p. 276. [5] Dodd, op. cit., p. 405.
[6] Hoskyns, op. cit., p. 454. Barrett, op. cit., pp. 380, 382, 387, 410.
[7] Cited by Hoskyns, op. cit., p. 459. [8] op. cit., pp. 288-9.

but is a distinct resurrection appearance.[1] Nor does Barrett suppose that John simply confounds Jesus with the Holy Spirit. Yet the thought of the coming of Jesus is deepened by the conception of the Spirit by whom the divine presence is effected.[2] I think we can hardly escape the conclusion that John does distinguish theoretically between Jesus and the Spirit but probably not experientially.

What does the presence of the exalted Christ mean for the nature of the community? The Church is one flock of sheep with one Shepherd (10.16). It is obvious that the situation described here is future from the standpoint of Jesus' historical ministry with the Church being made up of both Jewish and gentile members. Thus the Shepherd is the risen Christ. But is the unity of the flock no more organic or intimate than that imposed on a flock of sheep by the fact that they are gathered in one fold? Actually we must look at other passages in order to ascertain the nature of the oneness involved.

In chapter 17 Jesus prays that the Church may be one as He and God are one, that is, that the Church may be one in God and Jesus as God is in Jesus and Jesus in God (17.11, 21-23). The oneness of the Church, then, is not an accident but is rooted in the nature of ultimate reality and partakes of the nature of that reality. Let us, therefore, consider John's view of the unity of Father and Son. We had already noted that Father and Son are one so that to see the Son is to see the Father. Alongside this is the notion of mutual indwelling found in 17.21-23, 14.10-11, 20. This oneness is not a matter of static essence for it expresses itself in action. God does His *works* in Jesus (14.10) or Jesus does God's works (5.17, 19, 8.28-29, 9.4). This, however, is not merely an external relationship of obedience, for God and Jesus share the same life (5.26). And this finally is grounded in God's love for Jesus and Jesus' responsive love for God (5.20, 3.35, 14.31).[3] If John had understood Jesus' divine status purely in terms of a relationship to God he would have omitted the mutual indwelling passages and the statement that the Father gave the Son to have life in Himself (not to mention others). I think that it can hardly be denied

[1] Hoskyns, op. cit., p. 459.
[2] Barrett, op. cit., p. 387.
[3] See Dodd, op. cit., pp. 194-5.

that there are ontological as well as relational elements in John's Christology, and when this is transposed to the Church it means that the Church's unity is in some sense organic as well as ethical.[1] The argument now brings us inevitably to a consideration of the vine and its branches (15.1-10).

As usual neither Christ nor the Church is considered by John in isolation from the eternal saving purpose of God. The Father is the husbandman, and Christ is the vine while the disciples are branches (15.1, 5). Do we have here the description of a real organism filled with life from a single source or do we have a mere metaphor, or is this a false antithesis, and should we say '*mere* metaphor'? These same questions are raised in connexion with Paul's ecclesiological concept of the body of Christ, and it will be helpful in this discussion to make references to Paul's thought. Those who hold a 'Catholic' ecclesiology maintain that the Church is a living organism in the real sense of the words, signifying the corporeality of the continuing presence of Christ in the world. All that happened to the physical organism of Christ's body now happens to us in a mystical order.[2] Ernest Best, on the other hand, speaking about the 'body of Christ' (but the same principle applies to the vine and branches) argues convincingly that such terms should not be taken literally. The language is not ontological or realistic; it is rather metaphorical. For Paul the Church cannot be ontologically the body of Christ and also a temple, a virgin, and an olive tree.[3] So in John the Church cannot be ontologically branches in a vine and also a flock of sheep. But have we settled the matter when we simply say that these terms are metaphors indicating a certain likeness?

Is a metaphor merely a less efficient and exact way of saying something that could be said better in direct speech? C. H. Dodd in his discussion of symbolism in the Fourth Gospel has argued that since Christ is the *ἀληθινός* vine, light, or bread—the real or the genuine in a Platonic sense—the symbol actually is the thing symbolised. Also in the Hebrew prophetic אוֹת

[1] Bultmann (op. cit., p. 92) is well aware of the ethical unity.

[2] See references in J. Robert Nelson, *The Realm of Redemption*, London, 1956, p. 101.

[3] Ernest Best, *One Body in Christ*, London, 1955, pp. 98-101. The same concern is expressed by Floyd Filson in his *Jesus Christ the Risen Lord*, New York and Nashville, 1956, p. 193.

(sign) the thing symbolised is given in the sign (Ezek. 4.1-3).[1] Perhaps biblical theologians can be helped by a literary critic like Cleanth Brooks. He points out that the function of metaphor is not to illustrate or to decorate. It is the necessary and inevitable means for saying what the poet has to say and is a mode of apprehending and discovering truth. A metaphor says something which cannot be said in another way or paraphrased.[2] Of course, the Gospel of John is not a novel or a play, but what Brooks has to say seems to be basic for the meaning of metaphor wherever it is used. What then is the Church spoken of as branches-in-the-vine? It is not just a collection of individuals somehow like branches in a vine. It is a living organism nourished by the life of the resurrected Christ present in it, but it is not literally this. If it be asked what it is literally, the only answer is that if this could be known it would not have been necessary to use a metaphor. The recognition that the Church really is this living organism raises the question of whether it is the extension of the incarnation, which must be considered later.

The organism theory has been criticised penetratingly by F. W. Dillistone who makes the charge that this view whether in Church or State when interpreted literally and biologically must result in the extremes of totalitarianism. He points out that Christians have used methods for the restraint of personal freedom which are just as ruthlessly effective as those used by political dictators.[3] What Dillistone says about the Church's restraint of freedom is certainly true, but is that not because the Church has failed to be what the New Testament conceives it to be? I have declined to accept the organism view literally, but I do take it more realistically than I feel Dillistone does, so some defence is called for on my part. Filson also holds that neither the body of Christ nor the vine and its branches does justice to the individual will and responsibility of the Christian.[4]

[1] Dodd, op. cit., pp. 138-1. H. Wheeler Robinson ('Prophetic Symbolism', *Old Testament Essays*, London, [1927], p. 11) argues that in Hebrew thought metaphysical significance was ascribed to events in the external world so that they were conceived as parts of a larger whole of reality.

[2] Cleanth Brooks, 'Metaphor and the Function of Criticism', *Spiritual Problems in Contemporary Literature*, New York, 1957, pp. 133-5.

[3] F. W. Dillistone, 'How is the Church Christ's Body?', *Theology Today*, II (1945), 59f. Cited by Nelson, op. cit., p. 102.

[4] Filson, op. cit., p. 193.

Let us now take a closer look at John 15.1-10 and at other Johannine passages to see if he allows any place for authoritarianism or slavish conformity.

The vine image conveys metaphorically what the New Testament means by *koinonia*. This important term means participation in something in which others also participate, not, as is often thought, the notion of fellowship in the sense of association with other persons.[1] In John 15 the branches participate in the vine along with other branches, or disciples abide in Jesus and love one another. Martin Buber's thought is very close to this: 'The true community does not arise through people's having feelings for one another (though indeed not without it), but through, first, their taking their stand in living mutual relation with the living Centre, and, second, their being in living mutual relation with one another. The second has its source in the first, but is not given when the first alone is given.'[2]

[1] For the meaning of *koinonia* see J. Y. Campbell, 'Koinonia and its Cognates in the New Testament', *Journal of Biblical Literature*, LI (1932), 353.

[2] Martin Buber (translated by Ronald G. Smith), *I and Thou*, Edinburgh, 1944, p. 45. The Qumran Sect used the word *Yaḥad* as a name for the community, and Dupont-Sommer ([translated by E. Margaret Rowley] *The Dead Sea Scrolls*, Oxford, 1952, p. 46) held that the term is comparable to the Greek *koinonia*. This identification was challenged by George Edwards ('The Qumran Sect and the New Testament Church', unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Duke University, 1955, pp. 132-8) who pointed out that the dominant element in *yaḥad* is association rather than participation in something held in common: however, there is some similarity between the two words at the point of community sharing. Ralph Marcus ('Philo, Josephus, and the Dead Sea *Yaḥad*', *Journal of Biblical Literature*, LXXI [1952], 207-9) had also recognised that in both biblical and post-biblical Hebrew *yaḥad* normally means 'together' and not 'community', and he implies that the connotation of 'community' in 1QS is a change from the usual. He associates *yaḥad*, however, with the Greek ὅμολος which Philo and Josephus used of the Essenes. This word means 'crowd', usually in the sense of 'disorderly crowd'.

Frank Cross (*The Ancient Library of Qumran*, London, 1958, pp. 57-61, 155-6) sees a close parallel between the unity of the church in the Fourth Gospel and the *yaḥad* of the Scrolls. He holds that *yaḥad* refers to the principal sect community, the one at Qumran, and that it has also the more general sense of the eschatalogical community of the new covenant. It also refers to the activities of the sect 'in common'. Cross associates *yaḥad* with *koinonia* and suggests such English renderings as 'community', 'communion', 'unity', 'fellowship', and 'togetherness'. He does not appear, however, to distinguish between the ideas of association and participation in something held in common.

Bo Reicke ('The Constitution of the Primitive Church in the Light of Jewish Documents', *The Scrolls and the New Testament*, New York, 1957, pp. 148, 149, 156) affirms that the Qumran *yaḥad* is an organic community constituted by the strict hierarchic ranking of the various classes (priests, Levites, and Israel) within the community. Yet, he says, the members were not so closely united as the brothers in Christ would later be. This is the key to the real difference between the Qumran *yaḥad* and the Johannine Church.

The Qumran Sect was a messianic community in a stricter sense than Judaism in general; the messianic events have started to happen by anticipation. Possibly

The vine-and-its-branches is no static uniformity which negates individual responsibility, for we see here the New Testament paradox of the indicative and imperative. The vine is the source of life and the branches (disciples) are a part of it, not because of their deserving or choosing, but because Jesus' Word, which is life (6.63, 68), has cleansed them (15.3), and He has chosen them (15.16, cf. 6.44). At the same time the disciples are told to abide in the vine (15.4a, 9b), and this means keeping Jesus' commandment (15.10) which is the commandment to love (15.12). If the branches do not thus abide by producing fruit, they are cast out (15.2a, 6, 10). The conditional sentences in 15.6 and 15.10 are undetermined conditions; there is not absolute certainty that one is going to abide. Existentially this means that one may abandon his response to grace. Ecclesiastically it suggests that John allows for the possibility of excommunication as does Matt. 18.17. We see here that grace creates the community in which the command is given. In fact, they are two sides to the same reality (15.16). The demand is in the gift. And the more one obeys the command made possible by grace the more grace can operate so that even more can be achieved ethically (15.2, 7, 16).

There is then responsibility grounded in grace, and responsibility means individuality. The theme of unity in diversity does not express itself as explicitly perhaps in John as it does in Paul's metaphor of the body with different kinds of members, but the Church as John understands it certainly does not consist in an undifferentiated and stifling uniformity. Two or three passages especially imply that there are no external ecclesiastical norms which could impose a conformity and enable men to escape the risk of being an individual before God. It is true that these ideas in John take the form of a criticism of Judaism

the Teacher of Righteousness was expected to return as Messiah, but he was not and is not the Messiah. For the Church, on the other hand, Jesus by His Resurrection has introduced the age to come and already rules as Lord and Christ (see Krister Stendahl, 'The Scrolls and the New Testament: An Introduction and a Perspective', *The Scrolls and the New Testament*, pp. 5, 12-14, 15; Cross, op. cit., pp. 181, 183). Sometimes the *yaḥad* seems to mean no more than 'together' or 'in association' (1QS 6.3, 8, 9.6). At other times there is the idea of participation or sharing: in common property and mutual knowledge (1QS 1.11-12, 5.2, 6.18), in common meals (1QS 6.5), in the law and covenant (1QS 5.2-3, 1.16), and perhaps in a common lot or spirit (1QS 3.17-19, 20, 2.2, 5, 3.7, 4.15). In the Fourth Gospel, however, the members of the Church share together in the transcendent life of the resurrected Son of God, which enables one to live in the world, and not withdraw from it, while freeing one from the enslaving powers of the world.

but the principles are just as applicable to the Church, and John was aware of the Church's failings also. One may not take refuge in simply belonging to the Christian community, for those who claim to be sons of Abraham turn out to be singularly unlike Abraham (8.39-40). Nor may one presume upon his relationship with God and assume that it is securely intact, for those who claim to be sons of God turn out to be sons of the Devil (8.41-44). And one is not allowed to rest secure and safe in the authority of the Scriptures, for those who think to find eternal life by searching them are unable to recognise the bringer of life who is standing in their midst (5.37-40). It may also be relevant to mention that the man born blind, who at one point does not know who Jesus is, later came to say 'Lord, I believe', while the Jews who are quite sure who He is (that He is a sinner) never really find out (9.24-25, 38).[1]

We can see that in John's view of the Church there is certainly no loss of individuality nor responsibility. Rather one is always in the precarious existential situation of having to make a decision about the Word of life present in Jesus. But we must not forget the other side of the paradox, that this is done within the life of an organic community.[2] It is not just that Church members form an organism, but they with Christ do: *He* is the vine in which they have life. Christ so identifies Himself with the Church that to receive the Church is to receive Christ (13.20).[3]

Does this mean that for John the Church is the 'extension of the incarnation'? Is there a confusion between Christ and the Church? Claude Chavasse has contended that the figure of the body of Christ does not do justice to the fundamental and original apartness of the Word of God and man. The metaphor of the vine and its branches is more adequate, but neither is as

[1] In view of all this it is difficult to believe that E. F. Scott is quite right when he says (op. cit., pp. 119-21) that orthodoxy as a necessary condition for salvation has its roots in John. Scott also recognises, however, that John wanted to allow for new ideas and to prevent an undue hardening of doctrine.

[2] An indirect confirmation of the deep insight of John is seen in Seward Hiltner (*Sex and the Christian Life*, New York, 1957, p. 76): 'A "field theory" of personality is developing, according to which each man's individuality is real but is to be seen as the "focus" of a whole "field" or network of interrelationships. Without such a network or field, there could not be a focus. Focus and field are related internally and not merely accidentally.' Hiltner cites Gardner Murphy, *Personality: A Biosocial Approach to Origins and Structure*, New York, 1947.

[3] Virtually the same saying is found in Matt. 10.40. See the author's view (op. cit., pp. 276ff) of the Messiah's identification with the Church in Matthew.

suitable as the bride of Christ.[1] E. F. Scott, on the other hand, holds that John accepts in a fuller or more literal sense than Ephesians the idea that the Church is the body of Christ: Christ perpetuates His incarnation in the Church.[2] Over against this idea it has been argued that the inevitable end of such a doctrine must be the Roman Catholic dogmas of the Mass and the Papacy. If the Church is itself the incarnation of God, then it need not point beyond itself to Christ as true preaching must do.[3]

It would seem best to abandon the idea of the extension of the incarnation because it leads to confusion and does not really say what John (and the rest of the New Testament) wants to say about the Church. We have seen that the Church is organically related to Christ and that He identifies Himself with it. But the Church is not identical with nor equal to Him. He is unique. Only the Son has seen the Father and declared Him (1.18, 6.46). Only the Son of Man has descended from and ascended to heaven (3.13). And it must not be forgotten that John also presents the Church as a flock under a Shepherd, which clearly points to the Church's subordinate place distinct from Christ. We can well heed the words of Markus Barth which were written with respect to Paul's body of Christ metaphor but which are relevant here. Christ is the Church, but the Church is not Christ for the New Testament, although logic may say so. When Christ identifies Himself with the Church, it is His mercy and power which are being praised and not any divine nature of the Church.[4]

Perhaps it should be said here also that John's view of the Church does not permit the idea that Church members are mystically absorbed in Christ or God or each other so that there is a loss of individual personality. Life with God and life in the Christian community are mediated by the *historical event* of the Word's becoming flesh or God's giving His Son (1.14, 3.16, 12.32-33). This life is life in love which can never be reduced to mere emotion or mystical contemplation. It is the kind of love which derives both its power and its quality from the love

[1] See Claude Chavasse, *The Bride of Christ*, pp. 17, 61. Cited by Nelson, op. cit. p. 80.
[2] Scott, op. cit., pp. 142-3.
[3] See Nelson, op. cit., pp. 98-99.
[4] Markus Barth, 'A Chapter on the Church—The Body of Christ', *Interpretation*, XII (1958), 141, 148.

which was *active* in the Cross (10.14-15, 12.32-33, 15.12-13).

Keeping in mind that the Church is not identified with Christ let us return to the Johannine notion that Christ is identified with the Church. This is true in the sense that and for the reason that the risen Christ is present in the Church and carries out His ministry through the Church. The Church performs messianic functions.

Jesus is the holy One of God (6.69) who does what He sees the Father doing (5.19). Or He has come to accomplish the will of God (6.38ff) which is that those who believe might have eternal life. By accomplishing God's work, which is the manifestation of His name (17.6), He has glorified God (17.4). The Church also is made holy by God and Jesus (17.16-20) so that it may share in the work of Christ (4.33ff). In fact, the believer will not only do the works of Jesus but even greater works because Jesus goes to the Father (14.12).[1] Thus God is also glorified in the fruits of the Church (15.8).

For John, however, Jesus is not who He is simply because as a man He does the will of God. He has been 'sent' by God from God's very presence (3.34, 5.38, 7.28-29, 7.33, 8.26, 42, 16.27-28, 1.9-10) into the world. He is the only One who has seen God (6.46, 1.18), and He bears witness to what He has seen (3.11) and speaks what He has heard (8.26, 38). Thus the words which Jesus speaks are God's words (3.34, 8.40, 43, 47, 12.49-50) and as such they are Spirit and life (12.50, 6.63), and they save men from death (8.51). Though the Son has come with the Word of life into the world, He is not of the world. He is from the world above which makes Him very different from those of the world beneath (3.13, 3.31, 6.38, 8.23). Not only does He come *from above*, He has always *been* (1.1, 8.58, 17.5).

Inasmuch as Jesus Himself is the equivalent of His true Word of life (cf. 14.6 with 8.31-32; cf. 14.6 with 6.63, 5.24) and Jesus' Word equals God's Word (see above), it is natural for John to say that Jesus *is* the eternal Word of God made flesh (1.1, 14), and He *is* also life and light (1.4ff, 14.6, 8.12, 11.25) as we have seen. In a way it comes as a kind of surprise, but Bultmann

[1] For example, the disciples baptise by Jesus' authority, and in this action He acted. So John can say that Jesus baptised and did not baptise (3.22, 4.1-2). See Hoskyns, op. cit., p. 225.

would seem to be right when he holds that in John Jesus does not communicate any teaching but calls men to Himself. *He* is the gift (6.35, 8.12, 11.25, 14.6). He does not say what He saw with the Father but simply that He is the revealer present to men from God bringing in His person what the world has been longing for. He brings it only by saying that He is it.[1] I think it should be added, however, that for John Jesus also *acts* out what it means to be the incarnate Word and within the soteriological indicative is the ethical imperative. The categories of the world above and pre-existence John probably derives from the Old Testament pre-cosmic wisdom concept, from Rabbinic speculation on the Torah, from Philo, and from the mythology of Jewish apocalypse and Gnosticism. He uses them to affirm that the appearance of the eternal Word in history has transcendent dimensions. It comes from beyond history, not from within. The Word-Light gives men the right to become sons of God, but to those who refuse the light He is a judge (1.12-13, 5.27, 30, 8.16, 3.17, 18, 8.15, 12.47).

Along with the conception of incarnation there is in John another christological theme. Here Jesus is not the final Word of God because He came down from above but because He makes Himself nothing (5.19, 30, 31-32, 8.28, 50, 54, 12.49), though the two themes are not always separated (5.19, 7.16, 28, 8.28, 12.49). The Son is lifegiver and judge because He realises that He can do nothing of Himself. He does not seek His own will and does not bear witness of Himself or give His own teaching, for if He did, His witness would not be true. Nor does He seek His own glory because if He did, His glory would be nothing. The Jews condemn Jesus for making Himself equal with God (5.18), but Jesus replies that He can do nothing of Himself (5.19, 30-32). Hoskyns has discussed this whole theme with great penetration, and he has affirmed that the understanding of the Fourth Gospel depends wholly on the meaning of the reversing of 'making himself' and 'nothing of himself'.[2] Because the Son so completely renounces His own

[1] Bultmann, op. cit., pp. 41, 61-69.

[2] Hoskyns, op. cit., pp. 254-5. Tillich would seem to be quite Johannine when he holds that Jesus demonstrates his character as the Christ in the sacrifice of himself as Jesus to himself as the Christ. The New Testament picture shows no trace of self-elevation in spite of his awareness of his messianic role. See Paul Tillich, *Systematic Theology*, Chicago, 1957, II, 123, 126.

will and glory, He becomes transparent to the divine, eternal Word; and thus it shines through Him. To see Jesus then is to see God (10.30, 14.9).

It seems that we have in the Fourth Gospel two christological motifs: incarnation and a kind of adoptionism. Or at least we have both a *katagogic* and an *anagogic* movement. The eternal Word becomes flesh, and the man from Galilee makes himself transparent to the eternal Word. These are two ways of approaching the paradox of an eschatological event in the middle of history, and there would seem to be no rational synthesis.

G. V. Jones in his interesting *Christology and Myth in the New Testament* has taken the position that to speak of a divine figure becoming human is metaphor or myth, and, if the latter, it should be abandoned or given intelligible historical-personal terms. Mythological formulations are not necessary for an adequate christology.[1] How then is the myth to be reinterpreted? At one point Jones seems to believe that the 'new' quality in Jesus can be accounted for as the once-for-all 'emergence' of all that was implicit in the deepest potentialities of Israel's history.[2] Later on, however, he states that the category of evolution is inadequate as a means of reducing the mythological thinking, though it is illuminating up to a point.[3] Jones believes that the notion of pre-existence should be rejected as improbable, not deducible from known data, and not implied in a well-attested Synoptic saying. We are left with a picture of Jesus whose knowledge of God was unique and complete and whose relationship with God rested on the initiative of the divine redemptive purpose. This can be regarded as adoption without any loss of the full Christian faith, for the Son's knowledge of God is so complete that His mind expresses God's mind. We can speak of the perfect interpenetration of the divine and human in Jesus though we cannot say how this took place.[4]

We can agree with Jones' able statement as far as it goes, but is it really much less mysterious and mythological than the New Testament's statements? And does his attempt to reduce the *katagogic* to the *anagogic* really do justice to the christology

[1] G. V. Jones, *Christology and Myth in the New Testament*, London, 1956, pp. 73, 91.
[2] ibid., p. 134. [3] ibid., p. 142. [4] ibid., pp. 142-4.

of John and the other New Testament theologians? To be sure, the idea of pre-existence is mythological; and we cannot take literally the descent and ascent nor can we make any facile identification between Jesus and the eternal Son. If we are to be true to John's christology, however, must the myth not mean that Jesus comes from the depths of God's being and not just convey the impact of the Christ event on my existence? But no myth can really be translated completely into other terms. If Jesus was the incarnation of God's eternal saving purpose just because He made the right response, even upon God's initiative, someone else might also make the response. To ensure the *finality* of the revelation in Christ, the New Testament also affirms that the pre-existent Son became incarnate.[1] We can probably not give a better christological formulation than John who held in tension the proclamations that the Word became flesh and that Jesus sought not His own will and glory. Perhaps the closest we come to a resolution of the tension is in the dramatic symbol of the foot-washing. Jesus, who knows His divine origin and destiny (13.3), assumes the role of a slave (13.4-5), and is thereby known as Lord (13.13).

Let us return to the Church. As Jesus was sent by God into the world so He sends the Church into the world (17.18, 20.21) and gives to the Church His Word (15.15b, 17.8, 14) which becomes the Church's word (17.20). The Church then has a proclamation just as did her Lord. And as Jesus was in the world but not of it, the same is true for the Church (17.16) though its proclamation confronts the world (17.20).

What is the content of the Church's word? It is its witness to Jesus (15.26-27). Just because Jesus does not bear witness to Himself (5.31), He does bear witness to Himself (8.13-14), and His witness is true because it is God who is bearing witness in Him (8.14, 16, 18). The Church, however, does not bear witness to itself even in this paradoxical manner. Jesus' message is that salvation is present in Himself, and the Church's word is that salvation is present in Jesus. John gives no room for any deification or autonomy of the Church. Anyone who speaks from himself seeks his own glory (7.18) and is cut off from God

[1] The myth of the glorious return of Christ serves the same purpose, but once his cosmic significance for the end has been seen it is only logical to see it at the beginning also. Moreover, the symbol of pre-existent agency in creation prevents better than the *parousia* does any radical discontinuity between nature and grace.

(5.44). But the Church under the impact of the Spirit's presence will bear witness only to Jesus (15.26-27, 16.13-14) and in an ever creative way (16.12-13). Thus it will convict the world (16.8). It has been necessary to stress that for John the Church's ministry of the Word is derivative and grounded in Jesus' ministry, but we would do John a great disservice if we ignored that in his thought the mission of the Church *is* effective and decisive because the resurrected Lord is present in the Church.

Jesus is light and life but the judge of those who prefer darkness; therefore, the Church as sent by Him has the power to forgive and to retain sins (20.23).[1] *Ἀφίημι* is not used elsewhere in John in this sense,[2] but Jesus does deliver from the death caused by sin (8.21, 24), and He is the Lamb who takes away the sin of the world (1.29). This power of the Church to forgive and retain is the power of its Word which is able to create belief in some and to judge others (17.20, 20.31). As Hoskyns has said, the eschatological mission of the Church is to preserve Christ's words in such a way that the world hears His voice (14.26, 16.4, 17.20, 21). Living waters flow from Christ to the disciples and from them to the world.[3]

Not only does the Church's word create belief but its very unity is a manifestation to the world that God sent Jesus (17.21, 23) and that He loves the Church as He loves Jesus (17.23). The meaning seems to be that the Church participates in the communal nature of the divine reality to such an extent that it makes that reality present to the world.

We move finally to the Church's participation in Jesus' suffering. In the Cross God and Jesus are glorified (12.23-28, 13.31-32), and their love for men is revealed (3.16, 13.34). But Jesus gives His glory—what He really is—to the Church (17.22); in fact, it is this which constitutes the unity of the Church. This means that the Church shares in His suffering. As He was hated and persecuted, so will the Church be (7.7, 15.18, 19, 20-21, 16.2-3).

[1] The Greek is *ἀφίημι* and *πρατέω*. Compare Matt. 16.19, 18.18 where it is *δέω* and *λύω*.

[2] See Barrett, op. cit., p. 475.

[3] Hoskyns, op. cit., pp. 270, 320. Barrett (op. cit., p. 475) suggests that there may also be a reference here to conferring or not conferring baptism. It is also possible that the power of excommunication is in mind (15.6).

Nowhere is the meaning of Jesus' suffering more movingly portrayed than in John 13. In view of the contextual relationships it can hardly be doubted that John understands the foot-washing as a symbol for the total ministry of the eternal Word become flesh, which is consummated in the Cross. It is not just a lesson in humility but a symbol of Jesus' death which gives to men life and cleansing (13.7, 10).[1] In this action the Church is to share (13.14-15). The disciples are to behave as their Lord. This is not to suggest that the Church's suffering has atoning power, for the uniqueness of Jesus' ministry has already been demonstrated. But we *have* seen that the Church does have a derived authority. What is its foundation? Jesus has the authority of God because He makes Himself of no authority. The word of the Church has the power to redeem and to judge but only when the Church shares with Jesus the role of a slave (13.13-14).[2]

Out of this participation in the life of Christ comes the commandment to the disciples to love one another as they have been loved (13.34-35, 15.12, 17) and to love their friends (15.13). E. F. Scott declares that this concern of the Fourth Gospel for the friends of Jesus rather than for the world (17.9) is its gravest departure from the universal message of Christ as seen in the Synoptics.[3] It should be remembered, however, that Jesus died for the world (3.16), that the Church has a mission to the world (17.18, 23), and that this mission will bring others into the Church (17.20, 10.16). John could hardly have spoken otherwise and still have maintained any distinction between the Church and the world.[4] Certainly the implication of the total Johannine context is that this love is directed toward all.

At last we see clearly the great difference between the synagogue of darkness and the community of light. The former is constituted by the anxiety of those who, having refused the light and life, seek to provide their own lives by speaking from

[1] See Hoskyns, op. cit., p. 439. Barrett, op. cit., pp. 363-4.
[2] See Ramsey, op. cit., p. 70.
[3] E. F. Scott, op. cit., pp. 116-17.
[4] See Barrett, op. cit., p. 422. Cross (op. cit., p. 156) thinks that the Johannine hostility towards the world is reminiscent of, though milder than, the Qumran injunction to 'hate all the children of darkness'. This implicit criticism of John is, I believe, countered by the remarks above. Millar Burrows (*More Light on the Dead Sea Scrolls*, New York, 1958, p. 125) voices something of the same opinion as Cross but recognises that the logical implication of the Johannine motivation for love is to love all mankind.

themselves and receiving glory from others. The latter is constituted by the presence of the crucified-risen Christ. The total ministry of Jesus makes God, the source of life, present to men and thus delivers them from the impossible task of creating life for themselves. Now their lives are redirected and instead of seeking glory from others they give themselves to others as God has given Himself in Christ. While the synagogue of darkness finds it necessary to exclude those who come to the light, the community of light is always seeking to include those who will leave the darkness.

That the Church which all of us know is so much like the synagogue of darkness is a clarion call to faith.

BOOK REVIEWS

The New English Bible: New Testament. Oxford University Press, Cambridge University Press. Library Edition: pp. xiv + 447, 21s.; Popular Edition: pp. xii + 432, 8s. 6d.

THERE was a time when one and the same English version of the New Testament sufficed for all purposes—for public worship, private worship, personal or group study, and general reading. That time has gone, probably never to return. If the Revised Version of the New Testament did not replace the Authorised Version for any other purpose, it did replace it as the best version for accurate study. From 1881 to the present day the Revised Version is the text most commonly used by theological students, except for those passages of Scripture which they are required to study in the original. And the signs are that this state of affairs is likely to continue. For accurate study of the words of Scripture, the Revised Version has not been dethroned even by the Revised Standard Version—so far, at least, as the New Testament is concerned (the Old Testament situation is different).

For use in public worship the Authorised Version is still preferred far above all others. It lends itself to reading aloud as no more recent English version does.

For private devotions and general reading, however, a host of recent translations and paraphrases are used nowadays. Moffatt and Phillips are household names in Bible-reading circles; the Revised Standard Version is read widely in Britain as well as in its homeland; and Knox's translation knows nothing of denominational frontiers.

This is the situation into which the New Testament portion of the New English Bible has recently come. It comes with the advantage of a broadly based sponsorship; the Joint Committee by whose authority it has been published represents the main non-Roman Churches of Great Britain and Ireland, together with the two principal Bible Societies. The best biblical scholarship in the British Isles has been laid under contribution in its production.

The first question which scholars are likely to ask about it concerns the underlying Greek text. The A.V. is a translation of the 'Received Text'; the R.V. is based for the most part on the Alexandrian text represented by the great uncials. What of the New English Bible? It is perhaps unlikely that anything will be done to comply with one reviewer's request, that someone should publish the Greek text presumed to underlie the new translation—an

edition which will be to the New English Bible what Souter's edition is to the R.V. But the translators have made it plain that their work is based upon an eclectic text. 'There is not at the present time', they say, 'any critical text which would command the same degree of general acceptance as the Revisers' text did in its day. Nor has the time come, in the judgment of competent scholars, to construct such a text, since new material constantly comes to light, and the debate continues. The present translators therefore could do no other than consider variant readings on their merits, and, having weighed the evidence for themselves, select for translation in each passage the reading which to the best of their judgment seemed most likely to represent what the author wrote.' There can be little doubt that this was the best policy in the existing situation. But was it simply the weighing of the textual evidence at John 19.29 that led to the adoption of the reading 'a javelin' (Gk. *ὑσσός*, for which one medieval manuscript can be cited) as against the reading of all our other authorities, 'hyssop' (Gk. *ὕσσωπος*, which the New English Bible renders 'marjoram')?

The accurate student of the English Bible will appreciate certain features of the new version. The attention paid to the imperfective and perfective aspects of the verb *πιστεύω*, for example, add precision to the rendering. In 1 John 2.12 ff the indentation and spacing make the construction of the two parallel sets of three sentences each—addressed to children, fathers, and young men—easier to grasp. On the other hand, the new translators have gone farther even than the men who gave us the AV in their free selection of English synonyms to express one and the same Greek word or phrase. This becomes specially apparent in the comparison of parallel passages in the Synoptic Gospels. A Gospel harmony in parallel columns enables the student very readily to see the extent of correspondence or divergence in the triple or double tradition if the text of the RV or RSV, or even of the AV, is used; he will not be able to use the text of the new translation so readily for this purpose. It may be said, and quite properly so, that the new translators did not prepare their text of the Gospels in order to help readers to solve the Synoptic problems; but if that is so, it amounts to this, that our theological students, many of whom use an English version with much greater facility than the Greek text, will continue to use the RV (or RSV) in the study and classroom.

Whether the New English Bible will lend itself to use in public worship is something that experience will show; the private reader cannot well assess its suitability for this. The fact that a panel of literary experts was consulted means that the style is far superior to that of the RV. No doubt the new version has not the sonorous

quality of the AV, but sonorous quality is not everything; intelligibility counts for something too; and there are considerable tracts of the Bible in the AV which sound magnificent but convey remarkably little meaning to those who listen to them. I should, however, feel a little nervous about reading 1 Cor. 5.9 in public: 'In my letter I wrote that you must have nothing to do with loose livers.' Surely the collocation of 'loose livers' with floating kidneys in a number of oft-told tales should have put the expression out of court!

It is, however, the general reader who will decide the final verdict upon the new translation. It is the general reader who has already been responsible for the immense sales of the work, and it is the general reader who can be seen reading it in trains and places where they travel. This suggests that the translators have succeeded, to a degree beyond what might have been expected from a body of scholars, in producing a really readable version. And the fact that they have done so may remind us that in recent years many theological scholars in the top flight have tackled the problem of communication seriously and made their studies intelligible not only to their fellow-theologians but to the general public. The Director of the New English Bible himself provides a notable example.

Some of the severest criticisms of the new version have come from reviewers who are not themselves biblical scholars, but some of their criticisms are obviously misplaced. A number of them have found fault with the New English Bible because it is not the Authorised Version. Others have found fault with the translators for changing 'the Bible'. 'Surely they could at least have left the Lord's Prayer alone.' While it is an unconscious tribute to the workmanship of King James's revisers that their product should be regarded, 350 years later, as being 'the Bible' in a distinctive sense, such criticisms betray a failure to realise what the translators of the New English Bible have set out to do. Yet one would have thought that their purpose had been made crystal-clear—not to revise an existing version, but to make a new one, based directly on the original text; not to replace the Authorised Version but to stand alongside it. But the new version will outlive these and other criticisms. If it can attract to Bible-reading people who would not have thought of reading through considerable stretches of the Authorised Version for sheer interest in its contents—and signs are not absent that the New English Bible is doing just this—then its sponsors and producers may well be satisfied. When people start reading the Bible, one never knows what will happen next.

F. F. Bruce

The Scope of Demythologizing. By JOHN MACQUARRIE. S.C.M. Press, London, 1960. Pp. 248. 25s.

A Gospel Without Myth? By DAVID CAIRNS. S.C.M. Press, London, 1960. Pp. 227. 25s.

DR JOHN MACQUARRIE has already won just praise for his *Existentialist Theology* which is a learned treatment of the relation between Bultmann and Heidegger. In this book he offers a thorough examination of the various problems that are raised by Bultmann's attempt to demythologise the New Testament. He considers the bearing of *Entmythologisierung* on exegesis, history, dogma, the *Kerygma*, philosophy and language. Among the several valuable points that he makes the two following deserve especial note.

1. Bultmann's work discloses certain polarities or tensions (termed by Macquarrie 'paradoxes') that are characteristic of Christian faith. Each of these tensions must be preserved; they cannot be overcome by speculative thought. There are three main tensions which I give in the order of logical priority. The first is between God as He is in Himself and God as He is known to the believer; the second is between the Jesus of past history and the Christ of present experience; the third is between the Catholic view of Christianity as the communication of supernatural truth and the Existentialist view of it as a way of life.

Macquarrie admits that Bultmann weakens the force of the second tension (or paradox) by reducing the role of the historical Jesus almost to vanishing point. This is intolerable, for without 'a minimal core of historical factuality' (p. 93) faith in the Christ who meets us in the Church's preaching would be impossible. Bultmann's disciple Buri dissolves both the second and third tensions by affirming that it would not matter if Jesus had never lived, since the 'myth' about Him could still serve as a psychological aid to the 'authentic' life.

2. Macquarrie (whose thought here is closely similar to that of Tillich) draws a much needed distinction between myth and analogy. Ancient man took his stories about God (or the gods) literally; but we know today (as, of course, the Church has known for a very long time) that these stories are analogies or symbols: they point to a realm of spiritual being that they can never adequately describe. Bultmann is right in affirming that his existentialist interpretation of Christian images helps to reveal their inner content; but he is wrong in supposing that their outward form is thereby rendered obsolete. Analogies are indispensable, and it is ludicrous for Bultmann to suggest that his own language is any less analogical—any more direct—than the less sophisticated language of the Bible. The thought-forms of the New Testament may sometimes constitute an avoidable offence to the modern mind (for example), when they

reflect an outmoded cosmology). But a residual offence must remain, since any talk about a transcendent God and his act of grace will 'stretch' the normal use of language and offend the mind of secularised Western man.

Perhaps the most disputable section of the book is the one devoted to history. Macquarrie wishes to retain a minimal core of historical fact which will support the *Kerygma*. At the same time he wishes to exempt this core from the effects of historical research. But is this exemption obtainable? While research cannot demonstrate the truth of claims made for Jesus by the apostolic writers it surely has a part to play in validating the facts on which these claims are based. Maybe, as Althaus maintains, the average (Protestant) Christian accepts the substantial authenticity of the Gospels on the score of what may provisionally be called a pre-scientific 'grasp' or 'intuition'; but when any fact is questioned on critical grounds further criticism is needed to establish (or re-establish) its validity; and to this extent faith depends on historical research. If the facts required for Macquarrie's 'minimum' (which he does not describe in detail) cannot stand up to criticism, it is difficult to see that the theological affirmations of apostolic theology, and *a fortiori* of the Creeds, could continue to evoke belief. Admittedly criticism, even when enlightened by faith, cannot make any fact more than probable; but a sufficient measure of probability for a sufficient number of facts is surely *one* among the many elements that produce the certitude to which faith attains.

Macquarrie has obviously mastered Bultmann's thought and its Continental background. He also has a firm and subtle understanding of the problems that demythologising raises. It is to be hoped that he will investigate some of these problems further. He is certainly now in a position to use Existentialism as a basis from which (or a framework within which) to develop fully his own standpoint.

In his book Professor David Cairns offers a vigorous and illuminating critique of demythologisation. In the first (the more difficult) part he examines the philosophy of Heidegger and its relation to Christian faith. In the second part he examines demythologisation in detail. His ultimate aim is to evaluate the whole of Bultmann's theology and to determine the extent to which it can be preached.

Heidegger, in his *Sein und Zeit*, claimed to produce a neutral account of personal being, or existence—an account that is (*a*) free from any ethical or religious content, and (*b*) applicable to all men in every situation. Cairns rightly argues that the claim cannot be substantiated. Heidegger describes the properties of existence in

evaluative terms which suggest 'an ethic of an aesthetic, romantic and tragic character' (p. 47). Moreover, his omission of religious factors from his analysis in the interests of so-called 'objectivity' is thoroughly misleading; for the presence of religious belief transforms the essential character of those *existentialia* (such as 'conscience') which Heidegger (as an atheist) is obliged to construe in purely human terms (pp. 43, 49). There is not one interpretation of personal being—a neutral one. There are at least two interpretations—one based on belief and the other on unbelief (pp. 60, 76).

From these trenchant criticisms only one conclusion can be drawn. The Christian is not obliged to accept Heidegger's system in every detail, or even to adopt it as an ontological framework; but he may borrow from it (as, indeed, he may borrow from the system of any philosopher) when it seems to afford language in which the Christian doctrine of man may be fruitfully discussed (p. 77). How far John Macquarrie endorses this conclusion is not clear. Cairns accuses him of resting in an unsatisfactory half-way position. But in his latest book (*The Scope of Demythologizing*, pp. 166-8) he admits, in answering Jaspers, that Bultmann is primarily an apologist who uses Heidegger's philosophy as 'a hermeneutic tool' for the purpose of 'conceptual clarification'. At the same time he asserts that there remains a 'considerable disagreement' between him and Cairns (ibid., p. 57). It is hard to see where the disagreement lies.

In Part 2 Cairns examines demythologisation in all its aspects. After some general remarks on 'myth' he considers the nature of existential interpretation. He affirms, incontrovertibly, that Bultmann's ban on speech 'about' God is untenable and would, if maintained, endanger all the truth-claims of Christianity. He then turns to miracles, and easily rejects Bultmann's views on two main counts. Firstly, they confuse two different senses of 'miracle' (p. 115), and, secondly, they ignore the crucial fact that a startling or strange event cannot be perceived as a divine act except through the eyes of faith (pp. 117-18). Furthermore, while it is possible to take *some* miracles allegorically for homiletical ends, it is impossible to take them all in this way without disastrous dishonesty (p. 132).

From this point Cairns passes naturally to the question of history. He deplores Bultmann's tendency to separate the Jesus of history from the Christ of faith. Without a substantial and sound historical basis 'There would be nothing left to distinguish the gospel from mythology pure and simple' (p. 148). He agrees with Macquarrie that faith is not positively dependent on the results of historical research; but he insists that it is vulnerable to the potentially negative conclusions of research, since 'faith would be vitally stricken, could it be shown by historical research that Christ had never lived,

or had been either a mere political revolutionary, or a bad man' (Appendix A, p. 221).

In chapter 8 Cairns assesses the relevance of Bultmann's message for contemporary preaching. He shows how Bultmann's sermons reflect unquestioned piety and a sure insight into many (though by no means all) of the evangelical truths contained in the New Testament. He makes two instructive comments on these sermons. Firstly, they do not show any marked dependence on Heidegger. Their author uses existentialist terminology with the eclecticism that Cairns desiderates. Secondly, they presuppose a far greater degree of critical and doctrinal orthodoxy than demythologisation can permit. Bultmann the preacher is living on a capital to which he has no theological right. 'Ideas which drew their power from an older theology which Bultmann has discarded are still at work to make effective his preaching' (p. 192).

In the last chapter Cairns remarks truly that Bultmann's alternative 'either mythical or existential' is false. Faith needs both elements. It needs 'a mythical moment, a moment of confessed inadequacy, as it tries to touch the transcendent by means of its human concepts'. Also 'it will have an existential moment as it attempts to "cash" the value, or some part of it, of this judgement for the life of the believer' (p. 200). Faith correspondingly requires both 'to know' God by acquaintance and 'to know about' Him through a valid, objective, description of his past events in history (pp. 213-18).

Cairns has given us (as was to be expected) an honest, incisive, and in parts original, treatment of a singularly complex theme. But two queries present themselves. The first belongs to dogmatic, and the second to practical, theology.

1. Many readers will agree with Cairns in assigning to historical research a more important role than any which Macquarrie is prepared to allow. But does he go far enough? Can one limit the religious relevance of research to its negative findings? Surely this is a case where a negative implies a positive. A critical portrait of Jesus that is incompatible with faith would need to be refuted by further criticism. But criticism, like nature, abhors a vacuum. When it destroys one portrait of Jesus it creates a second. If this second portrait is also incompatible with faith it too will have to be destroyed; and so one might conceivably proceed *ad infinitum*. But if the second (or any succeeding) portrait is the one that faith requires it will inevitably strengthen faith and so produce a positive effect. The question is, admittedly, difficult; but it cannot be said that either Macquarrie or Cairns has solved it. A solution might be brought nearer if attention were paid to the actual manner

in which faith and criticism co-operate in the study of the Gospels.

2. Cairns' book is sub-titled 'Bultmann's challenge to the preacher'. One is left in no doubt concerning Bultmann's challenge to the theologian; but his challenge to the preacher could have been made more precise. Presumably the latter consists in a warning and an appeal. The warning is only too clear. The preacher cannot hope to draw endless homiletical interest from a dwindling theological account. Sooner or later his bankruptcy will become apparent. The appeal is equally clear. The preacher must attempt to make the Gospel intelligible to the modern mind and so create the possibility of an existential choice. As Cairns points out, Bultmann offers some interesting hints on this score. Such concepts as 'anxiety', 'authenticity', 'security' and 'recognition' can certainly help to express the meaning that the Gospel has for human life. Perhaps someone will explore these concepts further by showing how they are related to the Bible, to traditional theology, and to those secular sciences (such as psychology and sociology) upon which they inevitably impinge. H. P. OWEN

Christ Our Life. By DIETRICH RITSCHL. Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh, 1960. Pp. 114. 12s. 6d.

IT is all too easy for us in Scotland, with centuries of parochial life and tradition on which to draw, to assume that our patterns of congregational life are permanent and even sacred. Dietrich Ritschl's book ought to be compulsory reading for ministers and elders if only because it approaches the theme of the daily life of the congregation from a point of view which to most of us will be unfamiliar. Brought up within the Reformed tradition on the continent of Europe, Dr Ritschl brings to his theme a number of insights from his German and Swiss inheritance; but he was also for six years pastor of the German-speaking Congregation in Scotland. More important, his thought is biblically-centre throughout; so that what he says, unfamiliar though his approach will be, is entirely relevant to this country (and, we might add, to the U.S.A. where he now teaches).

Dr Ritschl writes crisply and simply with a most refreshing economy of words. He begins with Sunday worship, and here we get our first surprise. Before the section on preaching there is a section, and a very good one, on listening. Has it ever occurred to us that we need to be taught about, and to practise, a right listening, and that 'listening has something radical about it because Christ is the Word of God' (p. 6)? Do those of us who are ministers, and who, in our tradition, do all the speaking at the Sunday service, remember that we must be listeners first, and do we think

often enough about the task of the congregation in prayer, when they must not merely listen but themselves pray? 'A prayer during which people try to listen is certainly one to which God is no longer listening. He prefers us in that case to have a proper conversation' (p. 13).

This one example may be enough to show the style and quality of the book. Sometimes the very brevity of expression makes the meaning hard to grasp, at any rate for English-speaking readers; and occasionally a word or phrase carries a sense which will be unfamiliar to the uninitiated, as for example when we are told that 'faith and life without trust in the power of the Advocate, the Holy Spirit, would be, and always have been, enthusiasm' (p. 38). Yet one of the most valuable things about the book is precisely its criticism of any 'enthusiasm' which does not rest on a sure awareness that God's demand always calls man-centred efforts in question (e.g. in social work, pp. 93-94).

There is a most valuable chapter on 'Man and Woman' with excellent sections on marriage and on the lost frankness between man and woman; but many ordinary readers may find themselves a little lost in the very compressed analysis of three kinds of love and uncertain of the meaning of such a phrase as 'erotic love is a love of work' (p. 73). Elsewhere the critical will find gaps in the treatment; it is strange, for example, to find a section on the ministry which does not even mention the Sacraments, although the part of the minister is mentioned in the section on the Lord's Supper (p. 24).

But if these are blemishes at all, they ought not to lessen our appreciation of a book which speaks to us with the directness of good preaching, which time and again assails our easy assumptions and our 'conformity to this world' in the life of our parishes, and which sets the life of the congregation firmly in the context of the world in which our Christian obedience must be carried out. This book will help us to renew our life under the sovereignty of God's Word.

R. S. Barbour

Freedom and Immortality. By Ian T. Ramsey. S.C.M. Press, London, 1960. Pp. 157. 16s.

Readers of books on the Philosophy of Religion have not only to decide what quality such books have, but even more importantly to assess the worth of how the authors conceive their task.

Professor Ramsey is, apparently, an old fashioned believer in 'the metaphysical justification of religion', even though he uses up-to-date methods to deploy his convictions. His 1957 Forwood Lectures in the University of Liverpool on 'Freedom and Im-

mortality' are very readable and contain an abundance of illustrations of the argument. Indeed, in this very characteristic of Professor Ramsey's work lies its disconcerting character to anyone who has learnt from St. Anselm the importance of the idea of 'necessity'. What reliance can we place upon even the most interesting catena of fertile suggestions which remain suggestions only? Of the five lectures in the book two are on freedom, dealing with predictability and decision; and three are on immortality (so-called), dealing with persons, eternal life and the soul, and a 'future' life. On freedom, Professor Ramsey has much that is sensible and interesting to say, yet he is too easily content with his own answers. In a discussion of views held by Lord Russell and Professor Ayer on 'duty' and 'God's will', he comes to the conclusion that these are 'alternative descriptions, one of which is contextually more comprehensive than the other', but for the crucial assumption that these are in fact alternative descriptions he gives no argument at all. So, too, he assumes rather than demonstrates that the relation of man's freedom to God's omnipotence, and also Universalism, are bogus problems.

In his discussion of immortality, Professor Ramsey is concerned with a further treatment of the possible ways in which persons may transcend the spatio-temporal. Here he commits himself to the astonishing dictum that, if either belief in God or belief in immortality is dominant, the other belief may be overlooked. As evidence he adduces on the one side the Old Testament and on the other side McTaggart! McTaggart would scarcely seem to justify the importance which Professor Ramsey attributes to him. Professor Ramsey also gives us a valuable discussion on the term 'the soul', and an interesting but undeveloped thesis that we should talk of a future life in terms of discontinuous time-periods. This, then, is an interesting, well-written, and provocative book, the assessment of which will depend very much upon the standpoint of the reader.

H. Cunliffe-Jones

Saint Augustin dans l'œuvre de Jean Calvin. Vol. I, *Étude de critique littéraire.* 1957. Pp. 336. Hfl. 15.50. Vol. II, *Tables des références augustiniennes.* 1958. Pp. 295. No price. By L. Smits, translated from the Dutch by E. van Laetham. Van Gorcum, Assen.

Augustinus est totus noster, said Calvin in a memorable phrase. In the sixteenth-century struggle for the claim to inherit the Church of the fathers, Augustine was a key position. A reading of this book will, I believe, support the thesis that Calvin saw the need for the Churches of the Reformation, after the primary stand on the Bible,

to claim the man who provided the climate for Western Christian thought. To win Augustine was to gain the West. Is this perhaps not the chief reason why his citations of Augustine so far outnumber any other theologian, totalling as many as all the rest together?

That Augustine held this predominant place in Calvin's thinking is obvious to the most careless reader of the *Institutio* and has, of course, been treated as a commonplace in Calvin studies. But it has been left to Dr Smits to investigate the matter thoroughly and in detail and to set us asking the more interesting questions: Which Augustine is completely ours? Simply the theologian of grace, or the earlier thinker as well? What part of Augustine's work—his theology, his expository work, his ecclesiology? And what books of Augustine? Again, looking at it from Calvin's end: in what connexions does he use Augustine? What does he particularly approve of, of what disapprove?

It has been left to Dr Smits to investigate this; and how well he has done it! With an awe-ful thoroughness he has tracked down and tabulated every reference, whether cited or unnamed, to Augustine in every work of Calvin. This he has done himself, not relying on indexes. For the index of *Corpus Reformatorum* is just good enough to be really dangerous in precise work, and the *Opera Selecta*, with its wealth of critical material, is still unindexed. All this material that Dr Smits has gathered fills vol. II. First, he approaches it from Calvin's side, taking each of his works in turn and supplying an Augustine index. Thus:

Optima ineundae concordiae ratio, 1561

Corp. Ref.	*Augustini loci*	*Patr. Lat.*
9, 514^{46-41}	*Epist.* 118 (54, 6, 8)	33, 203^{33-35}
„	*Serm. Temp.* 215 (265, 4)	39, 2239^{30-33}
9, 522^{18-24}	*In Joh. Evang.* 26, 15	35, 1614^{12-18}
„	*In Joh. Evang.* 27, 11	35, 1621^{8-11}

After this, he gives the relevant Augustine works with a Calvin index: for example:

Contra academicos

Patr. Lat.	*Calvini Opera*	*Corp. Ref.* *Op. Selecta*
32, 905	*Inst.*, 1543: I, 16, 8	*O.S.* 3, 199^{10-23}
32, 935-936	*Inst.*, 1543: I, 16, 8	*O.S.* 3, 199^{10-23}

The mere labour involved in this mechanical task should be noticed and applauded. To go through fifty-eight quarto volumes of double column, watching for every possible reference to Augustine whether the name appears or not, to assign each to its correct place, checking Calvin against Augustine, Augustine against Calvin,

and then, at the end of it all, to count the lines in *Corpus Reformatorum* for the convenience of the reader—this is noble! (It is, of course, inevitable that working on such a scale and with so little in the way of technical helps, a few figures should be given wrongly. Some of the dates given for the NT Commentaries, for example, are misleading. Romans is given only as 1540 (p. 141), whereas two of the references under this heading were in fact first added in the revised edition of 1556 (*C.R.* 49, p. 95, lines 48-52 and p. 182 line 53 to p. 183 line 10). 2 Corinthians is assigned to 1548. But it was first published, in French, in 1547; it was the Latin that appeared in 1548. 1 Thessalonians should surely be 1550 and not 1551 and Titus 1549 and not 1550.)

Of more importance than the collection of the figures is their interpretation. Here we turn to vol. I, where Dr Smits explains their significance. First, what writings of Augustine does Calvin use? He follows Erasmus and Possidius in dividing the works into the twelve groups: introductory, philosophical, apologetic, dogmatic, anti-Manichean, anti-Donatist, anti-Pelagian, anti-Arian, exegetical, ethical, sermons and letters. His conclusion is worth quoting at length: 'les écrits philosophiques, anti-ariens, de morale et purement exégétiques n'eurent guère d'intérêt pour Calvin. Par contre, le réformateur avait une préférence très prononcée pour les écrits contre les pélagiens. Des 1564 références faites par Calvin aux œuvres de saint Augustin, 649 se rapportent à ce groupe. Les thèmes qui l'emportent sont les questions du péché originel et de la concupiscence, de la Loi et du libre arbitre, de la toutepuissance de la grâce et de la persévérance finale, et celle de la prédestination au ciel ou à l'enfer. . . . L'opuscule *De correptione et gratia* fournit à lui seul 139 références, soit 9% de l'ensemble. . . . On est surpris de voir le petit nombre—46 seulement—de citations et références aux écrits anti-donatistes' (p. 181). To the twelve groups, in the order given above, Dr Smits assigns the following number of citations, with or without reference: (i) 120, (ii) 8, (iii) 190, (iv) 230, (v) 289, (vi) 161, (vii) 1051, (viii) 32, (ix) 733, (x) 38, (xi) 364, (xii) 508. But statistics are deceptive. Do the great number of references to the anti-Pelagian writings really mean that this is the aspect of Augustine which Calvin found most sympathetic? or is it not rather that he found himself engaged in a struggle against semi-Pelagians in his own day and turned gratefully to the classic refutation? Or again, to take the opposing view in regard to Augustine's expository works. Calvin refers to them 733 times. But how many of these are hostile references?

In one respect, Dr Smits claims too much. He so sees Calvin in Augustinian terms that he even wants Augustine to be the agent

in his conversion. He founds this idea on a passage from the 1539 *Institutio*: 'Notre Seigneur donc commande une merveilleuse ardeur de charité laquelle il ne veut estre empeschée de la moindre concupiscence du monde. Il requiert un cœur merveilleusement temperé, lequel il ne veut estre aucunement piqué d'un seul aiguillon contre la Loy de charité. Sainct Augustin m'a fait ouverture à entendre ce precepte, afin qu'il ne semble à quelqu'un que ie soye seul en mon opinion' (II.vii.50). Dr Smits adds: 'La lecture de saint Augustin a donc soudainement ouvert les yeux à cet humaniste et confirmé pour lui les principes de la Réforme. . . . Le respect pour l'autorité de l'Église ancienne prenait le pas sur le respect pour l'Église de Rome et le réformateur se trouve "converti" ' (pp. 22-23). Building on this shaky ground (I do not for one moment think the *Institutio* passage autobiographical), Dr Smits goes on to conjecture which work of Augustine's wrought the change, and plumps for *De spiritu et littera*—he even hints at the edition, Robert Stephanus' 1534! By the end of the chapter he treats the matter as self-evident and as necessary for the understanding of Calvin's use of the works of 'l'évêque d'Hippone'. But only in this (and in his strange belief that Calvin 'fut l'homme d'un seul livre') is Dr Smits' judgment faulty.

Meanwhile, we await volume III to see what Calvin makes of Augustine. *Augustinus est totus noster*. Augustine, or part of Augustine, or Augustine re-interpreted by Calvin? But already Dr Smits has put forward what we must describe as a major work of Calvin scholarship, probably the best thing of its kind that has been done in this field.

T. H. L. Parker

The City of God and the Politics of Crisis. By Edgar H. Brookes. Oxford University Press, London, 1960. Pp. 111. 10s. 6d.

Dr Brookes was for many years a Senator representing the Bantu people in South Africa, and as such has had a long and intimate knowledge of native character and aspirations. For the last seven or eight years, he has been lecturing in the Department of History at the University of Natal, and recently succeeded Professor Keppel-Jones as Head of the Department. He is a member of the Anglican Church of the Province, with a deeply passionate evangelical faith. This background is reflected strongly in the volume before us, and he writes not academically here but as a man with a practical message in an hour of crisis, deriving his inspiration from the great doctor of the North African Church.

It may well be felt that Dr Brooke's comparison of South Africa in 1960 with North Africa in 426 is overdrawn or too facilely superficial, but nevertheless we cannot allow that to conceal the

fact that in St. Augustine's *De Civitate Dei* there is much that is supremely relevant for us today, with its summons to faith, hope, and courage, and this especially on continents such as Africa, the scene of rapid and often convulsive social change.

Perhaps the best way of conveying the quality of this work is to savour some of the statements Dr Brookes makes. He speaks, for example, of the unnatural reticence so many Christians exercise in expressing their faith, so that it becomes 'tolerance run mad'. 'If', he says, 'we are Christian teachers in an University, we feel rightly that others besides Christians must have freedom to speak. This soon comes to mean, however, that all may speak out in a Christian University except the Christians.' And he adds, 'The liberal democratic philosophy of politics, to which probably most English-speaking people subscribe more or less, suffers greatly from its exclusion of God, and the consequent unreality and impoverishment of its picture of man' (p. 4).

These are things which require to be said today, when a humanistic and consequently irresponsible liberalism is creating havoc, for it possesses no ultimate goal and purpose; and is built upon the lie that all men are equal instead of the truth that all men are brothers as members of the family of God. Thus the basis of much reform (or lack of it) is a secret fear—'the time is running out'; 'the blood-bath is almost here'—instead of man's duty to God to serve his brother. Reform can never be a mere evasion of risk or danger; reform may precipitate danger, as lack of reform may cause it to mount up to a flood. The Christian basis of reform is not escape from peril but the acknowledgment of God as Father, and its purpose is to enable men to realise their sonship. Thus, later, Dr Brookes can say, 'It is important in particular that a country like Great Britain which used to export Christianity and now exports Constitutions should give some serious thought to the basis of the new democracy' (p. 35). In these days when many suppose the chief end of man to be achieved when the franchise becomes universal, it is gratifying to have one with the courage to say, 'There never was a worse maxim than "vox populi vox Dei". Against it the tremendous minority of the Cross stands as a fact that cannot be ignored' (p. 36). Dr Brookes calls upon us also to examine the real significance of nationalism, and not to regard it as an end in itself, that having achieved nationhood one has done all: 'The danger of nationalist movements is precisely this danger of self-realization becoming an end in itself.' Then he adds, 'Nowhere is the truth of this more easily seen than in the Union of South Africa, where Afrikaner nationalism, following the non-Christian principle of self-preservation, has made the ruin of the soul of white

South Africa almost certain and the ruin of its material civilization probable.' Many may feel that this judgment is too radical, for the Afrikaners are not the only Christian peoples who have studied and fought for self-preservation and we cannot speak as if this was of no importance to any nation; nor can it be established that self-preservation is not a basic Christian duty, broadly speaking, for a nation or community in contrast to an individual.

Yet as Toynbee has pointed out, the twin evils of our time are nationalism and totalitarianism; and it is important to see neither of these as ends in themselves. Meanwhile, Christianity is acting as a strong leaven among the Afrikaner people, and it is a grave misreading of the facts not to see within them a growing movement which transcends nationalism and which is making itself felt with undeniable potency. Dr Brooke's analysis of both present and future in South Africa is unduly pessimistic because it underrates this growing resurgent sense of service and responsibility within Afrikanerdom and its Church.

Dr Brookes has, however, given us a wise and stimulating book, undoubtedly the mature reflections of a generous, sympathetic, and strong Christian mind. If his political analysis and practical political suggestions are often too heavily weighted with nineteenth-century liberalism (e.g. his confused defence of universal suffrage and some of his judgments upon the Afrikaner), there is nevertheless here a fine summons to duty and even to battle for justice, mercy, and goodness. 'The temptations of the average Christian are to complacency, a refined materialism, and fear' (p. 33). How near the bone this cuts to us all, even to the exporters of constitutions! —constitutions are less expensive to export than missionaries and schools; and, delightfully, once you have exported a constitution, duty ends. Not so will the battle of truth and brotherhood be won. This is a book which no one seriously interested in current political problems should neglect.

WILLIAM D. MAXWELL

A History of Israel. By JOHN BRIGHT. S.C.M. Press, London, 1960. Pp. 453 plus indexes. 40s.

THIS present volume is the British edition of the original American edition published in 1959 by the Westminster Press, Philadelphia. It is well produced, with sufficient marginal space, especially at the bottom of the pages, to make the volume easy to read and pleasant to handle. At the end, there are useful chronological tables, set out in columns as necessary for the various spheres of activity, but with arrows cutting across the columns to indicate clearly the occasion and the extent of those invasions which charac-

terise ancient times, equally with our modern world. There are fifteen historical maps based on those in *The Westminster Historical Atlas*, edited by Professors G. Ernest Wright and Floyd V. Filson.

The book is divided into six parts, with prologue and epilogue. The prologue gives an account of the Ancient East prior to 2000 B.C., of which the intention is to show that 'Israel was born into a world already ancient'. The various parts end at the obvious points: expulsion of the Hyksos kings from Egypt in 1550 B.C., end of the Judges, end of single monarchy, end of Judah, restoration (such as it was), and the success of the Maccabean revolt. The author stops here: he had to stop somewhere, and this is the end of the Old Testament period. The concluding chapter in this sixth part is an excellent survey of Judaism at the end of the Old Testament period, particularly with its twin tendencies to universalism, that sense of world mission never wholly lost in Israel, and the dominant separatism. At no point in the book is the author afraid of pointing out the religious motif which is found throughout Hebrew-Jewish history: in this chapter he gives it full rein.

This volume is not an attempt to write a secular history of Israel. It is a truly scientific history; that is, it is a history of Israel which takes in all the factors. It is not like so many modern, spuriously 'scientific' histories, which assume that to be scientific one must cut out all religious motifs. A truly scientific history builds on all the evidence, and recognises religious motifs and movements equally with the rest. This, incidentally, is why Sir Arthur Bryant's *The Making of the Realm*, has a sound, scientific approach; in spite of the fact that many modern critics speak deprecatingly of it because the author is scientific enough to acknowledge the dominant religious influences which so largely shaped the destinies of this country of ours. All this is exceptionally and uniquely clear in Israel's history. Apart from Israel's religion, no Israel would have survived. The epilogue focuses the whole volume on this one dominant issue when it asks the question 'Whither?' What is the *telos*, the *eschaton*? For no historian can make any sense of any nation's story, unless he knows the 'end'. Professor Bright here says, 'it is, in short, a *Heilsgeschichte* that never in the pages of the Old Testament arrives at *Heil* (salvation).' I wish that all who claim the Old Testament as a *Heilsgeschichte* would remember what John Bright never forgets—that the German word *Heil* means Salvation rather than Holy.

The volume is on the whole conservative, but this is because the author again and again refuses to go beyond the evidence. Everywhere his conclusions are marked by great care and by a never-weakening demand for evidence. When he himself is going beyond the evidence, he says so. He does not, for instance, use words like

'clearly', 'obviously' in order, consciously or subconsciously, to bridge a hiatus in the argument. All types of readers will find the book safe and reliable. No reader will agree throughout, but if he does disagree, he will need to produce strong reasons: and if he does, no one will be more pleased than the author.

Professor Bright quotes W. F. Albright most frequently, and tends to swing away from Noth and Alt. He generally accepts Chronicles as being more trustworthy than Kings. He is not impressed by the Myth-Ritual-Pattern school. In fact, almost everywhere he keeps to the middle road, with adequate information, be it noted, on all the signposts of alternative routes.

The main positions which John Bright holds are as follows: Hammurabi's dates are 1728-1686 B.C. It is impossible to say within centuries when Abraham, Isaac and Jacob lived: the attempt to equate the Amraphel of Genesis 14 with Hammurabi must be abandoned. The patriarchs were ass-nomads, and not camel-nomads. They probably adopted Hebrew when they first entered Canaan. The religion of the patriarchs was not animism and polydaemonism, but a clan religion. The Exodus took place during the thirteenth century (? 1280 B.C.). The invasion of Canaan was not mainly piecemeal: there was a general onslaught. The first picture of Israel in Canaan is of a twelve-clan tribal league, an amphictyony centred in a common shrine. Solomon's Egyptian dowry was probably Gerar and not Gezer. He also developed the copper industry (evidence not in Bible but in excavations). Jehoshaphat was not a vassal of Ahab's. The puzzle of Isaiah-Hezekiah-Sennacherib is solved by assuming two campaigns by Sennacherib in Palestine. The death of Asshur-bani-pal cannot be later than 631 B.C. The author follows Chronicles rather than Kings for the order of events in Josiah's reformation, and so also he holds that Josiah died in battle. Ezekiel went to Babylonia in 597 B.C., Ezra arrived in Jerusalem in 428 B.C., after Nehemiah, but before Nehemiah's activity had ended.

The most important statements are these. Israel had no God-King bound to her by ties of blood and cult, but a cosmic God who had chosen her by grace in her dire need. The cult did not centre in a sacrificial system but in certain great annual feasts, where the aim was not to maintain the renewal of life and fertility in nature but to renew the covenant, and to take anew the oath of allegiance to their Saviour-God. The cult was 'no historyless maintainer of material well-being . . . but precisely a reminder of history'. Centralising tendencies did not begin with Deuteronomy and Josiah: they go back to the tradition of the amphictyonic shrine. The history of the monarchy is, in part at least, the story of the inter-

action of two themes: the old amphictyony with its common shrine and a leader endowed and designated by charismatic gifts, and the dogma that Yahweh has chosen Zion as His eternal dwelling-place and has made a covenant with David that his line shall reign for ever.

Here, in this volume, we have a protest against the modern movement which would make the study of Israel's religion mainly a branch of Comparative Religion, and a realisation, based on considerable reliance on the results of archaeology, that not everything is to be explained in terms of cult and ritual. John Bright does not agree that there was an enthronement of Yahweh at the New Year Feast; rather it was Yahweh coming to take up his abode in Zion associated with the promise of the continuance of the Davidic line.

NORMAN H. SNAITH

Interpreting the Parables. By A. M. HUNTER. S.C.M. Press, London, 1960. Pp. 126. 8s. 6d.

IN this book, Professor A. M. Hunter 'attempts to show the ordinary reader . . . how modern scholars understand the parables of Jesus'. Chapter one treats of the nature of the parables, their authenticity and their use in the early Church. Chapter two reviews the history of parable interpretation from the apostolic age to our own day. Then follow four chapters showing how the parables were originally related to 'the Kingdom themes which Jesus meant them to enforce'—the themes of the Coming of the Kingdom, the Grace of the Kingdom, the Men of the Kingdom and the Crisis of the Kingdom. A seventh chapter on 'Preaching the Parables' briefs the preacher (or teacher) for the exposition of the parables today. Here are shown the defects of some allegorising and moralising methods, as well as how, by keeping one's eye upon the main point of the parable and its setting, it is possible in parable exposition to bring people into 'direct contact with the declared mind of Christ'.

Free of difficult technicalities, and written in a clear, lively style, this book admirably fulfils the purpose for which it was designed.

G. H. BOOBYER

The Gospel Miracles: Studies in Matthew, Mark and Luke. By RONALD S. WALLACE. Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh, 1960. Pp. 161. 15s.

THESE studies in the miracles which are reported in Matthew, Mark, and Luke, consist for the most part of sermons preached by the author to the members of the Lothian Road Church, Edinburgh, and many will be grateful that they are now made available to a

larger public. The miracles which Jesus performed suggest to Dr Wallace the spiritual diseases and infirmities which beset mankind. That perhaps is a commonplace of the pulpit, but the author of these sermons possesses great insight into, and understanding of, the conditions in which people have to live and work and die. The various fevers which grip and dominate men's lives are no more powerful than the fever which afflicted Peter's mother-in-law and are equally submissive to the healing word and touch of Jesus. These fevers include gambling fevers and stock-exchange fevers and collectors' fevers which can become so strong and uncontrollable that men need to be saved from them.

We find in this book not only spiritual insight but scholarship which though it does not obtrude itself gives profundity to his exegesis. For example, commenting on the words of the Centurion, 'Say the word, and let my servant be healed', Dr Wallace takes us back to the Old Testament conception of the Creative Word, and suggests that the Centurion by faith has recognised in Jesus the embodiment of the Divine Word. It was this recognition which made the Centurion exclaim: 'I am not worthy to have you under my roof.'

It would have increased the value of the book if there had been an introductory chapter on the relation of miracles to modern thought, as in the case of Archbishop Trench's *Notes on the Miracles*. Critical discussions are not always acceptable in sermons, but it would have been helpful to many if Dr Wallace had discussed the possible relationship between sin and paralysis either physical or spiritual in his exposition of the Healing of the Paralytic Man. Similarly, he does not meet difficulties which may have been in his hearers' minds as to the possibility of raising people from the dead. This was perhaps outside the purpose of Dr Wallace, and he admirably succeeds in showing that the miracles are a revelation of the will of God, lessons on the divine method of dealing with the spiritual needs of human life. The book will bring encouragement, new insight and hope to many who are baffled by the 'slings and arrows of outrageous fortune'.

E. Kenneth Lee

The Gnostic Problem. By R. McL. Wilson. Mowbray, 1958. Pp. 274. 35s.

Dr Wilson has written a most thorough and carefully documented survey of certain stages and aspects of the Gnostic movement in the ancient world. The book took its origin in a thesis presented at Cambridge University and shows at certain points the influence of Dr Wilson's supervisor, the late Canon W. L. Knox (e.g. in its

tentative acceptance of Knox's views about the development of the 'Wisdom-theology' in Judaism). Its main interest is sufficiently indicated in the subtitle: *A Study of the Relations between Hellenistic Judaism and the Gnostic Heresy*. It begins with two useful chapters on the Judaism of the Dispersion and on Philo, which can be strongly recommended to students and others who want an introduction to these subjects. Thereafter, as the maze of ancient Gnostic theories is approached, the treatment becomes of necessity more technical; here again the book betrays its origin as a thesis by being almost overloaded with references to modern literature, and a little sparse in quotation of and reference to the originals. Three chapters pass in review the main Gnostic systems and their relations to early Christianity and Hellenistic Judaism; these are followed by a discussion of two documents which are not readily available to the student or the public, the *Apocryphon of John* and the *Gospel of Truth*. These two treatises, which have only recently been unearthed, are of permanent interest in so far as they represent attempts to mould Jewish and Christian ideas into the shape of contemporary speculation about man and his place in the universe. Both are Gnostic in character, but they differ in many ways. It seems very likely that the latter is the document known to Irenaeus. One might sum them up by saying that if the *Apocryphon* shows how easy it was for the Judaeo-Christian tradition to become almost totally submerged in a kind of mythical theosophy, the *Gospel of Truth* shows how even small changes of emphasis in the handling of great New Testament themes like those of truth and falsehood, light and darkness, could lead to a doctrine of the good life and of salvation profoundly different from that of orthodox Christianity. Unfortunately Dr Wilson was not able to take the *Gospel of Thomas* into account, since it was published after the completion of his manuscript.

The long penultimate chapter of the book makes a comparison of Gnosticism with contemporary Judaism and Christianity by examining certain cardinal points concerning God, creation, the doctrine of man and of salvation. This is followed by a brief summing-up in the last chapter.

What do we learn from this book on the controversial questions concerning Gnosticism which are attracting so much attention today? Dr Wilson is too good and too cautious a scholar to commit himself to easy generalisations, or to firm conclusions on questions that are still under debate. At times he seems to be almost excessively careful to present both sides of a case, so that parts of the book become a little repetitive. But there are certain most important issues on which his study certainly carries us further than we had been able to go before. Was there, for example, a pre-

Christian Gnosticism, a religious philosophy which embraced a doctrine of a Redeemer from heaven and which has influenced the New Testament writers in their understanding of Jesus' significance? Dr Wilson concludes, as others have done, that there is no solid evidence for the existence of such a pre-Christian Gnosticism: Gnosticising tendencies perhaps, but no clearly defined doctrine. Where this book breaks new ground is in its discussion of the early forms of Gnosticism in their relation to Judaism. It constitutes another link in a growing chain of evidence that Gnosticism as a Hellenistic movement owes more to Judaism than has often hitherto been allowed; another indication that Bultmann's account of early Hellenistic Christianity is based on assumptions which will have to be revised.

But while Dr Wilson stresses certain elements found in Judaism and Gnosticism alike he is careful to point out that direct Jewish influence on the Gnostics is by no means always proven, and he does not commit himself to any overall hypothesis about the relations between the two. R. M. Grant's suggestion that the fall of Jerusalem in A.D. 70 and the consequent collapse of apocalyptic Judaism were a major factor in the growth of Gnosticism is something to which, one suspects, Dr Wilson would reply 'not proven'. Nor does he attempt, as Hans Jonas has recently done, to recreate imaginatively for us the kind of spiritual situation in which Gnosticism became a congenial and intelligible faith. Had he done so his book would perhaps have been easier in places to read. But that is not his purpose; indeed it may be the case that such attempts are always liable to be misleading since they must involve the importation of contemporary categories of thought to bring to life the strange aeons, syzygies and mythological figures of the ancient Gnostics, and in the process the historical reality in distorted. Yet modern theories of history (whether we follow Collingwood or not) may remind us that some such process of recreation in part of all historiography, and perhaps some day, when more of the mists surrounding Gnosticism have cleared, Dr Wilson will be able to give us another book which will make use of the material that he has here so carefully gathered and add to it whatever is to come from the Gnostic library of Nag Hammadi. By that time it may be possible to look afresh at the great issues which were at stake between the Catholic Church and the Gnostics, and restate them in a form which will make the contestants' motives and interests, as well as the origins of their ideas, a little clearer than they are today. Meanwhile, so far as the origins of their ideas are concerned, Dr Wilson has given us a most important study.

R. S. Barbour

The English Reformers and the Fathers of the Church. By S. L. Greenslade. Oxford University Press (Clarendon Press), London, 1960. Pp. 20. 2s. 6d.

In this inaugural lecture, Professor Greenslade recalls the appeal made by Anglican Reformers to the patristic evidence, and he has some interesting remarks on the amount of such evidence then available. With incomplete editions, and a mass of spurious pieces still accepted, a controversialist might well find his proofs crumbling under criticism, or else have his favourite arguments trumped by a treatise which he did not know. Passages torn from their context were circulated in collections of patristic *testimonia*, and one author unashamedly borrowed his references from another. The Fathers were not studied so much for their own sakes as to score debating-points. None the less, in a spirit 'grateful, respectful, but cautious', the foundations of the Anglican tradition were being laid. In a concluding paragraph, the author expresses his hope that modern patristic studies, unlike those in the Reformation period, may help to promote the cause of Christian unity. G. S. M. Walker

Via Media. By E. L. Mascall. Longmans. Pp. xvi + 171. 12s. 6d.

A book bearing this classic title, further amplified in the subtitle, *An Essay in Theological Synthesis*, raises great expectations, and they are all the greater when the book comes from the pen of Dr Mascall. We hope, perhaps, for a new presentation of that famous defence of Anglicanism which Newman once abandoned, and which has never since been taken up with sufficient theological weight to answer the objections Newman himself came to see in it; or, even better, for a profound investigation into the coherence of Christian truth which might altogether transcend the perspectives of Anglican apologetic. Neither of these expectations is altogether fulfilled in the volume under review, though it is the second rather than the first at which the author aims. But the theme demands a major work, and although we do not doubt Dr Mascall's capacity to write it, he has not chosen to do so on this occasion. Instead, he browses over well-trodden ground, unifying a number of themes by the intuition, which they are held to exemplify, that 'Christian orthodoxy in some strange way at one and the same time holds a middle position between the various heresies and also includes whatever positive truth those heresies contain'.

Unfortunately this intuition is not likely to prove so compelling to our brethren in other communions as it observably is to the Anglican mind, and it will no doubt seem to many of them that Dr Mascall is begging many questions. If we are sure what Catholic truth is, in each of the spheres, of creation, the Trinity, the In-

carnation, and grace, on which Dr Mascall touches, we can perhaps find a law whose working will be displayed when each doctrine is correctly formulated. All the same, it is doubtful whether the law here suggested is applicable at every point in Christian doctrine: it was, after all, the extremist Athanasius, not the mediating homoiousians, who was right about the relation of Christ to the Father, and whether or not Luther was wise to speak of *sola fide*, there is no median position between the conviction that we are saved by God alone, and the sub-Christian view that we contribute something to our own salvation.

But of course it is not yet possible to take it for granted that we know what Catholic truth is; in the sphere of grace, and of the doctrine of the Church, the matter is still in dispute, and what we need is not a law which is at work in our own convictions, but a criterion which we can all accept, by which we can criticise and correct the formulations that are in dispute. This Dr Mascall can hardly be said to have provided. Here is the source of the disappointment one feels with his book, excellent as it is in so many ways. It would hardly be possible for Dr Mascall to write a book that was not worth reading, whatever its defects; here his characteristic lucidity is displayed at very many points, and it would be good to see more ecumenical debate on some of the things he says about creation, and indeed about 'deified creaturehood', a topic on which the Reformed in their turn are apt to fall back on not very clearly defended intuition.

Why then has this exceedingly capable theologian failed to write the book implicit in his title and theme? It is difficult to resist the conclusion, to which, indeed, some of his more important works also lend credence, that Dr Mascall's theology is in a sense provincial. While he readily goes beyond Anglican boundaries in the Catholic direction, and thus greatly enriches his thought and understanding, he cannot bring himself to believe that Reformed theology is really worthy of his study. In spite of certain self-exculpatory footnotes in the present work, he nowhere shows that he has entered into the great dialogue on the fundamental issues of Christian doctrine which is gathering strength in the Faith and Order movement, and seems likely to lead to a major breakthrough on the issues that have divided Catholics and Protestants. In this dialogue, for which the ecumenical movement provides the locus, not only can Catholics and Protestants learn from each other, but they can start from a common faith in Christ as God and man, and think together about the implications of this common Christian faith for every doctrine.

In such discussions, and in the less formal ones in which Romans

also join, there are signs that the criterion for which we seek in vain in Dr Mascall's book may be emerging, and we owe it as much to the Reformed as to the Romans that this is so. It is in Christology *par excellence* that the proposition holds good that the truth lies between the opposing errors. Only if what the Reformed have taught us to call the christological analogy holds throughout the doctrines that depend upon the Incarnation can the notion of *via media* be given the scientific justification it requires, if it is to serve as a principle of correction and therefore of unification. At this time of day, it is no longer possible to discuss the *via media* acceptably without taking into account the far-reaching work that has been done by Barth and others along these lines. But to enter that discussion would mean placing our own formulations of Christian doctrine under the mutual 'correction in Christ' which the ecumenical dialogue envisages. Can Dr Mascall learn to do this, and so liberate his theology for greatly enhanced usefulness to the Church, or will his immense gifts be confined to what is in the end a domestic discussion among Anglicans? WILLIAM NICHOLLS

St. Francis de Sales: Selected Letters. Translated with an Introduction by ELIZABETH STOPP. Faber and Faber, London, 1960. Pp. 318. 25s.

The Way of the Ascetics. By TITO COLLIANDER, translated by KATHERINE FERRÉ and edited by R. M. FRENCH. Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1960. Pp. 123. 9s. 6d.

IN one of his letters St. Francis advises his correspondent to read the seventh chapter of his *Treatise on the Love of God* to discover the saint's teaching on prayer. The chapter referred to is indeed worth close study by anyone bent upon learning mystic communion with God, but the Letters themselves are far more valuable to the ordinary Christian desirous of knowing more about the practice of the Presence of God. For in his letters, as in his popular *Introduction to the Devout Life*, St. Francis is seen to be the kindly practical teacher who has a deep understanding of the obstacles which human nature puts in the way of a life of prayer. He has many wise things to say about the length of prayers and meditations; on spiritual and bodily discipline also; and on the temptations that assail the devout. Above all St. Francis wishes to avoid making devotion a painful burden. Thus, to Madame de la Fléchère, a woman of deep faith, he writes, '. . . do not be in the least anxious about keeping yourself to any sort of spiritual exercise, except in a most gentle way. If you get tired of kneeling, sit down; if you have not sufficient concentration to pray for half an hour, then make it a quarter of an hour or even half of that.' On the other hand this spiritual director

can be austere when he likes. To another confidant he writes, 'Never argue with the enemy or give him any quarter whatsoever, when he suggests things to you which are against faith. No, not a single word is to be said in answer, unless the words of our Lord, "Get thee behind me, Satan." ' And to Baronne de Chantal he even prescribes 'fifty or sixty strokes of the discipline, or else thirty, as you feel', adding, 'It is amazing how effective this recipe has proved for someone I know.' So important is it in St. Francis' estimation that nothing should come in the way of man's communion with God.

The letters moreover are a treasure house of memorable sayings both on prayer and on other aspects of the spiritual life. Once read, who can forget Francis' encouragement to the life of devotion in his letter 'To the Presidente Brulart': 'Ordinarily good people walk in God's ways, but the devout run, and the really devout run swiftly'; or his calm counsel to another who was obsessed by the fear of temptation: 'No, no, dear daughter, let the wind blow freely, and don't mistake the rustling of leaves for the clash of armour'; or his wise reminder to one whose resolution wavered: 'What else are you looking for on earth except God? And him you have'? And that Francis' wisdom was not confined to letters written to devout women is amply proved by his letter to the president of the Parliament of Burgundy, President Benigne Fremyot, one of the best letters in the series, and so well calculated to touch the soul of a successful man of the world with its frequent hint of 'dust and ashes'. 'Those who get their armour ready before the alarm sounds are always better prepared than people who rush round collecting their breastplate, thigh pieces and helmet when the alert has actually been given.'

Fascinating too and characteristic of the saint are his metaphors from Nature. The pigeons feeding on corn scattered on the snow, a 'tableau of virtue'; the halcyons whose nests floating on the water unharmed resemble hearts so compact through faith that waves of sorrow beat against them in vain; the mistletoe which grows unbidden on a tree, as imperfections appear involuntarily in natures dedicated to God—these are typical instances of St. Francis' literary skill and charm.

A strong resemblance may be found between these letters and the letters of Fénelon. Both the Bishop of Geneva and the Archbishop of Cambray were wise and patient counsellors and both kept faith alive and strong in the hearts of many correspondents. Both have keen insight into the intricacies of the human heart and a deep understanding of the power available in the appointed means of grace. Another comparison is perhaps inevitable, namely between

this Selection and earlier selections of St. Francis' letters, such as the earliest English translation, published in 1871. By omitting some of the best-known letters in this older selection, notably the lengthy and valuable letter on Preaching, and substituting others the translator has considerably widened the English readers' knowledge of St. Francis as a letter writer. Praise is due also for the useful Index of Correspondents, and especially for the biography of St. Francis contained in the Introduction. Clearly his was a life of complete self-abnegation and of unremitting toil, 'serving God with rosary and pen', first as a painstaking student, and then as bishop of one of the most exacting dioceses in the Church. 'Perhaps no bishop for a hundred miles round has to cope with such a tangled mass of affairs', he wrote himself. Gentle to others, he was yet very severe upon himself, sparing himself in nothing. Little wonder Francis died, worn out, at the age of fifty-five.

There is certainly no want of austerity in the book on Asceticism by Tito Colliander. 'Perhaps the book may seem rather frightening to some of us ordinary and everyday Christians', writes R. M. French in the Introduction. In parts however it is not so much frightening as just trivial, especially in its time-worn counsel to those who would practise daily self-denial. 'If you have the urge to drink two cups of coffee, drink only one. If you have the urge to look at the clock, don't look. If you wish to smoke a cigarette, refrain. If you want to go visiting, stay at home.' And he asks how a person can possibly benefit who denies himself in one thing, only to indulge himself in another. 'If you deny your urge to prattle, but read exciting novels. Or if you stop reading novels and let loose your imagination and quiver in sweet melancholy'—whatever that alternative may mean! Most extreme of all is his gratuitous advice to our excellent Marthas. 'Refrain from busying yourself therefore with charity bazaars, sewing meetings and other such occupations. Busyness over many things is in all its forms chiefly a poison.'

The obvious extravagances of this book appear less offensive nevertheless when read in their context. As a prefatory note points out, the work is based on the holy Fathers of the Orthodox Church, and their sayings scattered throughout the book show us where the preacher found his text. If his application to everyday life seems far fetched and needlessly severe, yet it is his main concern —the ascetic way of the holy Cross—that prompts his application. So needful is it that the Christian have complete integration of body and mind; the bodily members made willing servants to the will of God. The chapters on Prayer bring out the value of the Fathers' doctrine; fasting on the one hand being recommended because of

its aid to meditation, and, on the other hand, the use of material things such as the holy icons, candles and incense, holy water and the gleam of gold, and singing: integration of body and mind, of the world of material things and the sacramental spirit being all important. The chapter on Zacchaeus, which calls for whole-hearted love of Christ, and the closing chapter on 'The Pearl of Great Price', best understood by making use of the 'Manual of Eastern Orthodox Prayers', reach the high-water mark of spiritual wisdom, and reveal the power inherent in this great and ancient Church.

C. R. WALKER

The Divine Liturgy of the Russian Orthodox Church. By N. V. GOGOL. Darton, Longman and Todd, Longman, London, 1960. Pp. 67. 6s. 6d.

GOGOL is perhaps best known as the writer of *Dead Souls*, but he also wrote short stories and plays. His influence upon Russian literature was very great and it has been said that 'without him such masters as Tolstoy and Dostoyevsky could not have followed'. The present work was first published in 1851, five years after the death of this short-lived genius who was born in 1809. His aim was to put into words the deep inner meaning of the liturgy and to instil into the people a more genuinely religious life. It is a great service that the translator, Rosemary Edmonds, has done to English readers in making this classic available to them. Her translation reads very well, while her short preface and the foreword by Dr A. P. Shepherd make clear the point of view from which the book should be read.

This is really a mystical description of the Russian liturgy. The ritual and the ceremony are fully described and each part is explained as symbolical teaching. The details may seem confusing at first, but anyone who is interested in forms and problems of public worship will find this exposition most helpful. It is important that the separated branches of the Church should grow in mutual understanding, and the best way is through a better knowledge of and sympathy with the different forms of worship. This book should therefore prove of great value in this connexion, and one may hope that many readers will find through it illumination and spiritual uplift.

JOHN A. LAMB

Meister Eckhart, Selected Treatises and Sermons translated from Latin and German with an introduction and notes by Professor JAMES M. CLARK and JOHN V. SKINNER. Faber and Faber, London, 1958. Pp. 267. 21s.

THE late Professor E. Allison Peers started the series 'Classics of the Christian Life' which has given us in assimilable form some of

the best of van Ruysbroek, Walter Hilton, Henry Suso, Richard of Saint Victor and others in the same high company. Now a useful volume by the late Professor of German in Glasgow University and the Rector of Aberdeen Grammar School has been added. The publishers claim that 'the purpose of this book is to provide a representative selection from the Latin sermons and commentaries, together with the three genuine German treatises and two highly characteristic German sermons, with a bare minimum of explanatory matter', and that is what they do. I think we can also say that the editors make good their claim to cover the main features of Eckhart's thought as a mystic and a philosopher. The selection ranges from the simple and experimental 'Talks of Instruction' to the more obscure and technical 'Book of Divine Consolation'. I am glad that they have not omitted the 'Sermon for St. Dominic's Day' and the essays, 'The Nobleman' and 'On Detachment'. The translation from Latin treatises include something on the book of Exodus and the Prologue to the Fourth Gospel.

I must say that every time I return to Eckhart I am amazed that some students have even considered him as a kind of Reformer before the Reformation. It is quite incredible. Indeed one is bound to feel that such ideas have been fostered by the mere report of his undoubted conviction for heresy and the peculiar chance that made him a Thuringian like his great reforming fellow-countryman who was to rise some two centuries later. But they would not have recognised each other!

'The poor man is not he who wants to do the will of God but he who lives in such a way as to be free of his own will and from the will of God, even as he was when he was not.' This idea that virtue can be attained only by the disappearance of the individual's will is not Christian. It has its roots in Plotinus. 'Thou must be pure in heart; and only that heart is pure which has exterminated creaturehood.'

Ernst Cassirer was surely right when he argued that there is a strong connexion between Meister Eckhart and Nicholas of Cusa through the 'Brethren of the Common Life' and Jan Ruysbroek. Thus despite all that Maritain and Gilson urge, there is all the difference in the world between the Protestant concept of the individual's responsibility before God and the autonomous self of the Renaissance. Behind the latter lies the medieval mystical idea of the unbounded potentialities of the human spirit. There is no more persistent exponent of it than the great Dominican. 'The just soul is like to God, by the side of God, on a level with God, not under nor yet over.' 'The Father is begetting His Son unceasingly and furthermore I say He begets Me His Son, His very own Son.'

Reading these essays reminded me again of one of my unsolved missionary problems. In the great thirteenth century it was the Franciscans who had the most powerful and direct influence on vernacular literature. Their popular apostles were the best minstrels. From the *Canticle of Brother Son* by the Poverello himself right down to the *Laudi* of Fra Jacopone of Todi you have plenty proof of this. But in the fourteenth century it was the Dominicans who inspired the greatest movements of European mysticisms and spiritual songs—Tauler, Suso, Giseler, Margaret and Christina Ebner and the Sisters of Unterlinden, Toss and Engeltal. A most remarkable reversal.

KENNETH MACKENZIE

BOOKS RECEIVED

D. G. Barnhouse: *The Cross through the Open Tomb.* W. B. Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, Michigan. Pp. 152. $3.00.

André Benoit: *Saint Irénée.* Introduction à l'Étude de sa Théologie. Presses Universitaires de France. Pp. 275. N.F.14.

Bott, Marot, Congar, etc.: *Le Concile et les conciles. Contributions à l'histoire de la vie conciliaire de l'église.* Editions Chevetogne, et Editions du Cerf. Pp. 348.

Louis Bouyer: *The Meaning of Sacred Scripture.* Darton, Longman and Todd. Pp. 259. 35s.

Heinrich Suso Braun: *Jesus als Mensch.* Verlag Ars Sacra, München. Pp. 56. Art-cover. DM. 5.20.

F. F. Bruce: *The English Bible.* A History of the Translations from the earliest English Versions to the New English Bible. Lutterworth Press. Pp. 234. 25s.

Emil Brunner: *Dogmatik III. Die Lehre von der Kirche, vom Glauben und von der Kirche.* Zwingli Verlag, Zürich. Pp. 503. Sw.Fr. 37.50.

John Calvin: *Institutes of the Christian Religion.* Two vols. Translated by Ford Lewis Battles, edited by John T. McNeill. Library of Christian Classics, Vols. XX and XXI. Westminster Press, Philadelphia. $12.50 (two vols.). S.C.M. Press. £6 6s. (two vols.).

Edward John Carnell: *The Kingdom of Love and the Pride of Life.* W. B. Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, Michigan. Pp. 164. $3.50.

Philip Carrington: *According to Mark.* A Running Commentary on the Oldest Gospel. C.U.P. Pp. 384. 50s.

Francis Clark: *Eucharistic Sacrifice and the Reformation.* Darton, Longman and Todd. Pp. 582. 50s.

Charles Cleal: *The Selection and Training of Mixed Choirs in Churches.* Independent Press. Pp. 132. 9s. 6d.

The Communication of the Gospel in New Testament Times. Some recent studies by Farrer, Evans, Emerton, Beare, Markus, Dillistone. S.P.C.K. Pp. 93. 8s. 6d. (paper-back).

C. E. B. Cranfield: *I and II Peter and Jude.* The Torch Bible Commentaries. S.C.M. Press. Pp. 192. 12s. 6d.

F. L. Cross: *Early Christian Fathers.* Duckworth and Co. Ltd. Pp. 209. 15s.

Oscar Cullmann: *Petrus. Junger-Apostel-Martyrer.* 2. umgearbeitete und ergänzte Auflage. Zwingli Verlag, Zürich. Pp. 287.

Oscar Cullmann and Otto Karrer: *Einheit in Christus.* Evangelische und Katholische Bekenntnisse. Zwingli Verlag, Zürich. Pp. 171. Sw.Fr. 9.80.

P. T. Forsyth: *Christ on Parnasus.* Independent Press. Pp. 297. 17s. 6d.

John Foster: *To All Nations.* World Christian Books, No. 35. Lutterworth Press. Pp. 87. 2s. 6d.

P. T. Fuhrmann: *An Introduction to the Great Creeds of the Church.* The Westminster Press, Philadelphia. Pp. 144. $3.00.

J. Gadier: *The Man God Mastered. A Brief Biography of John Calvin.* Tr. from the French by O. R. Johnson. I.V.F. Pp. 187. 8s. 6d. (paper-back).

Kurt Galling (editor): *Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart,* 3rd. edn. Vol. IV. Kop.-O. J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Tübingen. Pp. 1755.

J. Stanley Glen: *The Recovery of the Teaching Ministry.* The Westminster Press, Philadelphia. Pp. 125. $2.75.

A. L. Griffith: *God and His People. The Renewal of the Church.* Lutterworth Press. Pp. 84. 5s. (paper-back).

A. L. Griffith: *The Roman Letter Today.* Lutterworth Press. Pp. 77. 5s. (paper-back).

A. G. Hebert: *Liturgy and Society.* The Function of the Church in the Modern World. Faber and Faber. Pp. 267. 8s. 6d. (paper-back).

T. Hewitt: *The Epistle to the Hebrews. An Introduction and Commentary.* Tyndale Press. Pp. 217. 9s. 6d.

Douglas Johnson: *The Christian and His Bible.* I.V.F. Pp. 158. 4s. (paper-back).

S. E. Johnson: *The Gospel According to St. Mark.* A. and C. Black. Pp. 283. 25s.

Else Kähler: *Die Frau in den paulinischen Briefen.* Gotthelf Verlag, Zürich. Pp. 311. DM. 18 (paper-back).

Otto Karrer: *Nachfolge Christi*—übersetzt u. eingeleitet von O. K. Verlag Ars Sacra, München. Pp. 320. Art-leather. DM. 8.50.

G. D. Kaufman: *Relativism, Knowledge and Faith.* University of Chicago Press. Pp. 141.

S. Kistemaker: *The Psalm Citations in the Epistle to the Hebrews.* W. G. van Soest. N.V., Amsterdam. Pp. 167.

Hendrik Kraemer: *World Cultures and World Religions.* Lutterworth Press. Pp. 386. 35s.

Ian G. Lindsay: *The Scottish Parish Kirk.* The Saint Andrew Press. 15 illustrations. Pp. 94. 16s.

E. A. Litton: *Introduction to Dogmatic Theology.* Edited with an Introduction by P. E. Hughes. James Clarke. Pp. 608. 27s. 6d.

Martin Lloyd-Jones: *Studies in the Sermon on the Mount,* vol. 2. I.V.F. Pp. 337. 15s.

Marcus L. Loan: *Makers of Religious Freedom. Henderson, Rutherford, Bunyan, Baxter.* I.V.F. Pp. 231. 4s. 6d. (paper-back).

J. A. Mackay: *The Presbyterian Way of Life.* Prentice Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N.J. Pp. 238. $3.50.

Bernard Martin: *The Ministry of Healing in the Church.* Lutterworth Press. Pp. 125. 16s.

Paul S. Minear: *Images of the Church in the NT.* Westminster Press, Philadelphia. Pp. 294. $6.00.

Pierre Montet: *Das Alte Egypten und die Bibel.* EVZ-Verlag, Zürich. Pp. 227. Sw.Fr. 17.60.

Colin Morris: *Out of Africa's Crucible.* Preaching for Today. Lutterworth Press. Pp. 128. 7s. 6d.

Stephen Neill: *What is Man?* World Christian Books, No. 36. Lutterworth Press. Pp. 79. 2s. 6d.

Konrad Onasch: *Dostojewski-Biographie.* Materialsammlung zur Beschäftigung mit religiösen und theologischen Fragen in der Dichtung F. M. Dostojewskis. EVZ-Verlag, Zürich. Pp. 147.

H. Ott: *Die Frage nach dem historischen Jesus und die Ontologie der Geschichte.* Theol. Studien 62. EVZ-Verlag, Zürich. Pp. 34. Sw.Fr. 2.80.

E. Padwick. *Muslim Devotions. A Study of Prayer-Manuals in Common Use.* S.P.C.K. Pp. 313. 35s.

Elena Quarelli: *Socrates and the Animals.* Tr. from the Italian by Kathleen Speight. Hodder and Stoughton. Pp. 160. 12s. 6d.

A. M. Ramsey: *From Gore to Temple.* Longman, Green and Co. Ltd. 18s. 6d.

E. H. Robertson: *The Bible in Our Time. The Recovery of Confidence.* The Association Press, New York. Pp. 63. $1.00 (paper-back).

Helen M. Ross: *Journeys into Prayer.* George Philip and Son Ltd. Pp. 62. 3s. 6d.

St. Augustine on the Psalms: Translated and Edited. Ancient Christian Writers, vol. XXIX. Longman, Green and Co. Ltd. Pp. 354. 35s.

E. Schweizer: *The Spirit of God*. A. and C. Black. Pp. 119. 15s.

G. Scott-Moncrieff: *The Mirror and the Cross*. Scotland and the Catholic Faith. Burns Oates. Pp. 168. 18s.

E. M. Sidebottom: *The Christ of the Fourth Gospel*. S.P.C.K. Pp. 260. 27s. 6d.

J. D. Smart: *Servants of the Word*. The Westminster Press, Philadelphia. Pp. 95. $1.50.

H. N. V. Temperley: *A Scientist who believes in God*. Hodder and Stoughton. Pp. 171. 15s.

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Pierre Valloton: *Le Christ et La Foi*. Labor et Fides, Geneva. Pp. 171.

C. R. Walker: *The Minister's Devotions*. The Saint Andrew Press. 1961. Pp. 128. 20s.

D. S. Wallace-Hadrill: *Eusebius of Caesarea*. A. R. Mowbray. Pp. 224. 35s.

Robert R. Williams: *A Guide to the Teaching of the Early Fathers*. W. B. Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, Michigan. $4.00.

R. McL. Wilson: *Studies in the Gospel of Thomas*. A. R. Mowbray. Pp. 160. 21s.

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